



Istituto di Ricerche sulla Popolazione
e le Politiche Sociali - CNR

Monografie

N. 12, 2002



Contributions to international migration studies

edited by
Corrado Bonifazi
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Contribution to international migration studies / edited by Corrado Bonifazi,
Giuseppe Gesano. - Roma: IRPPS, 2002. (*IRPPS Monografie*)

ISBN: 978-88-90643-91-0 (online)

IRPPS Editoria Elettronica: <http://www.irpps.cnr.it/e-pub/ojs/>

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PREFACE

The study of the various aspects of international migration has been one of the main activities of the Institute for Population Research since its foundation. In this field, research has been done on the underlying trends, the causes and the main effects of the dynamics of international migration and some specific situations have been analysed, with special reference to Italy.

This present volume brings together four recent studies analysing international migration from different points of view and presents a picture of current trends. The first study, by Corrado Bonifazi, concentrates on the theoretical implications of the study of migration, identifying the proposals and contributions that are best suited to understanding the situation in Italy. The second contribution, by Corrado Bonifazi and Salvatore Strozza, gives a general overview of the development of migration in Europe over the last fifty years. The third study, by Caterina Gallina and Giuseppe Gesano, analyses the causes of migration in the Mediterranean scenario, highlighting the factors that have contributed - and will contribute - most to the dynamics of international migration. The fourth work, by Giuseppe Gesano, analyses the economic motivations and the plans of recent Ghanians and Egyptian migrants in Italy, using the result of a research on the causes of migration supported by Eurostat and coordinated by NIDI. The second and third contributions were prepared as part of the research carried out at the University of Rome La Sapienza on movements of people and capital in Europe, a project coordinated by Nicola Acocella and Eugenio Sonnino.

Corrado Bonifazi and Giuseppe Gesano

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION THEORIES
AND MIGRATORY PROCESS: BASIC REFLECTIONS FOR THE ITALIAN CASE

Corrado Bonifazi

1. Introduction

Over the past twenty years, international migration has been characterised by profound changes, together with the transformation of our society which, according to many researchers, has entered into a new stage of evolution defined as post-industrial, post-Fordist or “Toyota-type”. Likewise, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the two-power equilibrium sanctioned by the Yalta Conference finally ended, to be replaced by a “new world order” which is still in the process of being created and defined [Gould and Findlay, 1994]. The basic trends of this period can be found [Castles and Miller, 1993] in the following factors: changes in investment strategies, with increasing capital exports from developed countries and the creation of manufacturing industries in previously under-developed areas; the microelectronics revolution, which has reduced the demand for manual labour in industry; the decline of the traditional, qualified manual occupations in the developed countries; the expansion of the services sector, with demand focused on jobs with high- and low-level qualification; in the growth of “black” sectors in developed economies; greater job insecurity with the increase in part-time employment and less security in working conditions; the increasing differentiation of the labour force in accordance with gender, age and ethnicity.

All of these factors have led to the substantial revision of the geography of international migration and a profound change in the push and pull factors [Pugliese, 1995]. New destinations have been added to the traditional ones, new areas of emigration have arisen and sometimes replaced the previous ones in the context of economic globalisation which has led to a *de facto* reduction in distances and increasing links between different geographical areas. The changes have been triggered by an increase in the push factors in the Third World countries, i.e. the

economic, political and demographic crisis which has struck much of the developing world, leading to a rise in emigration supply. At the same time, the function of immigrant labour has also changed in the receiving countries. It no longer has the role of re-balancing labour markets from a quantitative point of view to respond to greater demand for labour, but rather from the qualitative point of view to fill in gaps which occur in specific areas despite a situation which is far from enjoying full employment. One might wonder, however whether and to what extent this mechanism - which has characterised labour mobility over the past twenty years - can last in economic structures increasingly marked by the gap between production increase and employment trends, and given the rise in unemployment due to the microelectronics revolution and the competition of countries with lower labour costs.

Migration is undoubtedly related to changes in social and economic systems. Its interpretation therefore requires the capacity to make a double reading, taking into account the factors involving continuity and standardisation of migratory process together with the focusing on the new and peculiar aspects of each migration flow examined. In any case, unlike the natural sciences, the social sciences must constantly update the basis for interpretation as the phenomena themselves change [Evans and Stephen, 1988]. The different way of studying or interpreting reality does not derive from advances or updating of scientific knowledge; it is rather changes in society which require the use of new instruments and new interpretations. Migration, especially on the international scale, is particularly sensitive to these changes, since it involves links between societies which are very different as well as being distant in the geographical sense, and is affected by facts and changes in sending and receiving societies. On the basis of these considerations, the aim of this paper is to provide a general overview of some recent theoretical developments useful to frame the Italian case. The first part of the work is an attempt to provide an outline of the most promising approaches in research on international migration. The second part will address the specific aspect regarding the potentials for identifying some definite stages in the process of immigrant insertion; these stages can be found in widely differing circumstances, thus showing how when starting from some general common characteristics, national and contingent factors can, at most, enhance or delay the immigration process but not stop it completely. Finally, the conclusions are an attempt to highlight

the role and the characteristics of the Italian case within the international migration trends of these last decades.

2. Migration trends and research approaches

The need to take into account the changing characteristics of migration has been an important factor in focusing research on mobility. Concern has more or less deliberately been focused on those aspects of mobility more linked to the features of flows in a given geographical location, their main characteristics and the political interests involved. In the case of Italy, for example, studies on our own emigration and on internal migration were virtually replaced in the 1980s by studies on foreign immigration, although the first two aspects were still of considerable importance, also from the quantitative point of view. Even when this trend is less obvious, and taking into account that there may be a “fashion effect” or some types of imitative process within the scientific community, even the most critical and innovative research in the social sciences should address social phenomena “as they are” and how they are perceived in that specific historical stage. If we look at trends in European studies on international migration conducted after World War II within a historical perspective [Bortot, 1982], it is perfectly easy to understand why the view of migration as a factor in re-balancing the labour markets prevailed as long as the pull effects prevailed. However, the process of stabilisation of immigrant communities has raised questions as to the relationship within a given labour market between the foreign labour force and the local labour force, and policies to stop immigration have triggered research on return migration.

Another important factor in the assessment of methodological developments is the fragmentation of research in semi-independent areas of literature [Massey, 1990]. The variety of aspects involved in determining migration flows and the range of consequences involved have attracted the attention of virtually all the disciplines of the social sciences as well as arousing the interest of the natural sciences [Degos, 1974; Piazza, 1994; Martuzzi Veronese and Guerresi, 1990]. Starting from the first pioneering studies by Ravenstein [1885 and 1889], there have been a number of studies and analyses conducted from the most diverse points of view, with a variety of approaches and methodologies

to investigate various aspects of migration. The highly specialised nature of research and above all the lack of communication between different disciplines have led to a fragmentation of lines of research which have often followed separate paths, with the results achieved in related fields of study being given little consideration or even wholly ignored [Morawska, 1990]. The debate takes place mainly within specific disciplines, often consisting of a conflict between the different theories and interpretations of migration; the latter have therefore virtually become self-sufficient and all-comprehensive theoretical systems, although this status is far beyond the real explanatory potential of the available paradigms. The result has been a type of debate which is useful for the improvement and development of the various lines of research, but the limitations have prevented this approach from achieving an overall understanding of migration and the formulation of general theoretical principles [Davis, 1988].

The changes which took place in international migration dynamics with the stop policies in second half of the 1970s - fully consolidated in the last decade - have led to a profound revision of methodologies and the attempt to formulate overall approaches to the study of migration [Papademetriou, 1988]. Because of the new characteristics of international migration, the previous grids for interpretation based mainly on the key role of labour-market factors are no longer very useful [Bonifazi and Gesano, 1991]. The globalisation or internationalisation of economic and social processes over the last 25 years has also meant that mobility processes need to be examined in the light of the current changes; tools for analysis and interpretation taking into account the complexity of the phenomenon and the underlying relationships are required.

Recent changes in international migration basically reflect events on the world scene. Globalisation, in particular, is connected with migration, and is occurring by the increasing size of the areas involved in the structure of the international migration system [Salt, 1989] with the inclusion of countries previously excluded from the migration flows (Central Africa, Eastern Europe) and the end of the close relationship between sending and receiving areas which previously modelled international migration on the basis of past colonial links or geographical nearness [Gesano, 1991]. For the rich developed countries of the West, the changes in migration have led to a reduction of the

differences between the migration areas in North America and in Europe. The countries of Southern Europe, formerly characterised by emigration, now host a substantial foreign population, while the traditional distinction between temporary and permanent immigration countries is no longer relevant [Golini and Bonifazi, 1987]. The result is an increasing conflict between supra-national areas with different levels of development, characterised geographically by continental or geographical “fault lines” with divisions between “North” and “South”, “East” and “West”.

Today, international migration flows take place in a highly interdependent global system in which there is no longer a link between economic growth and the rise in employment, and the cultural gap between the population groups involved is much greater than in the past [Chiarello, 1990]. In terms of push and pull factors, this migration occurs in a context in which push factors - demographic, economic, social and political - have increased in the countries of origin, while in the traditional or potential countries of destination the explicit demand for immigrant labour has fallen dramatically [Bonifazi, 1988; Golini, 1988]. This group of factors has led to the diversification of migration, which has adapted to a variety of situations. An emerging feature of migration is the increase in variety of types, together with the fall in the amount of permanent migration and the increase in temporary moves (or at least seemingly so), as well as the feminilisation in some considerable migration streams. Other features include increasingly restrictive immigration policies and greater roles played by government institutions; these factors have led to the growing importance of family reunions, one of the few channels of legal immigration still open, and the rise in the number of refugees and illegal migrants [Salt, 1989].

With regard to an overall assessment of the changes which have occurred in international migration over the past twenty years, the most important feature seems to be the prevalence of the political aspect over all the other elements contributing to the creation of migration dynamics. While generally speaking border controls undertaken by governments define international migration as a specific social process [Zolberg, 1989], the political aspect has never been so important. In nearly all the developed countries, immigration policy, which stems from the balance between the needs and sentiments of different social groups, now plays a role which goes beyond the significance of the

specific problem. In any case, these policies determine the amount and characteristics of immigration which is allowed and thus determine the initial, basic distinction between people migrating legally and those who are illegal and clandestine, with all the differences deriving from this situation. The overall institutional framework has also had a greater impact on migration flows, and the way in which each nation-state develops its own national identity will determine the attitude towards immigration, policy formulation and the formulation of strategies for immigrant integration [Balibar, 1988; Brubaker, 1989; Melotti, 1992]. Finally, it should be recalled that political causes induce hundreds of thousands of people throughout the world to emigrate.

These changes have clearly highlighted the limitations of the traditional approaches. The fact that labour-market factors - especially in the countries of arrival - are no longer so important for the direction and characteristics of flows means that re-thinking is needed with regard to the factors involved in migration. This more complex situation means that there is more emphasis on non-economic factors (demographic, social and political) in determining the flows. Variables which were previously less important now require more attention, such as the social and cultural dynamics of the sending and receiving countries, various types of relationships and above all the information network which in the "global village" are created between areas which may be geographically distant.

The response by the research community has been to start up a complex process of revision in the patterns of interpretation and methodologies, leading to some interesting trends in research. There have been a number of attempts to use new patterns of interpretation designed to deal with the complexity of the problem. In particular, Zolberg [1989, pp. 403-4] has identified four elements which are common to the most interesting new approaches to migration: «(1) they are generally historical, not in the sense of dealing mostly with a more distant past, but rather an appropriate attention to the changing specificities of time and space; (2) they are generally structural rather than individualistic, focusing on the social forces that constrain individual action, with special emphasis on the dynamics of capitalism and of the state; (3) they are generally globalist, in that they see national entities as social formations, as interactive units within an encompassing international social field, permeable to determination by

transnational and international economic and political processes; and (4) they are generally critical, sharing to some degree a commitment to social sciences as a process of demystification and rectification». Zolberg has obviously focused on macro-oriented analysis, which has taken significant steps forward over recent years in the study of migration. Examples include: the analyses of Piore [1979] on the importance of the dualistic structure of the labour market in modern industrialised societies in determining migration flows; the interpretations of international migration on the basis of the “world-system” theory developed by Wallerstein [Portes, 1987; Portes and Böröcz, 1989; Chiarello, 1990]; the interesting attempt by Grasmuck and Pessar [1991] in their study on emigration from the Dominican Republic to the United States to link macrostructural factors with mechanisms of social mediation such as social networks, families and gender relationships. There have also been very interesting developments in the micro-oriented approaches to the study of international migration. We can recall the *new economics of migration*, which has the merit of shifting emphasis from individuals to households in the broad sense, highlighting how migration can also be a factor of risk diversification to be seen in the context of the overall strategies followed by households in their countries of origin [Stark, 1991].

This often diversified range of analyses providing relevant interpretation of migration has shown that it is both useful and necessary to develop a multi-disciplinary approach to the study of migration in order to integrate the results and methodologies of various disciplines; this need is especially evident among researchers on population problems [Fergany, 1989; Federici, 1991]. In particular, some Scientific Committee of the International Union for the Scientific Studies of Population (IUSSP) have adopted this approach, providing over recent years some of the contributions which have been the most interesting from the methodological point of view [Kritz, Lim and Zlotnik, 1992; Massey *et al.* 1993 and 1994]. The aim of these studies, following different guidelines, has not been to identify the best method and theory, but rather to join together various approaches followed up to now, verifying the hypotheses and showing their capacity to interpret the facts, focusing on what and how the various methods explain about international migration, thus creating an overall framework on migration utilising and taking advantage of the various contributions.

This means becoming aware that the study of complex social phenomena cannot be undertaken solely through the use of a single pattern of interpretation, but intrinsically requires various approaches in order to clarify different aspects; if barriers between disciplines are not actually overcome, this may lead to a more explicit and productive interaction.

These lines of research, involving inter-disciplinary verification on theoretical aspects regarding the study of international migration, offer a number of interesting opportunities; since they are more concentrated on migration and the problems of analysis concerning migration than on the background of the various disciplines, they could be an effective way to overcome the obvious limitations on the study of mobility. These limitations above all reflect the over-specialisation in the approach to the problem up to now, and the results, though interesting, are by their very nature partial and sectional [Salt, 1987].

In particular, use has been made of the systems theory¹ and joint analysis of the various approaches towards migration adopted up to now. This has led to the formation of two different but far from incompatible lines of research which seem to outline a theoretical and methodological approach which is suited to the current nature of the migratory process. The initial formulations of a systems approach to the study of migration date back to the early seventies [Mabogunje, 1970] and focused on mobility from rural to urban areas in Africa. More recently, it has been successfully utilised in the study of international migration due to its capacity to highlight the space aspects of migrations and their role in transforming the economic and social structures in sending and receiving countries [Salt, 1987; Fawcett and Arnold, 1987; Boyd, 1989; Fawcett, 1989]. G. Simon [1979] has also started from a space approach to geographical mobility processes; considering the need to develop a global, dynamic approach to migration, he proposed

¹ «For the general Systems Theory, a system is a group of interacting elements where the term 'interaction' means that elements p which compose it are connected by relations r in such a way that the behaviour of an element p in r is different from the way in which it would behave with respect to another relation r'. A system is furthermore formed by parts linked together by interdependence, and a system has a specific property that the whole (system) is more than the sum of its parts, i.e. it has intrinsic properties of synergy and association» [Scandurra 1995, p. 172].

the concept of “*espace migratoire*” understood as the physical space containing not only migration flows but also all the other economic and human relationships connected with them in various ways.

It can be said that «calls for a systems approach tend to follow from a recognition that to capture the changing trends and patterns of contemporary international migration requires a dynamic perspective. Consideration of the causes or impacts of international migration from either a sending- or a receiving-country perspective often fails to convey the dynamics associated with the evolution of the flow, from its origins, through the shifts in its composition and volume as it matures, taking account of the return migration and remittances, and of the policy and structural conditions at origin and destination that shape migration» [Kritz and Zlotnik 1992, p. 2]. The basic factor of this approach applied to the study of mobility is viewing international population moves and migrations in particular as one of the possible links between countries and geographical areas, to be analysed in its interrelations with other types of flows and exchanges (economic, institutional, political, cultural, linguistic, information, etc.) which connect various countries. Migration dynamics are therefore largely determined by the functioning of a variety of networks linking various actors in the migratory process at different levels of aggregation [Kritz and Zlotnik, 1992].

The actual features of individual migration flow can be identified through the workings and interactions of processes and structures operating in the various levels involved in the migration dynamics: individual, household, community, national and international. Migration is, therefore, affected by macro-relationships linking nation-states together and characterising the economic and social situation in the individual countries; it is the expression of community and household ties and on the micro level involves personal cost-benefits analysis made by each potential migrant to decide whether or not to migrate from a given geographical and social context. The features of this social context determine the basic variables and limitations involved in the decision-making process, which is therefore the meeting point of macro and micro factors, between the structural and individual aspects of migration [Massey, 1990].

This is where the results of previous research acquire new vitality, enabling them to be placed within a satisfactory context [Massey *et al.*,

1993 and 1994]. We can start from neo-classical economic theory viewing migration from the macro level as a response to wage differences between labour markets and, on the individual level, as the result of a rational choice made by individuals on the basis of a cost-benefits analysis comparing the initial situation with expectations after migration. Then, there is the *new economics of migration* mentioned above, which shifts attention from individuals to households and considers migration as a strategy for risk diversification through the re-allocation over a given space of the human resources available. In this context, the migration of household members has the function of reducing risks, and is equivalent to the one performed in Western countries by private insurance and social security and the financial market. Mobility, therefore, becomes a form of insurance against poor harvests, the fluctuation of farm-product prices and unemployment; it is a means for capital accumulation, recalling that immigration may be induced not only by an absolute lack of income but rather a relative deprivation compared to the economic conditions of other households in the same community. Then, we come to the macro-structuralist hypotheses connected with theories of the segmentation of the labour market, interpreting migration flows as the result of a specific labour demand produced by modern industrial societies. Finally, there are the hypotheses linked to the theory of the world-system, viewing population flows as the effect of the development of a single world market and the penetration of capitalism on non-capitalistic societies.

Migration networks are an essential element in a dynamic view of the migratory process. These can be defined as «groups of social ties formed on the basis of kinship, friendship and common origin. They link migrants and nonmigrants together in a system of reciprocal obligations and mutual expectations. They develop rapidly because the act of migration itself generates network connections; every new migrant creates a group of friends and relatives with a social tie to someone with valuable migrant experience. Networks bring about the cumulative causation of migration because every new migrant reduces the costs of migration for a group of nonmigrants, thereby inducing some of them to migrate, creating new network ties to the destination area for another group of people, some of whom are also induced to migrate, creating more network ties, and so on. The structural impact of networks acts on the cost side of the cost-benefit calculation to build a

strong dynamic momentum into migration» [Massey 1990, p. 17]. Furthermore, the effect of the other elements contributing to maintaining migration flows over time should not be underestimated. The economic, social and cultural changes which migrations trigger in the sending and receiving areas tend to give migration its internal strength and maintain it over time well beyond the duration of the factors which gave rise to it. The development of ethnic economies in the receiving countries fosters the continuation of flows from the supply side, and the identification of some jobs as being “for immigrants” fosters the demand side, inducing local workers to abandon them. Another aspects which should not be underestimated is the way in which a “migration culture” in the sending countries favours migration, endowing them with meaning as a real social initiation, especially in situations in which migration is a major vehicle for mobility and social promotion.

These various approaches are applicable to different levels of analyses, thus enabling scholars to clarify many of the functional mechanisms of the migratory process. Taking them in an overall view, there could be a basis for a sophisticated theory capable of incorporating various research perspectives, levels and hypotheses, a step which appears indispensable for dealing with migration as a whole [Massey *et al.*, 1993]. A comparative study of empirical research conducted over recent years in the North American migration area indicated how each theory can highlight part of the truth [Massey *et al.*, 1994]. Migrations originate within a process of economic growth and political change in the context of a global market economy, and this process destroys pre-capitalistic economic and social forms, creating a mobile population which attempts to increase its income and diversify its risks. A gap has arisen in the developed countries between the various sectors of the labour market. This is particularly acute in the *global cities* which attract immigrants; once it starts, the flow tends to be self-perpetuating through the migration networks, the formation of ethnic economies and a number of other structural transformations. Finally, the development process tends to reduce migration and transform the emigration countries into immigration countries.

A recent work has tried to develop these new approaches in terms of field research [van der Erf and Heering, 1995; Schoorl *et al.*, 2000; Birindelli *et al.*, 2000]. However, considerable practical and theoretical

difficulties must naturally be overcome [Bilsborrow and Zlotnik, 1995], especially in view of a quantitative approach. The most important result, however, appears to be the possibility of using a sufficiently realistic migration reference framework based on these ideas, also providing support to more specialised and sectional types of analysis. The acquisition of tools of interpretation for dealing with all the aspects and complexity of migration does not mean the abandoning the characteristics of the various disciplines and the sectional approaches to analysis, but rather an enriching of these disciplines in the light of new types of explanation made available by the theory. The undoubtedly partial approach of the analysis of the situation in the receiving country could thus be overcome by placing it in a historical and more general context of the international migration system, going more deeply into its specific aspects and trying to place it in a general reference framework designed to include and define the group of relationships in which the process is operating.

3. The dynamics of the migratory process

We shall now examine more closely migration dynamics after the arrival of the immigrants and how migration as a whole is related to the situation of the receiving country. We have already mentioned how the migratory process is an independent social phenomenon with its own evolutionary dynamics maintaining and perpetuating it over time. In this respect, the results of research conducted in sending countries are highly significant; starting from the initial situation of the migrants, they analyse relationships and interactions between migrants and their original society [Massey and Garcia España, 1987]. However, these factors, which contribute to an evolution of migration flows, are associated with structural, contingent and political factors in the receiving countries and which are decisive for the outcomes of the migration. In other words, the evolution of any single migration flow is the result of complex interaction between internal dynamics and external conditioning leading each immigrant group to adapt to the realities of the specific receiving society. In our case it is particularly useful to obtain a satisfactory theoretical basis for this process, since it can provide a plausible scenario of development by which the current situation can be interpreted, as well as help identify future trends and

the best policy strategies in countries including Italy where immigration is still a recent phenomenon.

The historical experience available has enabled us to identify specific phases of development in immigrant insertion, although immigrants tend to find themselves in a wide variety of situations, thus showing that starting from common features the national and contingent characteristics can at most foster or delay the migratory process but not stop it completely. «Although each migratory movement has its specific historical patterns, it is to generalise on the way migrations evolve, and to find certain internal dynamics in the process» [Castles and Miller 1993, p. 24]. The study is conducted by the Authors on two completely different situations: Australia, a classical example of a permanent immigration country and Germany, a classical example of a temporary immigration country; they identify significant parallel aspects in migration, concluding that «this leads to the conjecture that the dynamics of the migratory process can be powerful enough to override political structures, government policies and subjective intentions of the migrants. This does not mean, however, that these factors are unimportant: [...] settlement and ethnic-group formation have taken place in both cases, but under very different conditions. This has led to differing outcomes, which can be briefly characterised as the formation of ethnic *communities* in the Australian case, as against ethnic *minorities* in Germany» [Castles and Miller 1993, p. 98].

More will be said later on the usefulness of the categories of ethnic communities and minorities proposed by Castles and Miller. We will now recall some of the previous formulations on the stages of the migratory process which may provide a more accurate definition of the dynamics involved. Even before European labour migration changed from temporary to permanent, Böhning [1972] had identified a specific dynamics of flows leading him to define economic migration towards the post-industrial capitalistic societies as a *self-feeding process*. His reference point was European experience after World War II, especially in Germany, where labour migration in that period was interpreted as the outcome of a lack of national labour supply for socially unwanted, low-paid jobs. The mechanism attracting immigrant labour and the simultaneous bottom-up social mobility of local workers occurring in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, was the first element in the process. The second one was based on the characteristics of the migration dynamics

which led to the evolution of the flow in four stages «analytically distinct but historically intertwined in any actual situation» [Böhning 1972, p. 64].

The migratory process was analysed on the basis of the economic attraction factors in the European societies and of the fact that it is a social process with independent trends of development. Interpretation of the latter aspect started with the concept of “migratory chain”, widely used in that period, and which despite its rather intuitive, informal nature was in many respects a precursor of the more recent notion of migration networks, the tool of analysis widely used today. In the first stage of Böhning’s model, the main part of the migration flow consists of young, single and mostly male workers coming from the more industrialised and urbanised areas of the emigration country. Since they come from the more developed areas, the flow in this stage is better vocationally qualified and educated than the population as a whole in the sending country. In the second stage, the age of the migrants rises slightly while the gender composition does not change, though the marital status distribution is closer to that in the original population. The duration of their stay tends to lengthen and turnover falls; the sending area is extended from the major cities to the surrounding areas as the information network is extended. In the third stage, migrants age are differentiated by gender and between working and non-working migrants due to family reunions. The duration of their stay is longer and the turnover falls further. Finally, in the fourth stage the stay lengthens further and family reunions increase, and veritable ethnic communities arise in the receiving countries.

A few years after the apparent stabilisation of immigration in the European countries, also due to unexpected effects of stop policies, the idea that the migratory process involves specific stages was again taken up by Tapinos [1982, p. 340], who says that «the most striking lesson to be drawn from the history of European immigration over the course of the last two decades is probably the fact that migration is a process which entails certain sequences that one must be aware of *from the start*. The entry of foreign workers induced a migration of families whose members - wives and school-age children - in turn entered the labour market». The factor distinguishing the situation in the various European countries is not so much how favourable their policy is towards family reunions, but rather the time delay between the three

stages identified which is involved apart from any other factors. In this case, the process of integration in the receiving-country labour market identifies the stages, while the migration mechanisms in the sending countries are ignored.

The models proposed by Böhning and Tapinos leave some matters regarding their limitations of validity and applicability unsolved. In both cases, attention is focused on Europe and on labour migration, an experience which is extremely limited in terms of geography and time. Castles and Miller [1993] adopt a broader perspective and identify a four-stage model applicable to a wider variety of cases; not only migration from the Mediterranean basin to Western Europe, but also migration to Australia and North America. «A high proportion of these movements was labour migration, followed by family reunion, settlement and community formation. The model also fits the migrations from former colonies to the colonial powers fairly well. It is less appropriate to refugee movement or temporary migrations of highly-skilled personnel. Nonetheless the model has analytical value for these groups too, since both refugee movement and highly-skilled migration are often at the beginning of migratory chains which lead to family reunion and community formation» [Castles and Miller 1993, p. 25].

This extension of the model highlights the importance of internal dynamics in the migratory process which operate in a wide variety of situations, though they also induce us to attempt to identify the factors which the different receiving areas have in common. The immigration-receiving countries in North America, Oceania and Western Europe are all parliamentary democracies where immigrants can acquire civil, social and political rights making it impossible to undertake massive, indiscriminate forms of expulsion once their presence is no longer useful for the receiving country. This feature, despite the considerable differences between various countries, still holds at the present time although even in the Western democracies the legal and legitimate status of immigrants is undergoing increasing restrictions and conditioning. In all the situations, when migration-flow target countries which ensure immigrants legal status preventing forced expulsion and obvious forms of evident discrimination, the migratory process can develop according to its own internal dynamics and lead to the settling-up of stable communities in the receiving countries. This has not occurred where authoritarian regimes have conducted mass expulsions

or particularly serious forms of discrimination. Unfortunately, there are many recent examples of this in the history of international migration: the expulsion of Asian minorities from some countries in East Africa after independence, of Jews from the Arab states after the birth of Israel, of foreign workers from Nigeria and the most recent episode of the Palestinian workers expelled from the Gulf states after the Gulf war.

Apart from this basic political and institutional framework, there is another important political aspect on the evolution of migration flows, highlighted by Castles and Miller [1993] as recalled above. The model proposed by the two Authors involves four stages. The first one consists of temporary labour immigration, formed by young workers still closely linked with their sending countries; the second one involves longer stays and the development of a social network based on family ties or home links, and forms of solidarity in the new environment; the third one entails an increase in family reunions, stronger links with the immigration country and the formation of ethnic communities. The fourth one involves «permanent settlement which, depending on the policies of the government and the behaviour of the population of the receiving country, leads either to secure legal status and eventual citizenship, or to political exclusion, socio-economic marginalisation and the formation of permanent ethnic minorities» [Castles and Miller 1993, p. 25].

Besides the different arrangement and explanation of the stages as compared to previous models of migration, the importance of this new proposal lies in the fact that it provides for different final outcomes of migration, making reference to real experience and highlighting the importance for immigration of the attitude of the receiving society as a whole. Therefore, «at one extreme, openness to settlement, granting of citizenship and gradual acceptance of cultural diversity may allow the formation of ethnic communities, which can be seen as part of a multi-cultural society. At the other extreme, denial of the reality of settlement, refusal of citizenship and rights to settlers, and rejection of cultural diversity may lead to the formation of ethnic minorities, whose presence is widely regarded as undesirable and divisive. In the first case, immigrants and their descendants are seen as an integral part of a society which is willing to reshape its culture and identity. In the second, immigrants are excluded and marginalised, so that they live on the fringes of a society which is determined to preserve myths of a static

culture and homogeneous identity» [Castles and Miller 1993, p. 26].

These different models of the migratory process - especially the one just discussed, which seems to be the most complete - enable us to define some important features of migration which can be taken as reference points for the Italian situation. First of all, there is the substantially structural characteristics of migration. Beyond the possible changes and details of the dynamics of each flow which can differ from the theoretical postulates, we should be aware that significant levels of immigration tend to give rise to a stable, permanent community in the receiving country, unless violations of democracy lead to a loss of rights acquired by legal immigrants. Secondly, we should consider the importance of the receiving society in shaping the outcomes of immigration. Ensuring that immigrants become an active and interactive part of society which is enriched by the multi-cultural exchange and conflict, and not just a marginal minority excluded from a closed society depends on the various levels of integration procedures which that society is capable of undertaking. This not only leads to a significant change in the position and role of immigrants but is also a decisive element in the characteristics and framework of society as a whole.

4. Conclusions

Stated that the migratory process tends to follow an evolutionary trend, the main features of which can be identified, the nature of the specific context involved plays an important role in enhancing or delaying the development of the various stages and their characteristics. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the models proposed after what has been defined as the *golden period* of European labour migration especially focused on pull factors prevailing at that time. On the other hand, the more recent models of Castles and Miller pay much more attention to internal dynamics within the migratory process. The new scenario, since the early 1980s, has involved a drastic change in the internal equilibrium of migration, with push factors outweighing pull factors. In this stage, in the dynamic relationship between individual behaviour, household strategies, community structures and national economic policies, determining the process of cumulative causation of migrations [Massey, 1990], the factors in the sending societies and the development mechanisms of migration networks have priority.

While much remains to be done to achieve an accurate, agreed definition of the characteristics of post-Fordist production or “flexible specialisation” as they have been defined [Fielding, 1993] and of the identification of their effects on international migration, one thing seems clear: «post-Fordist production systems seem to be inimical to 'mass' consumption. [...] *thus the most important feature* of mass migration under post-Fordist forms of production organisation is its absence!» [Fielding 1993, p. 14]. However, the disappearance of mass migration, or rather of the structural elements in the developed economies capable of triggering major flows of manpower towards industrial areas, certainly does not mean the end of international migration. First of all, because post-Fordist production structures, though on a different scale and on a more local level, still tend to need immigrant manpower; secondly, because the inducements to emigration seem to have grown over the past fifteen years.

The result is a migratory process characterised by dynamics of self-perpetuation and self-development within the immigrant communities, the success of which depends on the capacity of immigrants to identify sectors for insertion within the receiving societies to create, in often hostile environments, a place for themselves and achieving the legal recognition of their presence which is the basic condition for the outcome of the migration plan. While the immigration flows in the 1950s and 1960s could count on a basically favourable context since their arrival was a response to an explicit demand in the receiving countries, often based on bilateral agreements and with favourable or at least tolerant regulations, the situation of today's immigrants seems to be radically different. We, therefore, have the fragmentation of the sending areas, the diversification of the migration paths and migratory strategies as well as the development of new forms of mobility. While over recent years the production structures in industrialised countries have aimed at various forms of “specialised flexibility”, international migrations have likewise adapted themselves. The migrants have adopted strategies based on flexibility and adaptability, often succeeding in avoiding increasingly serious restrictions which the rich Western countries have placed on them.

The various elements characterising the situation in the immigration countries are of prime importance in determining the forms of the migration. An interpretation of the dynamics of the migratory process

based on the changes which have occurred in the receiving countries enables us to add further interesting elements to our analysis. In this respect, we can cite White [1993] who identifies three main types of flows in post-war Europe: labour migration, family reunions and post-industrial movements. The latter partly reflect «the changing nature of European economics and societies away from an industrial base towards a more varied economic structure in which the significance of industrial and manufacturing employment is generally diminishing, coupled with other changes tending towards a greater polarisation of social structures» [White 1993, p. 50]. The main aspects of this new type of migration have been identified by White as movements of highly qualified personnel, illegal migration and refugee movements.

In practice these types of flow may also co-exist, arising at the same time in different real situations; what the characteristics of the specific local features determine is how successful any one of these movements will be. If we are able to identify the evolutionary trend of the migratory process and their relationship with the overall situation in the receiving country, we can also obtain a sufficiently clear idea on immigration in Italy. Immigration started in Italy at the end of the 1970s, and is therefore fully within the post-industrial stage which characterises it. This involves a wide gap between a type of immigration covering medium-to-high level jobs on the labour market, generally legal and originating in developed countries, and immigration on the lower end of the employment scale, often irregular and illegal as well as coming from the Third World or Eastern Europe. There is likewise a significant number of politically-motivated immigrants, although Italian legislation and administrative procedures have been reluctant to recognise refugee status. Together with these categories there are also more “traditional” flows. There is undoubtedly labour migration, no longer focused exclusively on the demand from the industrial sector but rather resulting from personnel shortages in specific sectors such as maids. There is also a flow for family reunions. The dynamics of the migratory process and the changes in the context involved therefore interact in the real world, resulting in a highly complex situation and confirming the need for a number of different interpretations and readings.

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INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN EUROPE IN THE LAST FIFTY YEARS*

Corrado Bonifazi and Salvatore Strozza

1. Definition and measurement of international migration in the European scenario

Statisticians and demographers usually demonstrate the good and consolidated habit of starting their own personal research and reflections with an extremely careful examination of the validity of the data used and the reliability and accuracy of the statistical sources and of the data collection systems in measuring the phenomenon being studied. The authors of this work are in full agreement with this, not only because we want to adhere to a scientific practice with which we agree and that we have always tried to adopt, but also because in this particular case if we do not consider these aspects, the results could be difficult to understand and to read even for specialists in the field and we would run the risk of causing serious misunderstandings. Indeed, it is a well known fact that, amongst demographic arguments, the subject of the territorial mobility of the population presents its own particular problems of conceptualisation, definition and measurement, reflecting the complex nature of the migration process. It should be recalled that this process is a social dynamic connecting different geographical areas, involving more than one contextual level: individual, family, community, regional, national and international. At each of these levels there are specific and important causes and consequences of a demographic, economic, social, political, psychological, and environmental nature.

As de Gans [1994, p. 29] recently noted: «in the study of migration the identification of migration can only be made within the

* The authors would like to thank Cinzia Conti, Caterina Gallina and Fabiola Schiavella who helped with the data collection and preparation of the figures and tables. The two authors worked together, with Corrado Bonifazi editing chapters 1 and 4 and Salvatore Strozza editing chapters 2 and 3. The conclusions were written jointly. The quoted text published in Italian have been translated in English.

framework of a specific concept. The problems of conceptualization should be distinguished carefully from measurement problems, because of the interdependency of identification and measurements. As Willekens puts it: 'Migration is a fuzzy concept with many definitional problems' (Willekens, 1984: 2-3)». The scope and objectives of our work suggest we should adopt as pragmatic an attitude as possible in addressing these problems. Looking at the three aspects we have just identified, we need to overturn, at least in part, the logical and consequential approach and so we shall start by examining the definitions used, then we will deal with methods of measurement before finally considering the conceptualisation of the migration process on which the data collection systems of various countries are based. For obvious reasons of balance and the content of our research, our choice has clearly been influenced by the need to consider the question in the space of few pages, even if it would merit better levels of detail and attention but we also wanted to make a more general evaluation of the nature of the decision-making processes that lead to the identification and implementation of international migration data collection systems.

In fact, even if it is by no means obvious, these systems have a precise political dimension and are one of the final outcomes of the complex processes of conceptualisation and elaboration of the meaning and role that each nation ascribes to immigration [Bonifazi 1998]. As a result, there tends to be a preponderance of administrative sources not only, obviously, for economic reasons but also for the greater possibilities these sources provide for following the different categories identified in the migration policies and then for measuring the effectiveness of any provisions made. We are also facing a limited degree of stability in statistical sources in the medium and long-term because they are tied both to any changes in the characteristics of migration and to the even more uncertain results of the political and cultural debate. In many ways, this all goes to show how the conceptualisation at the basis of the migration statistics is almost to be considered exogenous, a decisive *a priori* to be borne in mind but which, on an essentially descriptive level like ours, is only worth considering in terms of its practical results rather than its theoretical aspects. In other words, we decided it might be better to start with data collection methods and definitions in order to identify some of the

issues connected with the conceptualisation of migration rather than going in the opposite direction which would perhaps be more rigorous from a formal point of view but would certainly be more dispersive and less direct as regards the substance, especially when we are dealing with the situation in different countries and over a rather long time span.

Looking at the question of making calculations about demographic processes, but also at the strata of the population potentially or directly interested in economic and productive activities, our attention should be centred on all migratory flows - those composed of foreign citizens and those made up of citizens of the country under examination because they both contribute to determining the variations in size and structure of the various aggregates. The definition that the United Nations has proposed is along these lines as regards international migration statistics. It identifies, respectively, long-term emigrants and long-term immigrants as those residents who intend to stay abroad for more than one year [United Nations 1991]. Excluding citizenship, the two elements that can be used together to distinguish definitive, or at least long-term, migration from other types of migration or other movements are residence and length of stay. The substantially arbitrary nature of the concept of residence is largely accepted and it is not necessary to discuss it any further, however it is worth stressing the fact that length of stay itself can be identified in a completely subjective way at the moment of departure or arrival, often even independently of the will of the individual to get round the existing immigration regulations.

In practice the definitions used are often quite far from the one proposed by the United Nations. In particular, statistics offices pay great attention to identifying size and flows, especially arrivals, of foreigners for the obvious reason that at a time of strict immigration controls, the needs of politics and the government authorities move in this direction. This means that in some cases, movements of foreigners are easier to measure statistically, given the numerous administrative traces that they are obliged to leave in their wake, at least the ones who are able to respect the laws and regulations. Basically, even if in many cases in the same country there are various possible sources of information, reconstructing a full statistical picture in order to make

international comparisons of migration is a task which is still far from being completed despite the commitment and efforts of the numerous supranational organisations who deal with the question [Salt *et al.* 1994]. The United Nations Organisation itself [1991, p. 99], in presentation of its most recent *Demographic Yearbook* devoted to international migration, strongly highlighted the fact that «in addition to problems relating to the variety of sources and probable incompleteness of data on migratory flows, these data are affected by conceptual problems. While births and deaths can be defined biologically and marriages and divorces legally, migration is more difficult to define. Migration entails not only the crossing of international borders but also entails the intention of staying in the country or area of arrival. Although international migration may well in many cases entail legal procedures, it remains the most difficult of demographic phenomenon to define and measure correctly».

The possibility of obtaining more than one measurement of the phenomenon taken from different perspectives and angles is surely a positive factor in the study and analysis of international mobility, especially at a time like today which is marked by great changes in the intensity, characteristics and direction of the flows [Willekens 1994]. However it should be borne in mind that it is also a potential and not insignificant source of confusion which is worth discussing for a moment. Taking something that happens in Italy as an example, to measure flows we can look at the data on entries and cancellations in the population registers regarding transfers of residence from and to abroad. From 1980 on, this data has separated the figures on Italian citizens and foreigners and can be considered, even if the year of registration may not be the year of migration, to be fairly close to the definition proposed by the United Nations, in that we may reasonably presume that most of the people who register a transfer at the municipal offices intend to stay in or leave the country for at least one year. In consequence, the potential user may have to deal with three different sets of figures for a single flow (total entries or cancellations, those of Italian citizens only or those of foreign citizens only), according to the aspect or definition preferred and all three of these may be given the same general label of immigrants or emigrants, committing a sin of omission rather than a genuine error.

The risk of confusion in this situation is clear. To have an even

more precise idea and to highlight the difficulties and pitfalls that accompany anyone trying to deal with migration, it may be useful to give a practical example, verifying how the data on Italian migratory flows are presented in the three main international publications devoted to this subject. In the *Sopemi Report* issued by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), broadly based on the work of national correspondents, under the item 'inflows and outflows of foreign population' until 1997 no figures are given for Italy despite the fact that flows of foreign citizens are currently published in considerable detail (country of citizenship, sex, and age group) by Istat in *Movimento migratorio della popolazione residente*¹. Besides this data can be considered, at least as far as the regular component of inflows is concerned, to be of reasonable quality given that the immigrants in this situation have good reason, having the legal possibility to do so, to request inclusion in the population registers if they stay for some time in Italy, not forgetting however the significant swings linked to the regularisation procedures. These problems are in any case common to all countries using population registers to measure migratory flows, but they do not prevent the data being widely used, especially in the Scandinavian countries, Belgium and the Netherlands. The United Nations, in the above mentioned *Demographic Yearbook*, publishes, instead, the figures relating to *Espatriati e rimpatriati* (expatriations and repatriations), a source that only took Italian citizens into consideration and which was abandoned in 1988 because this was no longer an efficient measurement. Despite the fact that the United Nations' definition considers as migrants both a country's citizens and foreigners, no reference is made in the yearbook to the fact that the Italian data only refers to Italian citizens. Furthermore, no data is given for the years 1979-1982, although such data was widely available and the quality was presumably better than that of the figures published (1983-1987), relating to the period immediately before the abandonment of the source. Nor is it clear which criterion has been used, in the case of "departures", to distinguish between "short-term migrants" and "long-term migrants".

¹ In the last edition [OECD 2000] data on the issues of permits to stay (excluding renewals) are considered.

Lastly, in *Migration statistics* of 1996, Eurostat uses the data on population registers entries and cancellations distinguishing, if possible, between “nationals” and “non-nationals”².

The framework we have outlined does not appear very comforting, partly because the information directly obtainable from the three sources considered above, does not enable us to make even a very summary reconstruction which instead required a far from easy task working on the original statistical sources and which should be considered, in all probability, beyond the real possibilities of most of the users. And one should not think that the Italian situation represents a particular and exceptional case since more or less similar difficulties are to be found in many countries, indeed sometimes the situation is even more muddled and complex, with changes over time in the ways of defining and gathering data on the phenomenon, with consequent severe limitations to comparisons being made within the same series. An examination of the migration statistics cannot therefore be made without a knowledge of the definitions being used, because often very different aggregates are hiding behind identical terms. Hoping to have succeeded, by means of our considerations, in underlining at least the main risks related to the problems of defining migration, it is now time to move on and study some of these in relation to data collection methods.

Referring to a very compact schematisation [Kuijsten 1995], there are basically three sources used in the measurement of international mobility: information collected as people cross borders; population or other administrative registers; and field surveys (including censuses and special surveys). Each of these sources has advantages and disadvantages which are dealt with at length in the literature³ and to which it is certainly not the case to return here, mainly because much depends on the effective means of data collection employed which for

² As regards this publication, it is worth mentioning for the benefit of the reader, that in previous editions the time series of immigrants in Italy presents up to 1990 different figures from those actually registered and there is no distinction made between Italians and foreigners.

³ On these aspects, see the monographic number of *International migration review* (No. 4 of 1987) devoted to “Measuring international migration: theory and practice”.

the same kind of statistical source can be very different from one country to another. It is nevertheless important to underline the usefulness of knowing from which type of source the data used have come from. But even this simple, and apparently banal need is far from easy to satisfy, especially if we want to make comparisons between countries and we are referring to publications of international organisations. The case of Italy, mentioned above, is in this respect quite significant. In one source the available data are not published, in another, they were not given for some years, and in yet another the statistics used are not quoted - this lack of indications is certainly misleading.

A more general distinction, more usually available, is that between flow data and stock data. The former should allow us to follow the phenomenon constantly over time whilst the latter should permit us to look in greater depth at some aspects, with the possibility of gathering more detailed information, perhaps with a larger and temporally more concentrated effort e.g. by means of a census. In effect, as for the other demographic phenomena, and as for most social and economic phenomena too, as regards migration, the first aspect that one would like to know about is the number of events that occur during a given interval of time. Therefore, in our case the main aim should be that of knowing the size and characteristics of the inflows and outflows whose correct calculation would also allow us to construct information on the size of immigrant populations at various moments. Leaving, however, the theoretical level to look at the more practical side, it should be noted that collecting data on migratory flows requires the existence of a well-organised and well-structured statistical system and, in any case, we come up against objective and insurmountable difficulties. Therefore in the statistical measurement of migration, this situation has led us to use stock measurements (referring that is to the number of migrants present in the population considered at a given moment), not only taken together with flow data (as would be opportune) but sometimes as a clear alternative. Now, the two types of data provide different kinds of information and can help illuminate different aspects of the phenomenon, but the important point is to be well aware of the characteristics and consequent explanatory limits of each one of them and to avoid improper use of the statistics, especially when information gaps on the flows may push

us towards an extensive use of what we do have available. In fact, stock data such as that on permits to stay in Italy, cannot tell us much about the intensity of the flows. Variations in size from one year to another are the result of a complex mechanism of arrivals and departures leaving only the net balance unless a specific kind of calculation has been provided for. In the same way, flow data should be analysed taking into account any possible temporal differences between the moment of registration and that in which the movement actually occurred, not to mention the effects on the statistical series of amnesty provisions for illegal immigrants [Natale and Strozza 1997]. As we can see, neither of the two approaches to measuring migration phenomena is without its limits and the best situation, based on a combined and integrated use of the two levels of information, is unlikely to be found in most countries.

The differences in the ways countries collect data on migration cannot be attributed only to the different approaches to the phenomenon or to the different operational capabilities of the statistical systems in addressing such a complex problem. These differences should instead be linked above all to the fact that each nation state has attributed a particular role and function to immigration flows. Even within Europe, the experience and treatment of foreign immigrants have been very different; from the assimilation model favoured for decades by France, to the multiethnic approach of the United Kingdom, to the model of the guest worker common to Germany and Switzerland. From this is derived a different legislative framework in relation to arrivals, the general conditions for foreigners, and the possibility of acquiring citizenship in the destination country and there is also a different approach to the statistical measurement of migration. In France, for example, the greater ease with which immigrants can acquire citizenship means that data on the foreign population does not really reflect the actual size of the phenomenon, pushing statistical research towards a careful definition of the concepts used and the need to estimate the direct and indirect effects of the phenomenon [Tribalat 1994]. In Germany, on the other hand, if the much greater difficulties in obtaining German citizenship, even for second generation immigrants, have created fewer problems of validity for the data on the foreign population, they have determined a categorisation of the flows seldom found in other countries. The *ius*

sanguinis and the division of the country into two separate states meant that in the division between “nationals” and “non-nationals”, the former came to include not only citizens of the Federal Republic but also those from the Democratic Republic who moved westwards and the *Aussiedler* (populations of German origin who in some cases had left Germany several centuries previously). Translated into figures, this means that in the data on immigration flows of foreigners, flows from East Germany (388,000 in 1989 and 395,000 in 1990) and those of populations of German origin - which in the period 1988-1995 involved more than 2 million people overall - were not counted [Frey and Mammey 1996].

The summary overview that we have given on the problems connected with the statistical analysis of migration is surely not sufficient to fully and exhaustively describe such a complex and difficult subject, nor was it our intention to do so on this occasion. It has however served to illustrate the main problems encountered and the necessary caution to be adopted in using this type of data. It should, moreover, be borne in mind that by means of calculating demographic trends and the knowledge of population size, it is possible to make indirect estimates of net migration. These estimates are often used, as we will do ourselves in the next chapter, for purposes of international comparison, given that they offer the possibility of reaching a quantification of international mobility starting from a contained set of information and one that is generally available in all countries.

In order to schematise, for the benefit of the reader, the problems and difficulties which should be borne in mind when analysing migration, basically there are four factors involved: «1. The quality of available data and their meaning often result from political decisions and bureaucratic data-gathering traditions that reflect the process of social and political change taking place in each country [.....] 2. Quality and meaning of available data differ according to the system of data collection that is used [....] 3. Definitions of who is considered as a migrant differ across countries [.....] 4. Even if the above-mentioned reasons were not valid, there still would remain the categories of undocumented migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers» [Kuijsten 1995, pp. 593-4]. The ever-increasing size, at least in respect of regular flows, of the categories included in the last point is

an element that introduces an important non-statistical factor of distortion in the quality of migration statistics and is one which we have not discussed previously, precisely because it is not involved in the data production process, but which, obviously, must be given due consideration. This situation must not however distract us from the quantitative analysis of migration which is an operation to be carried out with extreme attention but for which there is a great availability of data. It is crucial that users are made well aware of the partial nature of the information-sets at their disposal and of the consequent explanatory limits.

In the following pages, we will try to reconstruct migration trends over the last fifty years, using the main international sources available and showing, where possible, the changes in the definitions and methods of data collection. Going further in the work of reconstructing the development of the statistical measurement of international migration in Europe appears beyond our objectives and our intentions - it is sufficient to have emphasised the complexity of the subject and the need to move with extreme caution in using the available data, especially if we want to try to make in-depth analyses. In order to demonstrate, as briefly as possible, the extreme complexity of the situation, Scheme 1 summarises the main statistical sources used in the 1996 edition of the *Sopemi Report* and the organisations from which they originate. As we can see, the situation varies greatly from one country to another, even if we limited ourselves to considering the type of sources and the organisation involved in data collection. Furthermore, within any one country, it is not always the same organisation that is responsible for gathering all the available information, with the consequent and easily imaginable problems of comparison and homogeneity. Lastly, it should be underlined that, despite the efforts of the OECD and the experience it has gained in the field of migration in recent years, it is more than likely that the picture is far from being error-free, given that in the case of Italy, information was missing in regard to migratory flows and naturalisation even though such data were available.

Scheme 1. Source of data published in Sopemi Report.						
Country	Stock of foreign population	Stock of foreign workers	Migration flows	Entries of foreign workers	Asylum seekers	Naturalisations
Austria	Population registers Österreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt	Permits to stay Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales		Work permits Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales	Osterrichisches Statistisches Zentralamt	Osterrichisches Statistisches Zentralamt
Belgium	Population registers Institut National de Statistiques	Work permits Ministère de l'Emploi et du Travail	Population registers Institut National de Statistiques	Work permits Ministère de l'Emploi et du Travail	Institute National de Statistique Office des Étrang. Comm. Général aux Réfugiés et aux Apatrides	Institut National de Statistiques Ministère de la Justice
Denmark	Population registers Danmarks Statistik	Population registers Danmarks Statistik	Population registers Danmarks Statistik	Permits to stay Danmarks Statistik	Danmarks Statistik	Danmarks Statistik
Finland	Population registers Central Statist. Office, Population Register Centre		Population registers Central Statistical Office		Ministry of the Interior	Central Statistical Office
France	Census Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques	Labour force survey Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques	Permits to stay Office des Migrations Internationales	Work permits Office des Migrations Internationales	Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et des Apatrides	Ministère des Affaires Sociales, de la Santé et de la Ville

Scheme 1. Source of data published in Sopemi Report (continued).						
Country	Stock of foreign population	Stock of foreign workers	Migration flows	Entries of foreign workers	Asylum seekers	Naturalisations
Germany	Population registers Statistisches Bundesamt Auslander-zentralregister	Work permits Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit	Population registers Statistisches Bundesamt Auslander-zentralregister	Work permits Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit	Bundesministerium des Innern	Statistisches Bundesamt
Ireland	Labour force survey Central Statistical Office	Labour force survey Central Statistical Office				
Italy	Permits to stay Ministry of the Interior				United Nations High Commiss. for Refuges	
Luxembourg	Population registers Service Central de la Statistique et des Études Économiques	Work permits Inspection Générale de la Sécurité Sociale	Population registers Service Central de la Statistique et des Études Économiques	Work permits Inspection Générale de la Sécurité Sociale		Service Central de la Statistique et des Études Économiques
Netherlands	Population registers Central Bureau of Statistics	Population registers Central Bureau of Statistics	Population registers Central Bureau of Statistics		Ministry of Justice	Central Bureau of Statistics
Norway	Population registers Statistics Norway	Population registers Statistics Norway	Population registers Statistics Norway		Directorate of Immigration	Statistics Norway
Portugal	Permits to stay Ministry of the Interior	Permits to stay Ministry of the Interior			Ministry of the Interior	

Scheme 1. Source of data published in Sopemi Report (continued).						
Country	Stock of foreign population	Stock of foreign workers	Migration flows	Entries of foreign workers	Asylum seekers	Naturalisations
Spain	Permits to stay Ministerio del Interior, Direction General de la Policia	Work permits Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social			Officine de Asilo y Refugio	Ministry of Justice
Sweden	Population registers Statistics Sweden	Labour force survey Statistics Sweden	Population registers Statistics Sweden		Swedish Immigration Board	Statistics Sweden
Switzerland	Register of foreigners Office Fédéral des Étrangers	Register of foreigners Office Fédéral des Étrangers	Register of foreigners Office Fédéral des Étrangers	Register of foreigners Office Fédéral des Étrangers	Office Fédéral des Étrangers	Office Fédéral des Étrangers
United Kingdom	Labour force survey Home Office	Labour force survey Department of Employment	Permits to stay Home Office	Work permits Department of Employment	Home Office	Home Office
Source: OECD, 1996, pp. 191-192.						

After trying to shed some light on the main issues linked to the process of the statistical measurement of migration, we will now move on to sketch a preliminary general frame of reference for international migration involving European countries by studying estimated net migration for the inter-Census periods between the start of the 1950s and the 1990s.

2. The history of international migration in Europe: a general frame of reference

In order to provide a preliminary frame of reference regarding the role assumed by European countries in the context of international migratory flows, an evaluation of net migration for the period 1950-1995 is proposed. Net migration (NM), which is the difference between the sum of immigrants (or total immigration) and that of emigrants (or total emigration), is estimated indirectly (by the residual method) using the so-called population equation (first equation of [1]).

In practice, for a given interval of time t , this estimation is obtained by calculating the difference between the population at the end (P_t) and the beginning of the period (P_0) which represents the demographic change ($DC_{\Delta t} = P_t - P_0$), and subtracting from it the natural change ($NC_{\Delta t}$), obtained by subtracting from the number of births ($B_{\Delta t}$) the number of deaths ($D_{\Delta t}$) observed in the period under consideration ($NC_{\Delta t} = B_{\Delta t} - D_{\Delta t}$). As a formula, this gives:

$$P_t = P_0 + B_{\Delta t} - D_{\Delta t} + I_{\Delta t} - E_{\Delta t} = P_0 + NC_{\Delta t} + NM_{\Delta t} \Rightarrow$$

$$NM_{\Delta t} = P_t - P_0 - NC_{\Delta t} = DC_{\Delta t} - NC_{\Delta t}. \quad [1]$$

The figure obtained as a residual represents a country's net migration in relation to the entire population present in the territory, both national and foreign, to which however are added the errors in population estimates and measurement of the flows of natural movement. The preceding statement appears, in formal terms, even more evident at a time when the population and demographic events are divided by citizenship, through the introduction of an index separating the nationals (n) from the foreigners (f):

$$NM_{\Delta t} = ({}^n P_t + {}^f P_t) - ({}^n P_0 + {}^f P_0) - ({}^n NC_{\Delta t} + {}^f NC_{\Delta t}) = {}^n NM_{\Delta t} + {}^f NM_{\Delta t}. \quad [2]$$

The net migration obtained as a residual provides an idea of the overall balance of population movements to and from abroad regarding any given country. It may be the resultant of balances for nationals and foreigners of the same sign (plus or minus as is the case) or of the opposite sign⁴. For this reason as well, the estimated figures

⁴ An example of an estimate of net migration between censuses in relation to the foreign population alone has been proposed by Boudoul and Labat [1988]. Zamora [1988] shows how it is possible to estimate the emigration of foreigners from the receiving country, information that is often not gathered directly or is underestimated, by means of the indirect method on the basis of the information on foreigners in two successive censuses and the inter-census flows relating to the other components of the balance (natural change, immigration and changes of citizenship). It is important to underline how the evolution of the national population and that of the foreign population depends - besides natural increase and

can only occasionally be compared with those obtainable by means of a direct measurement of emigration and immigration which, when available, does not always involve the whole population but only certain categories within it (nationals only, foreigners only, or else part of one and/or the other group). Furthermore, even in the best case in which there is a perfect match between the groups considered, the estimate as a residual of net migration provides evaluations which are in most cases discordant with those obtainable from a direct measurement of inflows and outflows. This could be an advantage if we consider that the direct measurements of migration are generally administrative in nature and therefore migrations (and migrants) are not always registered or referred to the actual moment of the event. The census, for example, should be able to gather more carefully the demographic aggregate that really exists in a given territory rather than that indicated by the population registers: identifying immigrants whose entry into the country has not been recorded (or who are not included in the population registers), and ignoring emigrants who have left the country without registering their departure. Naturally, all this holds true as long as the census manages to arrive at the real size of the resident population, without mistakes of under or over-representation. In practice, this is never possible. In practical terms, there is a problem concerning census coverage that, even if this problem is fairly limited in relative terms, produces significant effects on the net migration in absolute and relative terms, sometimes even changing the total from a plus to a minus figure or vice versa. For this reason the evaluations given below are of a very broad nature, but they are nevertheless useful in sketching a preliminary frame of reference which will be looked at in more detail in the following sections when we deal with the data from the direct sources.

The United Nations [1979] have already proposed estimates of net migration for the periods 1950-60, 1960-70 and 1970-75 for the main European countries, mainly based on indirect estimates using the residual method together, in some cases, with data from direct

net migration - also on the balance of changes in citizenship (acquisition and loss of citizenship in the receiving country), mainly represented in traditional immigration countries by the naturalisation of foreigners.

sources. More recently, some authors [King 1993b; Macura and Coleman 1994; Chesnais 1995; Münz 1995] have proposed some indirect estimates of net migration for European countries relating to the first four decades of the second half of the twentieth century. Even Livi Bacci [1996] has provided estimates for this period related to some geographic areas in Europe. Here, in order to ensure greater uniformity of the data on the various countries considered, we used the population estimates of the United Nations [United Nations 1999] which take account of the census results to once again calculate net migration using the residual method.

The estimates of net migration obtained, obviously refer to the overall population, both national and foreign. In Table 1, we give the summarised results relating to groups of countries based on mixed criteria, partly geographic and partly political and institutional. The results are basically in line with those produced by some organisations or individual researchers [United Nations 1979, p. 299; Öberg 1993, p. 209; Münz 1995, p. 114; Livi Bacci 1996] even if some divergences emerge mainly as a result of the way in which the Eastern European countries have been considered. Since the 1990s, some of these countries have undergone integration (here we refer to the two Germanys) and, above all, disintegration (in first place, former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union⁵).

The migration history of Europe up to the first half of the twentieth century has been summarised very clearly by Russell King: «In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the predominant movement was out of rather than into Europe as millions crossed the ocean to settle in the New World: an estimated 55-60 million during 1820-1940 of whom 38 million went to the United States» [King 1993b, p. 20]. During the second half of the twentieth century, Europe has significantly changed its position within the international migration scenario. In the 1950s, Europe seemed to continue to play

⁵ In table 1 estimates of net migration for the countries of the former Soviet Union are excluded. In fact, results of our calculations are unreliable and largely different from estimates obtained using national sources [Chesnais 1995; Rallu and Blum 1991]. These differences are probably due to the problems encountered by United Nations to estimate population of the new countries from 1950.

the same role as in the previous decades. Only the countries of Western Europe had positive net migration but this was not sufficient to compensate the net emigration recorded in other areas of Europe (in particular in Southern European countries) which was partially due to people crossing the Atlantic⁶ (Table 1).

The situation changed significantly in the 1960s, when Europe recorded net immigration of just over 300,000 people, basically due to the strong pull factors exercised by the more industrialised countries of Western Europe (Table 1) which, besides recruiting foreigner workers from neighbouring countries, and above all, from those in Southern Europe, welcomed foreign labour also from countries on the South and East coast of the Mediterranean (in particular, from Turkey, Morocco and Algeria), as well as more than a million national returnees from former overseas possessions in Africa and Asia following the granting of independence.

In the 1970s and in the two following periods, Europe recorded very positive net migration figures due to a steady expansion of the receiving areas. In fact, the 1970s were an important period of passage, showing big differences between the first and the second half of the decade which the net migration estimates were unable to allow for. Up to 1973, the traditional European immigration countries, even if to varying degrees, continued to receive a large number of foreign workers. However, from the end of that year and following the oil crisis caused by an exceptional increase in the price of oil, measures were progressively introduced to stop the entry of foreign labour and to encourage immigrants to return to their countries of origin.

⁶ The net migration of Western and Eastern Europe should be larger considering two different states in Germany. In fact, according to United Nations estimates in the 1950s Democratic Republic of Germany had a net migration of -2 millions of units, while Federal Republic of Germany had a positive net migration of more than 2.5 millions [United Nations 1979]. These net migrations are largely due to the flows between Eastern and Western Germany.

Table 1. Net migration in European geographical areas, 1950-1995. Absolute values in millions and annual average rates per 1000.					
Geographical areas	Years				
	1950-60	1960-70	1970-80	1980-90	1990-95
	Absolute values (in millions)				
East Europe ^a	-0.8	-1.1	-0.4	-0.9	-1.9
North Europe ^b	-1.0	-0.1	0.0	0.3	0.3
West Europe ^c	2.1	4.2	2.8	3.0	4.2
South Europe ^d	-2.5	-2.7	0.4	0.3	0.6
TOTAL	-2.2	0.3	2.8	2.8	3.2
	Net migration rates (annual average per 1000 inhabitants)				
East Europe ^a	-0.9	-1.1	-0.4	-0.7	-3.2
North Europe ^b	-1.3	-0.2	0.0	0.4	0.7
West Europe ^c	1.5	2.6	1.7	1.7	4.7
South Europe ^d	-2.7	-2.6	0.4	0.2	1.0
TOTAL	-0.5	0.1	0.6	0.7	1.3
Notes: (a) Including Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakian Republic, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Republic of Macedonia, Slovenia e Yugoslavian Federation). (b) Including Denmark, Finland, Island, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom. (c) Including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany (Federal Republic and Democratic Republic since 1950); Luxembourg, Netherlands and Switzerland. (d) Including Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain.					
Sources: elaboration on data United Nations [1999].					

It was from the mid-1970s that some Southern European countries began to experience positive net migration (Table 1) mainly due to the arrival of national returnees. These countries also began to be involved in a certain kind of foreign immigration which only became more evident at the beginning of the 1980s. In the 1990s, also due to the effect of the political and institutional upheavals in Eastern European countries, we witnessed an intensification of migration involving Western Europe above all (Table 1).

Basically, a clear difference emerges between the situation of the 1950s and '60s and that in the 1980s and '90s. In the first 20-year period, Europe experienced negative or only slightly positive net migration figures, with a significant amount of migration within

Europe, in particular from the less industrialised countries of the South (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Yugoslavia), towards the strongly industrialised countries, mainly in the West (West Germany, France, Switzerland Belgium and the Netherlands) but also in the North (Sweden). At that time transoceanic emigration was offset by the more recent non-European immigration, above all from some countries in the Mediterranean basin (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey). However, in the last 15 years, the picture has changed significantly with European net migration being strongly positive due to the prevalence of a clearly distinguishable immigration from the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) which has also involved some countries in Mediterranean Europe (above all, Italy and Spain) which until the mid-1970s were considered as traditional sending areas. Furthermore, it should be noted how the collapse of the socialist regimes in the 1990s entailed an expansion of the internal migration areas of Europe with the development of many East-West movements, which had been negligible - with a few exceptions - up until the end of the 1980s, due to the difficult economic situation in the countries of the former Soviet bloc and to the political and institutional crises that led, in some cases, to full-scale civil wars (the most dramatic, if not the only one, was that in the former Yugoslavia).

The turning point between the scenario observed in the first decades after the Second World War and that of the last fifteen years was reached in the mid-1970s when, after the oil crisis of 1973 and the consequent economic crisis, the traditional European receiving countries introduced measures to limit the foreign presence and to export some internal unemployment abroad by means of returnees. It was at around this time that we can place the end of the policy of recruiting foreign labour in Western European countries and the start of a period of closure towards, or at least, of a more rigid control over new arrivals. Moreover, in this period, the characteristics of the migratory flows changed, with movements for family reunion substituting those for work and with the migration from the developing countries becoming increasingly important [King 1993b]. The important differences in migratory flows in Europe (in terms of expansion of both the receiving and the sending areas), the significant changes observed in the international economy and local production systems, as well as the variations recorded at political and institutional

level, have led us to sub-divide the period under consideration into two sub-periods: the first going from the beginning of the 1950s to the beginning of the 1970s; the second from the mid-1970s until today.

3. International Migrations from 1945 to 1975

3.1. Size and characteristics of migratory flows

The prevailing interest in migratory movements, in particular those due to labour reasons, suggests that the beginning of the period of observation should be moved from mid-way in the 1940s to the start of the next decade. In point of fact, with the end of World War II, an enormous population movement was registered in Europe due both to previously displaced persons returning to their native country, either voluntarily or forcibly as a result of the vicissitudes of war, and also to the new political geography of Europe drawn essentially by the treaties of Yalta and Potsdam (1945). Between 1945 and 1949, territorial movements mainly involved the German population. In fact, in certain countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, persons of German origin and former German citizens were expelled with the consent of - or in certain cases following solicitation by - the Allies [Münz 1995]. For this reason, in the five years after the end of the war, more than 8 million German refugees or expelled persons arrived in the Western part of Germany controlled by the Allies, roughly 3.6 million went to the Eastern zone controlled by the Soviet army and slightly more than half a million went to Austria [Münz 1995]. The defining of the new national boundaries of European countries also determined other considerable population movements: approximately 1.5 million Poles left what was the Eastern part of Poland before it became territory belonging to Lithuania, Belarus and the Ukraine⁷; at least 660,000 persons of Ukrainian, Belarusian and Lithuanian descent

⁷ It should also be remembered how, after the end of World War II, the greater part of the Polish armed forces displaced through the countries of Western Europe chose not to return to Poland [Korcelli 1994]. The numbers of Poles abroad can be calculated approximately by the data taken from European censuses in the last years of 1940s or at the beginning of the 1950s (at least 700,000 persons).

left Poland and Czechoslovakia to settle in the Soviet Union [Kersten 1968]; more than 300,000 persons mainly belonging to a Hungarian minority and resident in the South of Slovakia, Romania, Serbia and the Soviet Union were moved to Hungary [Dovenyi and Vukovich 1994]; more than 100,000 Czechs and Slovaks were forced to move into territories from which the German language populations had previously been sent away; and more than 100,000 Italians were forced to leave Istria and Dalmatia which had become territories of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia.

For many reasons such exceptional population movements are removed from our field of interest which is aimed mainly at the flows more directly connected to economic factors. In one sense, moving the beginning of the reference period to 1950 may be insufficient since «in the early 1950s, movements resulting from wartime upheavals and associated political changes still dominated much of the migration picture» [United Nations 1979, p. 64], and in another sense can be misleading seeing that the more highly industrialised countries which had not suffered direct consequences as a result of the war (above all Switzerland and Sweden), began to import foreign labour immediately after the end of the war to meet the increasing labour demand resulting from the starting-up and development of the production system⁸ [Salt 1976]. But this choice permitted an examination of the situation when the national economies had overcome the stage of the first post-war reconstruction and the populations to a great extent had overcome the phase of territorial re-settlement resulting from the definition of new state boundaries.

For the period 1950-75, analysis of international migration is conducted separately for the European immigration and emigration countries. The statistics used are those derived from the direct measurement of inflows and outflows as recorded in the single countries. In the majority of cases the information is drawn from

⁸ Between 1946 and 1950, Sweden took in approximately 10,000 foreign workers each year, mainly coming from Finland. From October 1945, Switzerland stipulated agreements with neighbouring countries to favour the immigration of foreign workers. In 1946, 50,000 people entered and in the space of a year this number tripled [Salt 1976]. Between 1946 and 1949, France also received 214,000 foreign workers, mainly (more than two-thirds) Italians [Tapinos 1975].

population registers (for Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, Finland, Luxembourg, Holland, Norway and Sweden), but in certain cases it refers to border controls (for Greece, while for the United Kingdom data is provided by the International Passenger Survey), to specific surveys concerning the entry of foreign workers and their families (such as that of the *Office National de l'Immigration* for France) or to the statistics of the new permits to stay issued in the course of the year (for Switzerland). These sources present, as emphasised in chapter 1, problems of reliability and international comparability which, for the period dealt with (1950-75), are fully analysed and discussed in a monograph of the United Nations [United Nations 1979].

A preliminary examination of the migratory inflows and outflows to and from the so-called European host countries can be carried out considering first jointly then separately national citizens and foreigners (Table 2). This important distinction has been already stressed in chapter 1. It is therefore possible to distinguish countries which right from the start of the 1950s presented positive net migration overall (without distinction between nationals and foreigners) such as West Germany, Belgium and Sweden (as well as France and Switzerland which do not have such detailed data at their disposal⁹) from those which only from the 1960s began to record net immigration, such as Netherlands, Denmark and Norway or else show a negative balance as in the case of the United Kingdom (Table 2). Obviously, the positive or negative value of net migration overall depends on the sign and size of the net migration of nationals and foreigners. It seems important to emphasise how in the period under consideration the former was almost always negative and the latter, in practice, always positive (Table 2). In short, the net immigration of foreigners has sometimes counterbalanced and often more than compensated for the still important net emigration of nationals¹⁰. This consideration can also include Switzerland which, while not having

⁹ For France, official estimates of net migration for each single year, including Algerians and repatriating French citizens, show a positive balance for the whole of the 1950-75 period [United Nations 1979, p. 301].

¹⁰ Zlotnik reaches substantially similar results in a recent contribution in which she considers a more limited number of European countries in a period of time from 1965 to the present day [see Zlotnik 1999, tab. 3, pp. 50-51].

available data on the emigration of foreigners until 1974, presumably had a net immigration of foreigners in the face of a net outflow of nationals at least up to the end of the 1960s. A case apart is the United Kingdom, considered by several experts as a “traditional emigration country” since until the beginning of the 1990s it experienced negative net migration, mainly due to the emigration of British citizens (see also Table 2). Between 1945 and 1970, with the sole exception of the period 1958-63, emigration was always considerably greater than immigration and directed above all towards the “white” Commonwealth countries and the United States [Werner 1976]. The peculiarity of colonial history and the importance of the link with Ireland make the United Kingdom the centre of an autonomous migratory system compared with that of other European host countries, and its immigrants originate from the countries of the new Commonwealth [Zlotnik 1992], even if the importance of immigration from the Mediterranean area should not be ignored [Hollingsworth 1976]. The examination of the annual flow of immigration and emigration of foreign citizens recorded by the traditional European host countries allows us to evaluate precisely the evolution of migration in the course of the period under examination, highlighting stable changes in trends and fluctuations caused by the economic cycle (Figure 1). It is evident how, until the second half of the 1950s, the immigration of foreign workers was still kept within certain limits, for the more important host countries as well, while in the 1960s - with the exception of the period 1967-68 - and in the early 1970s it began to increase, even in those countries of Western Europe only marginally involved until that time (Tab. 2 and Fig. 1).

Before starting on a detailed analysis of the evolution of labour migration in the principal European host countries, it is opportune to emphasise that «cultural, political and historical links between the society of origin and the host society can be of higher explanatory value than purely economic factors such as wage differentials» [Fassmann and Münz 1994b, p. 17].

Table 2. Migration flows and net migration according to citizenship (nationals and foreigners) in some European countries, 1950-1974. Absolute values in thousand.									
Years	Total (nationals and foreigners)			Nationals			Foreigners		
	Immigrants	Emigrants	Net migration	Immigrants	Emigrants	Net migration	Immigrants	Emigrants	Net migration
Federal Republic of Germany									
1950-54	493	609	-116
1955-59	927	820	107	413	521	-108	514	288	227
1960-64	2714	1696	1018	372	424	-52	2342	1272	1070
1965-69	3531	2543	987	353	366	-14	3178	2177	1001
1970-74	4365	2834	1531	323	278	45	4042	2557	1485
United Kingdom^a									
1965-69	1078	1465	-388	399	1133	-735	679	332	347
1970-74	1027	1279	-252	460	921	-461	568	358	210
Belgium									
1950-54	215	191	24	31	55	-23	183	136	47
1955-59	252	182	70	35	50	-15	217	132	85
1960-64	296	174	122	44	55	-11	252	120	133
1965-69	328	208	120	36	54	-18	292	154	138
1970-74	323	207	117	36	54	-18	288	153	135
Netherlands^b									
1950-54	227	328	-101	198	300	-102	29	28	1
1955-59	259	293	-33	208	257	-49	51	35	15
1960-64	289	256	33	171	198	-26	117	58	59
1965-69	355	302	53	162	192	-31	193	109	84
1970-74	446	306	140	209	189	20	237	117	120
Sweden									
1950-54	126	76	50
1955-59	132	72	60	13	23	-10	120	50	70
1960-64	146	76	70	15	22	-7	131	54	77
1965-69	227	99	128	16	27	-11	211	72	139
1970-74	217	178	38	22	43	-21	195	135	59
Denmark									
1950-54	101	117	-16	75	98	-23	26	20	6
1955-59	108	141	-32	83	122	-39	26	19	7
1960-64	136	125	11	95	99	-4	41	26	15
1965-69	153	146	7	89	103	-15	64	43	22
1970-74	180	154	26	84	92	-9	96	61	35
Norway									
1960-64	62	67	-5	24	37	-12	38	31	7
1965-69	71	68	3	32	40	-8	39	27	11
1970-74	92	73	18	39	43	-4	53	31	22

Notes: (a) Excluding migration with Ireland, asylum seekers and temporary migrants (less than one year of stay) stay in UK more than one year. (b) Including temporary migration. (...) Data not available.

Sources: elaboration on National Statistical Office data and United Nations [1979; 1980].

The granting of independence to former colonies determined the return of thousands of people of European origin to their mother countries (colonisers, army personnel and state employees) and the immigration of citizens of the former colonies.

Figure 1. Migration flows of foreigners in some European countries, 1950-1975. Absolute values in thousands.




Figure 1. Migration flows of foreigners in some European countries, 1950- 1975. Absolute values in thousands (continued).





Figure 1. Migration flows of foreigners in some European countries, 1950-1975. Absolute values in thousands (continued).



Sources: elaboration on National statistical office data and United Nations [1979; 1980].

From the start of the 1950s a significant flow into the Netherlands of migrants from Indonesia was recorded. Still in the first post-war decade, several thousands of people who had evacuated to overseas territories returned to Belgium and Great Britain. Between 1962 and 1963 more than one million people left Algeria for France.

Seemingly of a similar dimension was the return to the mother country from other French ex-colonies [Tribalat 1991]. Moreover, the colonial link, which can be traced to the sharing of a common language, cultural affinities with the colonising country and the importance of trading connections, encouraged the flow of people from the colonies into several European countries. Migrants originating from Pakistan, India and English-speaking countries of the Caribbean headed for Great Britain, just as those originating from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and West Africa headed for France, while the migrants from Suriname and Indonesia settled in the Netherlands.


In the decade following the end of World War II, West Germany had little need to import foreign workers since the rate of unemployment was not very low (in 1951 it stood at 9% and only in the second half of the decade did it drop considerably) and there was in any case a considerable flow of refugees. It should not in fact be forgotten that after the constitution in 1949 of the Federal German Republic and later the Democratic German Republic, roughly 3.8 million Germans crossed what was to become the boundary line between the two Germanys. It is important to bear in mind that in the Federal German Republic «the German refugees were an important economic resource. Because they had lost most, if not all, of their property (many of them having been farmers in the East) they had to make their living in salaried employment. [...] They were also prepared to take jobs below their standards and to move to regions where work was offered (Korner 1976). Working hard was their main chance to improve their social status» [Rudolph 1994, pp. 117-119]. Further, with the building in 1961 of the Berlin Wall the last access route to the West was closed which reduced enormously the migratory flows between the two Germanys [Rudolph 1994]. Migrations on a large scale towards the Federal German Republic therefore began in the early 1960s (Tab. 2 and Fig. 1) as the consequence of a serious shortage of labour which was, to a large extent actually due to the flow of refugees from Eastern Germany having been cut off [Werner 1976]. Following agreements stipulated with labour-exporting countries, in the years immediately preceding and above all in those that followed the recession of 1967-68, the Federal German Republic experienced exceptional levels of immigration (Figure 1).

In 1945, in France the *Office National de l'Immigration* (ONI) was set up for the recruitment of foreign workers and already in 1946 bilateral agreements were reached with some sending countries (in particular with Italy) [Tapinos 1975]. The very liberal immigration policy of France favoured a quite considerable inflow of workers from abroad already by the second half of the 1940s and in the decade that followed, but only in the 1960s and in the early years of the 1970s did immigration reach absolutely exceptional levels (Figure 1). Such growth was not caused only by foreign workers but also by their families. Moreover, in the course of the 25 years under consideration, there was an almost constant increase of seasonal workers (Figure 2).

The immigration boom that occurred between 1965 and 1973, despite the fact that in 1962-63 France had to absorb approximately one million *pieds noirs* who abandoned Algeria at the conclusion of the Evian agreement, is considered by some to be due to three main reasons: the essentially temporary character of a part of the immigration, above all that concerning the prevalently male communities; the importance of the new countries of origin in Southern Europe and North Africa as the driving force behind immigration; and the substantial independence from government control of migratory flows. This last reason appears certainly to be the most important. If in theory the ONI had the monopoly of recruitment, in actual fact the immigrants arrived in France spontaneously and in direct response to the needs of private capital [Ogden 1993]. «In fact, the dynamics of immigration were largely independent of the public authorities: recruitment was managed by companies which directly employed labour, rather than going through the ONI. In 1968, the ONI recruited scarcely 18% of all entries. The other 82% entered illegally and were legalised in subsequent years» [Wihtol de Wenden 1994, p. 69]. France, at least until 1968, accepted the regularisation of workers who entered illegally or those who entered as tourists and found an occupation without having obtained a work contract, as laid down by bilateral agreements, before entering the country [Tapinos 1982], as shown in Figure 3. Allowing illegal foreigners to regulate their work status had the double effect of encouraging clandestine immigration and, at the same time, reducing the period of the illegal sojourn in the host country [Tapinos 1982].


As regards European migration, Belgium and the Netherlands assumed a position similar to that of France, having for the most part taken in immigrants coming from the main Mediterranean emigration countries and from those geographically the nearest, as well as from their former colonies and from overseas territories [Fassmann and Münz 1994b]. But we should not ignore the differences between these two countries as regards not only the main foreign communities, but also the evolution of the migratory flows and the migratory policies adopted by the respective governments.

Figure 2. Foreign immigration in France and Switzerland according to type of migrant and worker, 1950-1975. Absolute values in thousands.



Sources for France elaboration on data published in Tapinos [1975] and in Moulier-Boutang, Garson and Silberman [1986]; for Switzerland elaboration on date of Central Register of Foreigners.

Figure 3. Immigration of permanent workers "regular" and "regularised", France, 1950- 1975. Absolute values in thousands.



Sources: elaboration on data published in Tapinos [1975] and in Moulier-Boutang, Garson and Silberman [1986].

Belgium, which from halfway through the 19th century had experienced some foreign immigration worthy of note, from the end of the 1940s to the middle of the 1960s adopted a liberal immigration policy and encouraged permanent immigration and the integration of foreigners [Werner 1976]. Only from 1967, when the level of unemployment began to grow, measures were introduced to verify, through the *Office National de l'Emploi*, the lack of domestic labour supply (whether for nationals or foreigners already present in the territory) for those jobs for which a work permit had been requested from non-European Economic Community citizens still living abroad. In the period under consideration the evolution of annual immigration was particularly dynamic, with three peaks, the most important of

which almost halfway through the 1960s (Figure 1). In the years that followed, also due to the introduction of the previously mentioned control policies, foreign immigration has undergone a certain reduction, although net migration has nevertheless continued to be clearly positive (Figure 1). Only in the 1960s, later than the other countries of Western Europe, did the Netherlands experience positive net migration for the first time (Table 2). In fact, in the 1950s, the arrival in the mother country of hundreds of thousands of Dutch colonists, their descendants and persons of mixed race coming from Indonesia and other Dutch possessions which had gained independence, was more than compensated for by the emigration of Dutch citizens directed, in particular, to the United States and Australia [Entzinger 1994]. But the great influx of foreign workers began towards the mid-1960s (Figure 1), following the agreements for the recruitment of labour force which the Dutch government stipulated with some countries (European and non-European) of the Mediterranean basin, in particular with Turkey and Morocco which became the two main areas of origin of the new arrivals¹¹. Dutch migratory policy was aimed at limiting the length of stay of foreign workers and the possibility of their families joining them. Moreover, when possible, young and unmarried workers were selected and recruited [Werner 1976].

The evolution of foreign immigration in Switzerland appears completely different from the experience of France and Germany. After World War II, the Swiss economy, as mentioned earlier, experienced an unexpected revival since its production system had remained intact and investments were strong [Castelnuovo Frigessi 1976], so that the local labour supply did not manage to satisfy the growing demand. In this situation the laws drawn up in the 1930s to contain the “over foreignisation” were no longer able to act as a brake

¹¹ Moreover, the case of Netherlands is worthy of note, as in France here too there is a great number of immigrants from the former colonies who do not appear in the official statistics. Following the independence of Indonesia, approximately 200,000 persons of Indonesian origin but possessing Dutch citizenship arrived in the mother country. In 1971 it was estimated that during the 1960s more than 80,000 citizens of the West Indies, whose entry into the Netherlands was unrestricted, arrived in the country.

on the mass immigration for which they had been laid down [Hoffmann-Nowotny and Killias 1979]. During the 1950s and the early 1960s, the flow of active foreign population was to grow rapidly, reaching its peak in 1962 (Figures 1 and 2). Foreigners who in that period found a job in Switzerland were almost automatically authorised to work. However, the restrictive measures almost exclusively meant that it was difficult for the new arrivals to integrate and naturalise. These constraints are witnessed by the very limited size, both in absolute terms and with regard to migration overall, of the influx of non-active foreigners (Figure 2). For this reason, immigration was only marginally contained, mainly because foreign labour was considered as a “buffer” to lessen the effects of the economic cycle and its presence was considered temporary. In this connection the size and the evolution of the migratory flows of seasonal workers in the 1960s appear significant (Figure 2). This category «has been correctly defined as the strategic pillar of the Swiss labour market [...]. The “status” of the seasonal worker, without parallel in the rest of Europe, is without doubt the most striking example of that colonialism-at-home which forces the foreign proletariat to a political non-existence, to submit to economic discrimination, social segregation and exploitation assigning workers to a precise role (the heaviest and most humiliating low-paid jobs) in the production cycle in exchange for a precarious stay and with a job that from one minute to the next could be revoked in the country. [...] Seasonal workers can be dismissed at any time; and that [...] is important for example in sectors particularly sensitive to recession as is the construction industry, where the greater part of seasonal workers are employed» [Castelnuovo Frigessi 1976, pp. 1469-1470]. This was still more evident from 1963, the year when, encouraged by local labour organisations and trade unions, measures were introduced aimed at limiting the numbers of foreigners present in Switzerland in order to preserve the national identity [Werner 1976]. In particular, limits were introduced in the quotas of foreigners who could be employed by each single enterprise (company contingency policy), a measure that produced as its main effect the displacement of a part of the foreign workers into enterprises with a low proportion of foreign employees, but also a progressive reduction of the influx of permanent workers in favour of seasonal workers (Figure 2). In March 1970, the

Council of Ministers of the Confederation decided to switch to a system of centralised administrative checks in order to establish both the quota of foreigners present on the territory, through the fixing of quotas for new entries (and consequently of permits to be granted) for each canton, and also a national quota to meet specific needs (global policy of contingency containment).

Among host countries Sweden too assumes a substantially characteristic position. The revival of the Swedish economy required the inflow, from the second half of the 1940s, of a quite considerable number of foreign workers compared with the national population. The size of these inflows remained more or less stable in the 1950s, increasing significantly in the 1960s (Figure 1). Immigration in Sweden, coming mainly from Finland, seems circumscribed, at least in the period under consideration in this chapter, to essentially the area of the common labour market, set up in 1954 among Northern countries (Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark), with the purpose of encouraging the unrestricted movement of labour. The exclusively two-way nature of the migratory link between Sweden and Finland is fully evidenced as well by the data on Finnish emigration according to destination country. In Sweden the overall migratory situation remained much more stable in the 1970s (Figure 1), with an increase in the inflows and a reduction in outflows in the period 1973-76, which, according to some scholars [King 1993b], reflects the greater resistance of the Swedish economy to the recession and also the different history and diverse characteristics of prevalently Finnish immigration.

Among the other host countries the case of Luxembourg should be noted in particular. In the course of the 25 years considered here, this country experienced an almost continuous net inflow of foreigners (Figure 1) which, while resulting in very low figures overall, represented a considerable percentage of the local population, certainly greater than that registered in the other European host countries.

The migration channels running through European countries between 1950 and 1975 have been traced, for the most part, by the bilateral agreements stipulated between the more industrialised

countries of Western and Northern Europe which needed to recruit foreign labour¹², and those countries with a still mainly agricultural-type production structure in Southern Europe and the South and East coast of the Mediterranean which, through emigration, were able to reduce the excess labour supply¹³. The bilateral agreements represent, after the setting up of common labour markets between various nations¹⁴, the main type of institutional intervention aimed at

¹² It should however be remembered that «It would be wrong to assume that immigration of foreign labour means there are no indigenous labour surpluses in the host countries. In fact, concurrent surpluses and shortages of labour have usually been the case. To some extent these imbalances have been regional and countries have encouraged the migration of foreign labour into some regions while their own workers were experiencing unemployment elsewhere. In other cases, imbalances have been occupational, with the indigenous population refusing to accept some of the low-paid, dirty jobs on offer» [Salt 1976, p. 83].

¹³ Although we should not forget how in this period, geographical proximity played an important role in international migration following the adoption, in some cases, of simplified access procedures for citizens from nearby countries into the labour markets of the receiving countries. Some important examples are those of Finnish and Danish immigration into Sweden, that of the Irish into the United Kingdom, the Dutch and the French into Belgium, the Austrians and Poles into West Germany and even, at least in some regards, Italian immigration into Switzerland and West Germany.

¹⁴ The role played by the presence of a common labour market between the so-called Nordic countries in determining migratory flows into Sweden has already been highlighted. In this respect, it is worth saying a few words about the role played by the European Economic Community (EEC). In point of fact, we should not forget that art. 2 of the 1968 treaty establishing the EEC customs union allowed the free movement of workers and meant the abolition of all forms of discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States. The bases for the free circulation of workers were already contained in arts. 48 and 49 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Therefore, all restrictions were revoked, allowing workers and their families to freely cross the borders of the six Member States and allowing the transfer of social security rights for community migrants, in this way removing a possible source of inequality. It should however be borne in mind that «in the case of the EEC common labour market, the integration achieved for the most part came after patterns of movement had become established and when the flows between Member States were already of diminishing importance, both absolutely and relatively, in the face of much larger flows from elsewhere» [Salt 1976, p. 96-98]. With specific reference to the case of Italy, the most important emigration country

facilitating international migration for work purposes¹⁵. The importance assumed by such agreements can be easily understood if the evolution of migratory flows in the host countries is examined according to the citizenship of the migrant workers. Some brief comments can be made by referring above all to the case of the Federal German Republic, the principal European host country. The German government concluded recruitment agreements with Italy in 1955¹⁶, Spain and Greece in 1960, Turkey in 1961, Portugal in 1964 and Yugoslavia in 1968 [Werner 1976]. These agreements allowed the presence in the countries of origin of recruiting agencies to provide information on the jobs requested and the conditions offered. These agencies, apart from submitting applicant workers to medical and attitudinal tests, took care of the formal and organisational aspects of transferring the recruited workers to West Germany. The German employers made requests for foreign workers at the local labour offices guaranteeing that they would arrange accommodation. The cost of recruitment was borne by the employers who had to pay the medical, food and travel expenses for the foreign workers, plus a recruitment fee. From the beginning of the 1960s, both the enormous and more efficient effort of recruitment set up by the Federal German Republic and also the higher salary levels and the better work conditions offered compared with other host countries determined

within EEC, Nora Federici underlines how «[...] one might suppose that the principle of free movement of workers within the EEC would have given Italy a wider area in which to place its excess labour force, and that the destination of Italian migratory flows would have been largely concentrated in EEC countries, where more favourable conditions prevailed. [...] The EEC regulations appear to have only a very slight influence, or none at all, on the size and characteristics of the migratory flow» [Federici 1979, pp. 150-151].

¹⁵ An efficient summing-up of the agreements in force in 1974 for some of the principal European host countries (West Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland) is supplied by Salt [1976, p. 99].

¹⁶ It is interesting to note how in that particular year the rate of unemployment, despite economic growth, was still around 7%. Certain writers stress how immigration in Germany took place in a different situation from that of full employment, being determined, at least in the beginning, by the presence of certain obstacles in specific enterprises in certain sectors and regions [Blotevogel, Mullerter, Jung and Wood 1993].

significant changes in the European migratory channels. In particular, the principal destination countries of the 1950s, headed by France, were affected by the change of direction of Italian emigration which headed for the most part towards West Germany¹⁷. As a result, such nations turned their attention towards other countries of origin, in particular increasing immigration from Spain and Portugal. In France, between 1960 and 1964, the entries of permanent Spanish workers and their families increased from about 30,000 to over 90,000 and for Portuguese workers from 6,000 to more than 50,000. In Switzerland, in the same period, Spanish arrivals went from 6,000 to 80,000. In 1965, there was a fresh increase of Italian immigration into France as a result of the economic recession and the immigration restrictions introduced in Switzerland, the traditional destination of the Italians. During the recession of 1967-68 in the greater part of the host countries, a fairly significant reduction of immigration was recorded and, in certain cases, also an increase in emigration (Figure 1). In the course of the next few years, despite the revival of immigration, a reduction of the number and, above all of the quota of immigrants originating from other EEC countries was recorded. A summary of the evolution of the migration channels has been proposed by John Salt [1976, pp. 91-92]: «In the last two decades [we] have thus seen a spatial evolution in labour migration streams. The rise of West Germany as a major destination and the eclipse of Italy as the principal source of supply, together with increasing labour hunger in North-West Europe, have created a new pattern of movement whose hallmark is large-scale migration of long distances. By the early 1970s broad range of supply countries regularly dispatched workers to satisfy a wide spectrum of demand».

Turning our attention to the European emigration nations, it should first be emphasised how the Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the period between the start of the 1950s and the end of the 1980s, forbade emigration towards West European countries. The sole exception was Yugoslavia which in 1964 became

¹⁷ Moreover, the economic boom registered in Northern Italy caused a reduction in international migration in favour of internal migration from the South towards the industrial triangle in the North of the country.

the only Communist country allowing emigration abroad, seeking to regulate the migratory process through a series of bilateral agreements with the governments of the countries of Western Europe¹⁸. Above all in the years 1964-65 and 1968-71 recruitment in West Germany, Austria, France and Switzerland of Yugoslav workers was particularly intense who, from the end of the 1960s, were joined by their families [Malacic 1994]. For the other Communist countries, migratory displacement of a certain size was registered only in certain special years, caused by the emerging of political crises or for ethnic reasons. In the years 1956-57, some 194,000 Hungarians, amounting to 1.5% of the entire population, left their country just before it was invaded by Soviet troops and the Kadar regime closed the frontiers between Hungary and Austria [Dovenyi and Vukovich 1994]. In 1968-69 more than 160,000 Czechs and Slovaks fled from Czechoslovakia, also in this case by crossing the border into Austria before occupation on the part of Soviet troops and those allied to the Warsaw Pact [Fassmann and Münz 1994b]. In the period 1957-58, the heavy emigration from Poland¹⁹ concerned essentially one part of the population of German origin who were moving to West Germany²⁰, while the immigration noted between 1956 and 1959 was determined by the arrival from the Soviet Union of some hundreds of thousands of ethnic Poles [Korcelli 1994]. In 1950-53, Bulgaria experienced a large emigration of persons of Turkish origin directed towards their homeland. This flow was repeated, even if less intensely, in the period 1968-72. The intensity and the timing of these legal emigrations were agreed between the

¹⁸ Until 1964, emigration of an exclusively spontaneous and unofficial type had involved only a limited number of persons, so that in European countries at that date it is estimated that there were approximately 100,000 Yugoslav workers [Tanić 1979].

¹⁹ Obviously, this official source of data, also published by the United Nations [United Nations 1979, p. 303], has been considerably influenced by a strong restriction of “formal” emigration which, as a logical alternative, has brought about the emergence of an “informal”, non-documented type of emigration, which developed after 1956 with the gradual liberalisation of the procedures for the releasing of passports [Korcelli 1994].


²⁰ As also clearly emerges from the German data on Aussiedler immigration by country of origin [see Table A-9 in Frey and Mammey 1996, p. 147].

governments of Sofia and Ankara through specific agreements [Bobeva 1994].

Therefore it can be said that «[...] the division of Europe and the Cold War undoubtedly reduced the scale of traditional East-West migration in Europe, thus contributing to the opening of Western Europe's gates for South-North migration» [Fassmann and Münz 1994b, p. 10]. From the late 1950s, some countries of Western and Northern Europe began to try and meet the excessive demand for labour through the recruitment of non-qualified labour in the former colonies or in the few overseas territories still existing, but in most cases the excess demand for the supply of domestic labour was satisfied by the recruitment of migrant workers coming from the Mediterranean countries, in particular, first from Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece, and then also from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia [Böhning 1982; Stark 1989; Castles and Miller 1993].

During the 1950s, Italy was the most important sending country as regards migrant workers. High unemployment and the state of extreme poverty above all in certain areas of Southern Italy were important push factors encouraging emigration which, in these areas was virtually an exodus [Birindelli 1984]. The evolution of emigration and immigration in Italy between 1950 and 1975 can be examined on the basis of data on expatriates and returnees in reference to Italians only. The heavy emigration of the 1950s is clearly shown (Figure 4) and with the passing of time it was increasingly directed towards European destinations, partly due to agreements stipulated with the most important European host countries.

Such changes also occurred, with a delay of about a decade compared with Italy, for the other countries of Southern Europe. Spain, Greece and Portugal in the first half of the century had experienced strong transoceanic emigration which revived again in the first fifteen years after the end of World War II. From the beginning of the 1960s, the migratory flows of these countries became essentially European, favoured by the rapid economic growth of the countries of Western Europe and by the network of bilateral agreements between countries of origin and destination.

Figure 4. Migration flows of Italian citizens, 1950-1975. Absolute values in thousands.

Source: elaboration on Istat data.

3.2. Size and characteristics of foreign immigration

An overview of the evolution of international migration in the course of the 25 years under consideration and their impact on the local populations can be obtained, at least in part, through the examination of stock data on the numbers of the foreign population present in the traditional host countries on certain significant dates. In analysing this official information, for the most part derived from demographic censuses, population registers or from administrative sources, it must always be borne in mind that in general these sources do not include migrants returning from the former colonies who are considered to be citizens of the mother country. Moreover, foreign immigrants are not considered after they have acquired the citizenship of their country of adoption. For a precise analysis of the limits contained in the data of the different statistical sources, see the

comments in chapter 1 as well as the copious reading matter in existence [for all these see United Nations 1979].

Between 1950 and 1975 the number of foreigners present in European host countries practically tripled, going from just over 4 million to considerably more than 12 million (Table 3).

Table 3. Foreign population in some European countries around 1950, 1960, 1970 and 1975. Absolute values in thousands and percentage on total populations.

Countries	Absolute values (in thousands)				Percentage on the total population			
	1950	1960	1970	1975	1950	1960	1970	1975
Austria	323	102	212	271	4.7	1.4	2.8	3.6
Belgium	368	453	696	835	4.3	4.9	7.2	8.5
Denmark	91	1.8
France ^a	1737	2170	2621	3442	4.2	4.6	5.3	6.5
Fed. Rep. of Germany	532	686	3054	4090	1.1	1.2	5.0	6.6
Luxembourg	29	42	63	86	9.9	13.2	18.4	23.9
Norway	16	25	76	71	0.5	0.7	2.0	1.8
Netherland	104	118	252	350	1.1	1.0	1.9	2.6
Sweden	124	191	408	411	1.8	2.5	5.0	5.0
Switzerland ^b	285	585	1080	1039	6.1	10.8	17.2	16.4
United Kingdom ^c	1698	2377	3155	...	3.4	4.5	5.7	...
United Kingdom ^d	392	1436	0.8	2.6
Finland	11	5	6	13	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.3
Greece	31	55	93	...	0.4	0.6	1.1	...
Italy	47	63	121	186	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3
Portugal	21	30	32	...	0.2	0.3	0.4	...
Spain	93	68	148	165	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.5
TOTAL (excluding UK)	3721	4593	8862	11050	1.6	1.8	3.3	4.2
TOTAL (including UK) ^e	4113	5232	10032	12486	1.5	1.7	3.1	3.9

Notes: (a) Including Algerians (20,000 in 1946, 360,000 in 1962 and 470,000 in 1968). (b) Excluding seasonal foreign workers. (c) 1961 and 1971 data according to country of birth; people born in Commonwealth countries and other countries of Western Indies are included. (d) Excluding Commonwealth countries, Ireland and Western Indies. (e) Data for foreigners in UK in 1960 and 1970 are our estimates. (...) Data not available.

Sources: United Nations, Demographic Yearbook [Various editions], United Nations [1979; 1980]; Pennix [1984], Council of Europe [1997].

This growth was essentially limited to the period going from the start of the 1960s until the early 1970s, these being the years

immediately before the closing of the frontiers (Table 3). West Germany is the country which registered the highest growth (between 1950 and 1975, its foreign population rose from little more than 500,000 to over 4 million), followed by France, Switzerland and Belgium (Table 3). This is also the classification of the host countries based on the size of the foreign population present in their territory at the end of the period under consideration. A case apart is the United Kingdom, since the available statistics refer to persons born abroad who, between 1950 and 1970, almost doubled, going from almost 1.7 million to 3.2 million. The number of foreign citizens is smaller and the 1975 figure places the United Kingdom in third place among the European host countries. It must however be emphasised how, in terms of incidence on the national population, Luxembourg presents the highest proportion (in 1975 foreigners represented approximately a quarter of the population of the Grand Duchy), soaring clearly to first place, followed by Switzerland (16.5%), Belgium (8.5%) and then Germany (6.6%) and France (6.5%).

The data obtained by the main host nations on the foreign population divided by country of citizenship make it possible to assess the importance of internal migrations within Europe, to have some indication about the size of the foreign communities coming from the countries of Mediterranean Europe, and to reveal the more significant links between areas of origin and destination (Table 4). In the period running roughly from 1950 to 1970, foreigners of European origin living in the six principal host countries (excluding the United Kingdom) rose from just over 2.7 to almost 6.3 million, increasing in these twenty years by about 3.5 million, while non-European foreigners in 1970 reached 1.8 million, with a growth in this 20-year period of just under 1.5 million (Table 4).

At the beginning of the 1970s, more than three-quarters of the foreigners living in the six nations considered were citizens from another European country (Table 4), confirming the prevalently European character of the huge number of migrations recorded in the 1950s and 1960s. Among the European areas of origin, the case of Italy stands out for the high number of emigrants - at the start of the 1970s, more than 2 million Italians were resident in other European nations - and for the broad span of destination countries (there were particularly high numbers of Italians in Switzerland, France and West

Germany, but also in Belgium and the United Kingdom). Spain follows with more than one million residents in other European countries, mostly in France but also in West Germany and Switzerland. For the other emigration countries, links with a precise host country clearly prevailed: France for the Portuguese and West Germany for the Greeks and Yugoslavs²¹ (Table 4).

If attention is limited to the active population, at the beginning of the 1970s, official statistics reveal approximately 6.5 million foreign workers in West Germany, France, Switzerland, in the Benelux countries and the United Kingdom (Table 5). Bearing in mind the vast numbers of illegal immigrants²² who are not recorded in official statistics or at least not until later (the French are a case in point), these figures are almost certainly an under-estimation. For example, it has been estimated that the statistics relating to France and Austria are about 20% lower than they should be to reflect reality [ILO 1973]. Even in West Germany, where strict implementation of recruitment procedures and the expulsion of workers entering outside official channels represented strong deterrents to the development of illegal immigration, about 15% of immigrants were estimated as being illegal [Castles and Kosack 1973]. According to Hume [1973] in 1973 there were about 8 million foreign workers in Western and Northern Europe. At the same date the ILO estimated the number of foreign workers living in the EEC countries, Austria, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland at 7.5 million [ILO 1973].

²¹ Emigration from Yugoslavia to Austria was also quite high. In 1973, some 180,000 Yugoslav workers were present in Austria.

²² According to McDonald [1969], it is possible to identify three categories of illegal workers: foreigners who have entered the host country without any type of permit and who try to find work; foreigners who have crossed the border legally as tourists or for reasons other than those of work and who later find a job without having the necessary permit; and foreign workers admitted into the country with a seasonal contract or with a work contract for a definite length of time who prolong their stay and continue to be employed without authorisation after their work permit has expired.

Table 4. Foreign population in some receiving countries according to citizenship around 1950 and 1970. Absolute values in thousands and percentages.																	
Countries of citizenship	Federal Republic of Germany			France		United Kingdom ^a		Switzerland		Belgium		Sweden ^b		Netherlands		Total ^c	
	1950	1960	1970	1947	1968	1951	1971	1950	1970	1950	1970	1950	1970	1950	1970	1950	1970
Absolute values (in thousands)																	
Europe of which:	...	528	2255	1547	1876	1122	1435	270	1030	347	581	106	388	74	151	2755	6281
- Italy	20	197	574	451	572	38	109	140	584	84	249	3	8	3	18	701	2004
- Spain	1	44	246	302	607	7	49	1	121	3	68	0	4	0	28	308	1073
- Greece	3	42	343	14	...	5	18	1	9	1	22	0	14	0	4	19	392
- Portugal	0	1	54	22	296	1	11	0	4	0	7	0	2	0	5	23	368
- Yugosl.	25	16	514	21	48	11	15	1	25	4	0	0	37	1	8	52	632
Not European countries	...	158	800	190	745	457	1548	15	50	20	115	2	19	30	101	379	1831
TOTAL	532	686	3054	1737	2621	1579	2983	285	1080	368	696	124	411	104	252	3149	8115
Percentage																	
Europe of which:	...	77.0	73.8	89.1	71.6	71.1	48.1	94.7	95.4	94.5	83.4	98.3	95.2	71.6	59.9	87.9	77.4
- Italy	3.7	28.7	18.8	26.0	21.8	2.4	3.7	49.1	54.1	22.9	35.8	2.4	1.9	3.2	7.0	22.4	24.7
- Spain	0.3	6.4	8.0	17.4	23.2	0.4	1.7	0.4	11.2	0.9	9.7	0.1	1.0	0.1	11.1	9.8	13.2
- Greece	0.5	6.1	11.2	0.8	0.0	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.8	0.3	3.2	0.1	3.4	0.1	1.4	0.6	4.8
- Portugal	0.0	0.1	1.8	1.3	11.3	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.1	1.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	2.1	0.7	4.5
- Yugosl.	4.6	2.4	16.8	1.2	1.8	0.7	0.5	0.3	2.3	1.2	0.0	0.1	9.0	1.0	3.0	1.6	7.8
Not European countries	...	23.0	26.2	10.9	28.4	28.9	51.9	5.3	4.6	5.5	16.6	1.7	4.8	28.4	40.1	12.1	22.6
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<p>Notes: (a) Excluding Northern Ireland; data according to country of birth [Hollingsworth, 1976, p. 116]. (b) Including not stated (16,000 in 1950 and 3,000 in 1970). (c) Excluding UK; for 1950 not available data for Germany are estimated using the same distribution between European and not European countries observed in 1960. (...) Data not available.</p> <p>Sources: United Nations, Demographic Yearbook [various editions], United Nations [1979; 1980], Council of Europe [1997].</p>																	

For that matter, in the early 1970s the number of foreign workers in the European host countries peaked as did the rate of activity of the foreign population which, except in certain specific cases (such as Belgium and France) was considerably higher than that of nationals, specifically due to immigration policies aimed at recruiting above all

single and temporary workers.

Table 5. Foreign workers in some European countries around 1960, 1965, 1970 and 1975. Absolute values in thousands and percentages on total labour force.							
Receiving countries	Absolute values (in thousands)				Percentages on total labour force		
	1960	1965	1970	1975	1960	1970	1975
Austria ^a	22	37	112	191	0.6	3.6	6.4
Belgium ^b	169	173	257	278	4.8	7.1	7.1
France ^c	1294	...	1584	1588	6.3	7.2	7.3
Fed. Rep. of Germany ^d	509	1166	1844	2222	1.9	6.9	8.2
Luxembourg	20	34	27	47	15.6	21.0	29.7
Netherland ^e	47	80	134	176	1.1	2.8	3.5
Sweden ^f	95	146	209	204	2.9	6.1	4.9
Switzerland ^g	329	550	605	568	13.6	20.5	18.1
United Kingdom ^h	1233	1543	1815	...	5.1	7.3	...

Notes: (a) Biffi [1986] published in Fassmann and Münz [1994, p. 158]. (b) 1961: United Nations data; 1964: Rose [1979, p. 24]; 1970: Werner [1976, p. 78]; 1975: Pennix [1984]. (c) 1962, 1968 and 1975 census data. (d) Frey and Mammey [1996]. For 1965 and 1970, Werner published very similar data [1976, p.79]. (e) 1965: Rose [1979, p. 24]. (f) 1965 and 1970: Werner [1976, p. 84]; 1975: OCDE [1978, p. 13]. (g) Excluding seasonal and frontier workers. (h) Active population foreign born (Included Irish 470,810 in 1966 and 480,720 in 1971). Census data published in Werner [1976, p. 83].

Sources: United Nations [1979], Pennix [1984] and papers quoted in the notes.

Around halfway through the 1970s, governments and employers in the host countries reacted to the economic recession - and the reduction of the capacity of the labour market to absorb labour following the 1973 oil crisis - by reducing the recruitment of foreign workers and imposing restrictive regulations on the entry of immigrants from former overseas territories [Hollifield 1992]. The reduction of foreign workers was brought about principally through the non-renewal or non-extension of temporary residence and work permits [Haug 1980]. In particular, in West Germany in order to reduce the influx of foreign workers, at first (September 1973) the recruitment fee that employers had to pay was considerably increased, next (two months later) a complete halt was called to the recruitment

of labour from abroad [Werner 1976]. According to some writers [Blotevogel, Muller-ter Jung and Wood 1993] this latter measure represented the formal conclusion of the so-called principle of “rotation” of the foreign labour force (subject to re-recruitment in the case of a new demand for labour), which had become, in any case, obsolete since the end of the 1960s. In France, already by 1972, an attempt was being made to put a brake on illegal entries by refusing to legalise foreigners who had entered the country after the end of 1971 (the Fontanet-Marcellin circular). In October 1973, the system for regularising immigrants once they had found a job was abolished and, in July 1974, the new Secretary of State for Immigration blocked the recruitment of foreign workers. Apart from these measures to slow up the entry of new workers, incentives were introduced to encourage the return to their countries of origin of a part of the work force already present in the territory. The effects of these measures are very evident in the period 1973-75 for the three principal host countries (West Germany, France and Switzerland) which show a great reduction in immigration and an increase in the emigration of foreigners²³ (Figure 1), just as the stock data reveals a reduction in the numbers of foreign workers, mainly caused by reducing the numbers of seasonal workers, in the case of Switzerland. In the long period the stop policies would not succeed in achieving their aims, as shown in the following chapter.

4. International migration from the mid-1970s to the present day

The stop policies represent a fundamental divider in the recent history of European international migration and, above all, signal a decisive moment in the process of the construction of a European migratory system. In fact, right from the beginning of the 1970s, even in a framework characterised by strong and significant elements of homogeneity between the different countries, national particularities

²³ In Sweden the overall migratory situation in the 1970s remained much more stable, with an increase in the inflows and a reduction of the outflows in the period 1973-76, reflecting both the greater resistance of the Swedish economy to the recession and also the different history and diverse characteristics of immigration which came mainly from Finland [King 1993b].

and diversities appear still more important and decisive, determining a clear fragmentation of the European migratory scene. Although it is true that pull factors had been determined by basically similar elements, the functioning and characteristics of the migratory process appeared to be very different from one country to another.

In the first place, there was still a very clear division between emigration and immigration countries which has practically disappeared inside today's European Union. Although with differing levels of intensity and participation shares, Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal continued to be among the principal suppliers of workers for the labour market of Central Northern Europe. In point of fact, the activation of strict controls and limits at the traditional entry points was an important cause of the transformation of these countries of Mediterranean Europe. First they developed into areas of transit and then into areas of definitive immigration.

In second place, there were still important differences between reception policies: certain countries (Germany and Switzerland, above all) aimed at reinforcing the temporary character of the flows, discouraging, more or less openly, the settling of immigrants and the arrival of their families; others, such as France, were more likely to exploit the immigration for work reasons in order to favour demographic re-balancing through the assimilation of the first and, especially, the second generation; yet others, such as United Kingdom, had had, until a few years before, a wide-open citizenship policy which had permitted millions of immigrants coming from the former colonies to transfer to the "mother country" with the same rights, including political rights, as nationals. Since then, while there are still many differences between the various migratory philosophies and policies, the internal dynamics of the phenomenon have tended to harmonise the European scenario through the effect of the definitive transformation of immigration from the temporary and cyclical reality it was - or was considered to be - into a permanent and structural reality.

In third place, the sending zones appear to be closely linked to the particular experience of every single destination, with the colonial ties and geographic proximity being the decisive factors in the start-up and continuing of the flows. In the years that followed, after the nearest sources of immigration had been reduced and any preferential links

with the now-independent colonies had been limited (often as a result of explicit political decisions), the overall area of attraction widened and the new immigration's composition by country of origin was increasingly independent of the destination country.

The evolution of these elements which formed part of the migratory dynamics and their characteristics, was accompanied and strongly influenced by the more general process of the growing economic and political integration of European countries. To the six countries which in 1957 founded the European Community under the Treaty of Rome, were added, in time, a further nine nations, excluding only Iceland, Switzerland and Norway among the countries that did not enter the Soviet sphere of influence after Yalta. This geographic expansion was also flanked by a steady strengthening of Community ties so much so as to lead to the launching of a single currency in the 1998. With regard to migration policy, for the countries adhering to the Schengen group integration and cooperation in this field are already a reality today in many respects: from the criteria of crossing external frontiers, to the procedures of control, to the possibilities of movement of foreign citizens admitted into common territory, to expulsions, to the granting of residence permits and to the collaboration with other states for the re-admission of expelled persons [Monar 1999]. And even if «the Treaty of Amsterdam (with its incorporation of Schengen, its clauses on “closer co-operation” and the protocols regarding Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom) drastically increases the possibilities for further differentiation (or flexibility) in the development of a European migration policy» [ibidem, pp. 1-2] there is no doubt that the process of European integration has had, and above all, will have an extremely important role in reinforcing the trend towards the creation of an increasingly united European migratory system.

Remaining in the field of international policy, another factor has had considerable importance in recent developments of the phenomenon. We are referring to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the progressive breaking up, in the early 1990s, of all the Socialist regimes, which has in fact brought about a rapid insertion of the countries of Eastern Europe into international migratory dynamics. If we exclude any movements of refugees following the end of World War II and some particular flows of refugees (because of the invasion

of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, of Soviet Jews etc.) only Yugoslavia, among the European countries with a planned economy, participated actively in the mechanisms of the transfer of the labour force from less developed areas to the more developed zones of Europe. In the last decade this situation has changed radically even if the real size of the flows appears much smaller than certain observers feared just a few years ago. In particular, the roles that all these countries have in European migratory interchange appear to be in a phase of profound change. In certain cases (the former Yugoslavia and the Caucasian Republics of the former Soviet Union) the changes, apart from determining strong political and economic instability, have acted as detonators of actual armed conflicts on an ethnic and racial basis, which have shown death and destruction and that unfailing corollary of refugees which Europeans believed they had definitively cancelled from their history. In other situations (Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary), proximity to the borders of the European Union and the desire for a closer association with the Western partners have caused these countries to acquire, apart from the role as a point of departure for large emigration flows and as a point of transit for immigration coming from other states, also the role of buffer zone protecting the borders of the richer Western neighbours [Collinson 1996]. In still other countries (for example, Albania), the sudden and total disappearance of any state and administrative structure whatever has set in motion massive uncontrolled exoduses, the dramatic images of which have been seen world-wide and the arresting of which, at least in the more massive and improvised forms, has required actual military intervention in order to allow elections to be held and political authority over the territory to be re-established.

In this way, in terms of both the ways of managing the flows and the foreign presence, and also the effects of the changes in the more general sphere of domestic and international policy on the dynamics of the processes of mobility, the political dimension of migration increasingly appears to be a decisive element for the description and the understanding of the phenomenon. In this sense the European context appears perfectly in line with the transformations which are marking international migration throughout the world and which, above all due to the effect of the shift from demand-oriented flows to supply-oriented flows, have seen a growing importance of the political

element between the different factors which influence the phenomenon. From this point, therefore, it is appropriate to begin our brief reconstruction of recent European migratory dynamics.


The objectives of the stop policies were basically traceable to four reasons: «First, there was a desire to minimise unemployment among indigenous populations. [...] The intent was to export rising unemployment to the greatest possible extent. [...] The second primary objective of implementing restrictions was a desire to minimise the growing social tensions created by the presence of large numbers of foreigners. [...] A third reason is associated with a longer-term desire to reduce dependency on foreign labour. This objective is based on concerns about the cost of increasing migrant claims on public goods and services. [...] Finally, policy options in a single country are constrained by actions taken by other countries. In the deteriorating economic climate of world-wide recession, no single country feels able to maintain a completely open admission policy after his neighbours have closed their frontiers» [OECD 1978, pp. 21-23]. The choice, on the part of the arrival country, of using the safety valve of immigration above all as a way of responding to the social and economic problems created by the economic crisis (caused by the oil crisis of the early 1970s) appears fairly clear, even if the OECD did not fail to indicate important signs of the desire to intervene on the unplanned long-term effects of the phenomenon. The impression remains however that the interventions were still mainly aimed at the short-term perspective, in line, therefore, with policies implemented until then. This evaluation is also supported by the politically low profile of these measures, almost all of which were based on simple provisions of an administrative nature, without any prior discussion in Parliament, even if the importance of the matter and the relevance of the changes would have merited such debate [Hammar 1985].

In effect, in the following years and in those closer to us today, the more structural objectives will be the ones guiding the migration policies of the European countries, on the wave of a growing preoccupation spreading through public opinion and often encouraged by the electoral success of extreme right-wing parties and movements using the fight against immigration as one of the fundamental points of their political programmes. The consequences of these changes of direction and scenario on international European migration have been

deep and long-lasting. Having ended the *trente glorieuses*, as perhaps somewhat pompously and with a touch of nostalgia the post-war decades of strong economic growth were called in France, that harmony of interests between the different players (immigrants, governments of countries of origin and destination, contractors and workers in the arrival countries) in the migratory process was broken, a harmony which until then had characterised the phenomenon, allowing it to develop in an extremely favourable context. In particular, from those years onwards a profound process restructuring the European and world economies was set in motion which has certainly brought about a strong reduction of the explicit demand for immigrants in the central sectors of production systems and, in general, an overall reorganisation of labour markets and, as a result, of the role of the foreign labour force.

The different methods of data collection and variations in the actual definitions of immigrant and emigrant, which we mentioned in the first chapter, make it extremely difficult to reconstruct a statistically trustworthy overall picture of the evolution of the phenomenon. Moreover, while limiting our attention to the regular flows of foreign citizens alone (Figure 5), we obtain far from homogeneous movements among the various countries and not only because of a real diversity in the trends of the phenomenon, but sometimes also as a consequence of regularisation procedures (France 1982; Italy 1987-88, 1990 and 1995-96) or of changes in the definitions used or the criteria applied in statistical sources. The result is that in some cases (Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands) immigration increased in the second half of the 1970s, diminished in the early 1980s, then revived again towards the start of the 1990s to then fall off in the years closer to the present period. In other countries (Belgium and Sweden) on the other hand, immigration decreased until 1983, to then increase in the years that followed and drop once again at the end of the period under observation, even though with a quite different intensity in the two countries. In still other countries (the United Kingdom), the increase continued practically until the beginning of the 1990s, with a decrease in the first years of the decade and an increase in the most recent years.

Figure 5. Migration flows of foreigners in some European countries, 1975-1996. Absolute values in thousands.



Nevertheless, this already somewhat diversified typology does not tell the whole story since the other examples considered present different profiles again.

Figure 5. Migration flows of foreigners in some European countries, 1975-1996. Absolute values in thousands (*continued*).





Figure 5. Migration flows of foreigners in some European countries, 1975-1996. Absolute values in thousands (continued).



Source: elaboration on OECD data.

This state of things makes it extremely arduous to find a single thread of interpretation, mainly because the available statistical picture offers only a partial image of the phenomenon that does not always reflect the real trends. However, given the weight of Germany in the context of immigration flows in Europe in the period under consideration²⁴, with good reason we can rightly take the German case as a reasonable approximation (in many ways similar to Switzerland and Holland) as an example of the more general trends at European level. Moreover, in this way there is also the advantage, apart from making it easier to describe, of working on statistics of reasonably


²⁴ The percentage of immigration flows directed to Germany in relation to those directed to the countries considered in the period under examination has, except for a few cases, always been greater than 50%, in many years it was more than 60% and managed to touch 69% in 1992 and 1996.

good quality offering a measurement of immigration and emigration flows allowing us to quantify the migration balances. In Germany, right from the early 1980s, the phenomenon has fluctuated, with a prevalence in certain periods of outflows over inflows, while from 1985 to the beginning of the 1990s there was a period of a great increase in arrivals and a notable increase in positive net migration. The more recent years are marked by a decided inversion of the trend due to the restrictions introduced in the granting of political asylum and a more stringent control policy of the flows in arrival. Thus from the 1.2 million entries of 1992 the figure fell to 700,000 in 1996 and, in those same years, went from a situation of positive net migration very close to 600,000 to 150,000.


The German case offers us the opportunity to indicate another interesting aspect of international migration. The data we have just examined refers only to the foreign component of the phenomenon which is - for obvious reasons - the part studied and examined the most but which does not totally exhaust the migratory dynamics of a country. Figure 6 describes the trend of migratory flows of the principal components of the phenomenon. It can be noted how the immigration of German citizens grew considerably from 1987 onwards, reaching over 420,000 in 1990, and in the following years remaining between 200,000 and 300,000. The largest part of this flow was made up of the *Aussiedler* (ethnic Germans), coming mostly from Poland, the former Soviet Union and Romania, in some cases descendants of a centuries-old German emigration to Eastern Europe. On the whole this immigration from 1988 to 1996 involved 2.2 million people to whom should be added the 784,000 people coming from the Democratic Republic in the two final years of the existence of the two Germanys prior to unification.

The result is a much higher volume of migrants overall than that referring only to foreigners. In 1989, the total arrivals (foreigners, *Aussiedler*, German citizens and arrivals from the Democratic Republic) actually exceeded 1.5 million and in 1990 1.6 million, giving rise in these two years to a net migration of 980,000 and one million units.

Figure 6. Migration movements in Germany, 1975-1997. Absolute values in thousands.




..... Foreigners - - - - - DRG - . - . - - Aussiedler ——— Total



..... Foreigners - . - . - - Nationals - - - - - DRG ——— Total

Figure 6. Migration movements in Germany, 1975-1997. Absolute values in thousands (continued).



Source: elaboration on data published in Frey and Mammei [1996], Wendt [1999].

Between 1986 and 1996 the inhabitants of Germany therefore increased as a result of international migration by almost 5.8 million, a really high number and one that was greater than the population of Denmark and Finland, and equal to 10.5 % of the population in Germany at the start of the period. There is no doubt that the situation of Germany was very special - the division into two states and a citizenship law that considered as full citizens both those living in the Democratic Republic and the *Aussiedler* as well led to the starting of a mechanism when the division into two blocs came to an end which boosted the figures to this great extent. Even with these exceptional characteristics, however, this example is significant in that it shows the need to look at all the components of migration with attention. If, in fact, the flows of foreigners have a greater visibility and impact on the host society and polarise political attention, then the whole situation of arrivals and outflows influences the economic and

demographic system.

Returning to the foreign presence in the countries of Western Europe, in Table 6 we have offered an overview of the evolution of the phenomenon from 1975 to 1996. In stock terms, the foreign population grew in this score of years in all European countries. In certain cases it more than doubled, as in Austria and Italy, where the present figures are respectively 2.7 and almost 6 times higher than those of 1975. The reduction of the figures recorded in Sweden between 1975 and 1986 and in France between 1982 and 1990 are above all the result of freer legislation regarding the granting of citizenship which has allowed many immigrants and their children to become naturalised. On the other hand, the drop in the foreign presence in Switzerland between 1975 and 1986 is to be attributed to a greater administrative capacity of control which has led to a prevalence of outgoing flows from 1975 to 1978, with losses which have arrived at even 65,000 and 75,000 people per year.

At the end of 1996, foreigners in Germany numbered 7.3 million, probably more than 3 million in France, just under 2 million in the United Kingdom, 1.3 million in Switzerland, 1.1 million in Italy, 900,000 in Belgium and significant figures are found in almost all the other countries considered. The presence of immigrants has grown, with the sole exception of France, in relative terms as well. In Germany, foreigners represented 5.2% of the population in 1975 while in 1996 this figure had risen to 8.9%; in the same period in Switzerland figures rose from 16.4% to 19%. In 1996 foreigners number 9% of the total population in Austria and Belgium, around 6% in France and Sweden, close to 5% in Denmark and Holland, and over 3% in Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom, while figures between 1.1% and 1.7% are registered in the new immigration countries of Southern and Northern Europe.

It is clear that the overall dynamic of immigrant populations, defined in these statistics on the basis of the possession of a citizenship different from that of the country of residence, is the fruit not only of the new gains and losses determined by the migratory flows, but also of the processes of demographic exchange and the possibility of losing the title of "foreigner" on acquiring the citizenship of the country of immigration.

Table 6. Foreign population and foreign labour force in some European countries, 1975, 1986 and 1996^a. Absolute values in thousands and percentages on total population and on total labour force.						
Countries	Absolute values (in thousands)			Percentages on total population		
	1975	1986	1996	1975	1986	1996
	Foreign population ^b					
Austria	271	315	728	3.6	4.1	9.0
Belgium	835	853	912	8.5	8.6	9.0
Denmark	91	128	238	1.8	2.5	4.7
Finland	13	17	74	0.3	0.4	1.4
France	3442	3714	3597	6.6	6.8	6.3
Germany	4090	4513	7314	6.6	7.4	8.9
Ireland	69	77	118	2.2	2.2	3.2
Italy	186	450	986	0.3	0.8	1.7
Luxembourg	86	97	143	24.0	26.3	34.1
Norway	71	109	158	1.8	2.6	3.6
Netherlands	350	568	680	2.6	3.9	4.4
Portugal	..	95	173	..	1.0	1.7
Spain	..	293	539	..	0.8	1.3
Sweden	410	391	527	5.0	4.7	6.0
Switzerland	1039	956	1338	16.4	14.7	19.0
United Kingdom	1436	1820	1972	2.7	3.2	3.4
	Foreign labour force ^c					
Austria	191	155	328	6.4	5.3	10.0
Belgium	278	270	341	7.1	6.8	8.1
Denmark	..	60	84	..	2.1	3.0
Finland	19	0.8
France	1588	1556	1605	7.3	6.5	6.3
Germany	2227	1834	2559	8.2	6.8	9.1
Ireland	..	33	52	..	2.5	3.5
Italy	..	285	1.3	..
Luxembourg	47	59	118	29.7	35.6	53.8
Norway	..	49	55	..	2.3	2.6
Netherlands	176	169	218	3.5	3.2	3.1
Portugal	..	46	87	..	1.0	1.8
Spain	..	58	162	..	0.4	1.0
Sweden	204	215	218	4.9	4.9	5.1
Switzerland	553	567	709	17.7	16.4	17.9
United Kingdom	..	815	878	..	3.4	3.4
Notes: (a) For the definitions used in the different countries see the sources of data. (b) 1975: 1974 for Finland. 1986: 1982 for France; 1988 for Portugal. 1996: 1990 for France. (c) 1975: 1974 for Belgium. 1986: 1988 for Norway, Portugal and Spain; 1991 for Italy. 1996: 1995 for Denmark.						
Sources: 1975: Pennix [1984]; 1986 e 1996: OECD, Sopemi Report, 1998 Edition.						

In this sense, the opposite tendencies in France and Germany appear particularly significant. Nevertheless, since we wish here to

draw more general conclusions, it is clear, at more than twenty years since the introduction of the stop policy, that if the aim of these provisions was to prevent immigration stabilising, then this result has certainly not been reached. On the contrary, in some countries the size of the foreign population has doubled compared to the 1975 figures. This outcome is also due in part to the structural effects of this immigration on the functioning of European economic systems.

In point of fact, if we consider the number of foreign workers and their share in the total work force in the European immigration countries, it can be noted that between 1975 and 1986 there was a general downward trend both in absolute and relative terms, while in the decade that followed, absolute values and percentages almost always increased or were basically stable. The differing trend, in the first decade under consideration, between the weight of the foreign population and the weight of foreign workers on their respective aggregates of reference is indicative of the process of the stabilisation of immigration. New entries decreased, workers who remained were joined by their families and, as a result, the whole demographic structure of the immigrant community tended towards a gradual normalisation, with a reduction in the weight of the active and an increase in the weight of the inactive. In more recent years the foreign labour force in Germany increased from 6.8% of the total for 1986 to 9.1% in 1996, in Austria from 5.3% to 10%, in Switzerland from 16.4% to 17.9%, not to mention the small state of Luxembourg which shot from 35.6% to 53.8%. More stability can be seen, on the other hand, in the figures for France (6.3%-6.5%), Holland (3.1-3.2%), Sweden (4.9-5.1%) and the United Kingdom (3.4% in both years). This trend towards growth, apart from the revival of the flows recorded in many countries, may also be explained by the entry of women and the second generations into the labour market.

5. Conclusions

As has already been underlined, the problems of measuring international migration and the foreign population are also due to the existence of migratory movements that do not respect the rules governing entry into the receiving countries, giving place to a number of foreigners - varying from year to year - that cannot be found in

administrative sources because they are illegal as regards their presence in the territory. Until the mid-1970s, bilateral agreements between countries of origin and destination and the mechanisms for the ordinary regularisation of some irregular situations allowed by some receiving countries lead us to think that the stock of illegal immigrants is probably not so significant. This supposition is further supported by the consideration that many illegal immigrants only stayed for a few months in the receiving countries of Western Europe [Fassmann and Münz 1994b]. For these reasons, even though illegal migrants have a significant effect on the size and therefore the evolution of emigration from the countries of origin and above all on immigration in the destination countries, they have not produced significant effects on the size of the foreign population and foreign workers in the receiving areas.

The closure of the borders to new foreign workers in place since 1973 has however produced an increase in the number of illegal immigrants. In fact, the existence of informal ethnic networks and the possibility of entering receiving countries as tourists (so-called “disguised” migration) are the main factors that have encouraged illegal immigration into the traditional receiving countries. New categories of illegal seasonal workers have emerged and there is a quasi-commuter type of migration even over long distances [Fassmann and Münz 1994b]. Policies stopping the entry of new immigrants began in 1973-74, and the difficulties for immigrants in legalising their own status created the conditions for the appearance of a new type of illegal immigrant whose status generally remains the same for a long time. This new illegal flow involving Europe is, according to Tapinos [1982], radically different from that observed up until the mid-1970s and basically similar to that seen in the United States. Furthermore, foreign immigration into the new European receiving countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) is characterised by the presence of a significant component of illegal immigrants, mostly coming from less developed countries, in particular those of the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean basin, and from Eastern Europe. Illegal immigrants constitute such a large part of the foreign population in the new immigration countries that numerous attempts have been made to estimate this component. From the mid-1980s until today, in Italy and in Spain, there have been four

important amnesty laws, to allow the transition of a large number of immigrants from an illegal/irregular position to one of legality as regards staying in the country and, in some cases, as regards the work situation. In the last few years, regularisation provisions have also been introduced in Portugal (in 1992-93 and in 1996), Greece (1997-98) and France (1997-98) [OECD 1999; 2001].

And yet, this increase in irregular immigration, even with its specific nature and all its negative consequences, is a sign of the transformation of Europe into an area with strong pull factors for migratory flows, in a way not dissimilar from the migration system in North America. In fact, even if international migration involves a far greater number of geographic areas (from the oil-producing Arab countries to the new “tigers” of South-East Asia, to Japan itself and to other developing areas in the world) there is no doubt that the two systems with the greatest pull factors and greatest internal similarity are indeed Western Europe on the one hand and North America on the other. Of course, these are the two areas in the world which are the most economically advanced and where the largest part of production and consumption of goods and services is concentrated and, therefore, it certainly does not seem surprising that they are the preferred points of arrival.

In this sense, international migration is characterised as one, but not the only one and in some ways not even the most important one, of the numerous flows that at different contextual levels connect the geographic areas. Acquiring an overview of the complex network of economic and demographic flows linking the European countries amongst each other and with external areas is surely a difficult but indispensable task in order to understand the processes under way. In these pages, we have reconstructed, albeit in synthesis, the history of European international migration since the Second World War. We have highlighted some fundamental shifts, showing how the consequences of the conflict, historical and colonial links, policies of active recruitment and the division of the world into two opposing blocs played a decisive role in the first stage (until approximately 1973). It is more difficult to identify the key elements in the more recent period in which, on the basis of a still very fragmented picture, we have gradually characterised and explained the basic structure of the phenomenon, in a general context which - in the 1990s - was

marked by changes that we can only define as monumental: from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the processes of the globalisation of economic and social systems. These latter elements have accelerated the development of migration, making the differences between rich and poor countries increasingly obvious (and also more well-known), introducing Eastern Europe into the international migration exchange once again and creating new possibilities in the arrival countries of settling in, even in the face of significant levels of unemployment.

This entire group of factors makes the political aspect even more central in the characterisation of the migration processes (both in the determination of their size and characteristics), but it makes it even more important to identify the ways of effectively dealing with the problems. To stay within our field of interest, it is clear that suitable interventions cannot exclude a consideration of the different rhythms of growth of populations and economies in the arrival and departure countries, of the reciprocal relationships between migration and capital movements and of the specific role that the mobility of individuals has within the network of relationships of various types that links geographic areas.

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POPULATION AND LABOUR MARKET CHANGES
IN THE PROCESS OF OUT-MIGRATION:
EVIDENCE FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN AND
CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

*Caterina Gallina and Giuseppe Gesano**

1. Theories on international migration: micro and macro approaches

The scientific literature on international migration has been swinging between macro and micro approaches for a long time¹. Micro approaches seem to better explain the complex process by which individuals, families, or groups decide that they have to migrate for the survival of their family or group or – more probably – to raise their standard of living. Moreover, in relation to migration chains, micro approaches often succeed in explaining both why migrations may or may not occur under similar conditions, and also the main direction they take among possible routes and destinations.

Nevertheless, the individual/family/group's status and their terms of reference largely depend on some crucial macro variables. These can be considered either in a bilateral/multilateral framework, highlighting international imbalances in population and economics which encourage potential migrants and flows², or in terms of a 'stand-alone' approach, which searches for connections between the development of the sending country and its out-migration. As a matter of fact, though the latter approach is much simpler and less realistic

* This paper was presented as provisional draft to the Conference on "International Migration: Challenges for European Populations" held in Bari, 25-27 June, 1998.

The paper has been produced jointly by the authors. Nevertheless, G. Gesano is mainly responsible for the framework, model and chapters 1 and 2; C. Gallina for the statistical methods, elaboration, and chapter 3.

¹ For a review, see Bilborrow and Zlotnik [1995], Greenwood and McDowell [1992].

² For a multilateral analysis of labour markets and international migration see Venturini [1988], Bruni e Pinto [1990].

than the bilateral/multilateral one it can be usefully employed when an overview is needed. This is because each country has to come to terms with its own demographic and economic status and development from which its migration potential and possible outflows might originate. By means of the simultaneous analysis of these factors over a large number of countries and different periods of time, we could confirm or reject the hypothesis on causal connections between status/change in population/economics and international migration. Furthermore, different steps in the parallel process of population/economic development and migration phase could be singled out. On the other hand, in a migration network which has become increasingly complex, where main sending and receiving countries and bilateral connections are becoming less and less precise, it is almost impossible to apply the macro approach in the search for explanatory causes of international migration in differentials between countries because of continuous changes in origins, flows, and destinations.

For these reasons, dealing with possible domestic causes of international migration from the MENA and CEE countries³ over the 1950-1990 time period, we chose to approach the problem by studying the parallel trends in population, economic patterns and out-migration flows. Our aims were: *i*) to search for and confirm any relationship between migratory change and the levels and changes in the demographic and economic pattern of the labour market in the sending countries, with special attention to the demographically originated surplus in the labour supply as compared to the development of employment by industry; and *ii*) to find any possible inter-country and inter-temporal analogies in simultaneous phases of economic development and migration.

³ MENA = Middle East and Northern Africa; here (non-migration and very small countries excluded) Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. CEE = Central and Eastern Europe: here (Albania and former USSR excluded) Poland, former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and former Yugoslavia. For inter-country comparisons, Spain, Italy, and Greece (SEM = Southern Europe Mediterranean countries) are also considered.

2. Economic patterns, the labour market, and out-migration: our hypothesis

Although international migration is a complex phenomenon which cannot be reduced to a single causal matrix since family members, students, people moving for different personal reasons, and even refugees and asylum-seekers add to the number of labour migrants, nevertheless these latter still form the core and pull flows, at least in normal times and situations⁴. Permanent or temporary labour migration is particularly made up of young male adults: here male migrants aged 15-34 years are considered in particular, but also women of the same age and the male and female population of working-age overall (15-64 years⁵) are taken into account, because they also participate in the migration process, either as followers or, in some specific or later phases, as autonomous actors.

If the push-factor hypothesis is accepted, labour out-migration largely depends on changes in the internal labour market during the time period considered or immediately before it⁶. On the demographic side, these changes affect both the size and structure of the labour force while, on the economic side, both participation rates and composition by industry are modified.

In a country just appearing on the international migration stage the starting pattern is normally characterised by a very young labour force, for the most part employed – or rather – under-employed in agriculture, the sector which usually prevails over the others. Population growth and internal urbanisation together with the industrial restructuring and possible economic developments make the labour market change so that any pre-existing and new imbalances are

⁴ Although many exceptional events and conditions occurred in some of the countries considered here during the 1950-1990 period, it could be considered 'normal' when the CEE countries are singled out for their political and economic peculiarity, which ended only in the very late 1980s.

⁵ Working age should be defined with wider limits in less developed countries since children and the elderly also work there. Here they are considered as the marginal labour force (MLF) as opposed to the core labour force (CLF) of people aged 15-64 years.

⁶ Here only ten-years time periods are used, so hampering the study of any possible time-lagged correlation.

revealed, surpluses in the labour supply are produced especially among people entering the labour market, and pressure for their out-migration follows.

Large reductions in the agricultural labour force or, at least, a decrease of its share of the total labour force⁷ often characterise this phase because: *i)* the excess of under-employed people does not permit large numbers of new entries, except as marginal labourers; *ii)* those excesses should be cleared away thus reducing the real agricultural labour force because of the changes in products and an increase in productivity; *iii)* people in towns actually work or try to get a job either in manufacturing or in the service and administrative sector rather than in agriculture. Nevertheless, when the economic transformation and development are unable to employ the whole demographic surplus in non-agricultural sectors and/or out-migration is hindered, agriculture may still absorb unemployed people, so further expanding, notwithstanding the surplus already existing there. This occurs especially to the female labour force, because women often substitute male migrants in the fields and cattle-raising. Moreover, the modernisation of society makes female labour statistically evident in the rural context as well.

The manufacturing and especially the service sector may be growing considerably in an insufficiently buoyant economy. This is what is actually happening in many overgrown cities in the Third World. So, the migratory push may be higher there since people who have already moved from rural to urban areas and/or own nearly nothing but the shanty in which they live are more likely to migrate abroad than rural people, who often lack the necessary information for leaving.

Causes and processes are hence complex, also using the push approach to international migration. We were obliged to simplify them because of the data set available and the aggregate view we used. Briefly, we hypothesised that migratory outflows might originate from the imbalance between 'expected' and 'actual' changes in the 'core labour force' in a ten-year period. This unbalance in fast growing populations and developing economies normally comes both from the

⁷ See Table A1 in the Methodological and Statistical Annex.

excess of the demographic supply and the outflow of labour force from agriculture, while the increase of jobs in other industries turns to be insufficient in facing those numbers [Fielding 1993].

The expected change in the labour force – which, from this particular viewpoint, can be considered as the labour supply – is produced by natural demographic changes, i.e. the cohort turnover and deaths of people in labour age: it brings in each age group an ‘expected’ amount of population who, if entering the labour market at the same specific participation rates of the starting point in time, gives an ‘expected’ labour supply (ELS)⁸. The difference between ELS and the corresponding actual labour force ten years before gives the additional demographic supply (ADS), which only depends on the demographic component of the ten-years change in the labour force, being the specific participation rates constant.

The labour force change each country experiences in practice is the final result of the more or less satisfactory match between the potential increase in labour supply and the developments in labour demand. We divided this into a backward and overcrowded sector – agriculture –, which should be reduced, and the rest. We assumed that the latter provides satisfactory jobs for the additional demographic supply (ADS) and in the event of an inadequate number of new non-agricultural jobs, an unsatisfied additional demographic supply (UADS) is produced.

The decrease in the number of agricultural jobs should initially match any possible reduction in the ‘marginal labour force’ (workers under 15 or over 65 years), and then release ex-agricultural workers (EAW) into the ‘core labour market’. If there are still any available jobs in non-agricultural sectors, those workers can be transferred from the ‘backward’ to the ‘modern’ labour market or they can also be considered ‘unsatisfied ex-agricultural workers’ (UEAW).

The careful combination of the UEAW together with the UADS

⁸ An usual component method was used for splitting the labour-force change occurring in each of the five-year groups into the demographic and labour participation change. As always happens with these methods, a mixed component also arises. Then the demographic component was further split into the natural and migratory components (see the Annex).

makes up the unsatisfied additional supply (UAS). People in this category could: *i*) exit the labour market without out-migrating thus reducing labour participation rates (ΔLPR)⁹ or *ii*) migrate abroad (MC)¹⁰. The actual migrations in the period 1950-1990 (aged both 15-64 and 15-34) from our selected countries can hence be correlated with the UAS in order to prove to what extent this simple model works. This has been extrapolated for the total population (with reference both to total and only male migration), as well as separately for males and females. Substitution phenomena between males and females can occur in the labour migrant population, thus making an aggregate analysis necessary; nevertheless gender specific labour markets do work especially in backward economies, and labour migration is often carried out prevalently by males, thus making separate analysis by gender relevant.

3. Data set and analysis

In 1997, the International Labour Office published an updated version of its estimates and projections of national labour force by gender and five-years groups [ILO, 1997] and these are consistent with the UN's population estimates and projections produced in 1996 [UN, 1997]. The time period considered starts in 1950 and a ten-year period is used in ILO's tables, while the UN gives population estimates for each year ending in zero or five. ILO also produced estimates for the contemporary labour force by three-sector industry and gender, not disaggregated by age group. As the introductory notes warn, these numbers are largely hypothetical for many less developed countries, especially for the earlier periods and females whose labour

⁹ In changing societies specific labour participation rates may also be reduced by causes different from labour market mismatches between supply and demand: e.g. the spreading and lengthening of the educational process, the starting of pension and assistance benefits from the welfare state, etc.. But, as previously noted, modernisation often makes female participation rates increase, especially in the younger cohorts.

¹⁰ A third solution is provided in backward countries: the swelling of the labour force under-employed in agriculture. As stated before, this especially happens to the female core labour force.

activity may often be underestimated¹¹.

The aforementioned hypothesis concerning demographic and labour market dynamics has been implemented as reported in the Methodological and Statistical Annex. All the countries show positive natural demographic change (ADS) in all four periods considered here. This actually becomes an unsatisfied additional demographic supply (UADS) in only 51 per cent out of the 216 cases considered (18 countries x 4 time periods x 3 sexes), with a higher prevalence in MENA countries and, elsewhere, for males (Table 1). Reductions of the core labour force employed in agriculture (EAW) affect 65 per cent of cases, prevalently in CEE countries and males, but only 50 per cent show an unsatisfied amount of workers leaving agriculture (UEAW). From the composition of the UADS and the UEAW we obtained 76 per cent of cases in which an unsatisfied additional supply (UAS) is produced. This percentage is mainly higher for males and in MENA countries highlighting the pressure existing on those labour markets since the 1950s.

Ten-years change	MENA Countries (9)			CEE Countries (6)			SEM Countries (3)		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
ADS > 0	36	36	36	24	24	24	12	12	12
UADS > 0	28	31	29	12	2	5	3	0	1
EAW > 0	19	5	16	24	22	24	12	8	11
UEAW > 0	17	13	11	23	11	17	10	0	5
UAS > 0	34	31	31	24	11	17	11	0	6
LPR(15-64) < 0	35	4	27	23	10	16	12	0	7
MC(15-64) < 0	21	24	22	23	21	23	9	7	9
LPR(15-34) < 0	35	4	27	23	10	16	12	0	7
MC(15-34) < 0	31	29	29	22	21	22	9	7	8

Source: our elaboration of ILO and UN estimates.

This pressure, together with other factors, pushes for both

¹¹ Female participation rates go from a minimum of 9.9 per cent (Lebanon 1950) to a maximum of 40.5 per cent (Morocco 1990) in MENA countries, Turkey excluded, where very high initial levels have been decreasing during the forty-year period under consideration, while female activity rates have increased in almost all the other countries, CEE and SEM countries included.

reductions in labour participation and out-migration. The effect may be different on the whole working-age population and its younger part, which is more interested in positive and negative changes in activity and more likely to move. Education reduces participation rates at the younger ages for both genders, while, usually, new female cohorts explicitly participate in the labour market more than the previous ones did at the same age. Also, a higher propensity to migrate in the 15-34 years group has been widely found [Rogers and Castro, 1981]. In fact, almost all the cases considered here for males show the effects of reduction in labour participation rates both for people aged 15-34 and 15-64 years, while, for females, this only happens, to a lesser extent, in CEE countries and in some MENA countries. Out-migration is present in 82 per cent of cases for people aged 15-34 years and 75 per cent for people aged 15-64 years: this appears to be more age- and gender-specific in MENA countries, and more diffuse in CEE countries. The first step in our analysis aimed to prove a correlation between pressure on the labour market – as measured by the quota of unsatisfied additional supply (UAS) out of the expected labour supply (ELS) – and contemporary migratory change (MC) – as measured by the quota of the expected relevant population. Because of possible inter-gender offset and the prevalence of male international migration we tested the model on the total population, either with total and only male migratory change, for both the 15-64 and 15-34 age groups. Gender-specific models were also tested¹².

The correlation (R) is negative almost everywhere, confirming the relationship between demographic pressure on the labour market and migratory outflow of people of working age.

Nevertheless, the limited number of valid cases (MENA countries excluded, where R is, on the contrary, positive) and low correlation in female specific models (everywhere) confirm both that female labour markets have worked in different ways (e.g., raising participation rates in younger cohorts or increasing the agricultural labour force) and that

¹² Since UAS can only be positive or zero, we excluded the latter cases from the test, so reducing the case set to the number of valid cases mentioned in Table 2 and corresponding to the line 'UAS > 0' in Table 1.


female international migration still largely follows different paths from labour migration.

Table 2. Correlation (R) between the unsatisfied additional supply (UAS) and migratory change by group of countries, sex, and age group of migrants ^(a) .					
Independent variable	Dependent variable	Group of countries	Number of valid cases	Age group of migrants	
				15-64	15-34
Total UAS	Total migration	MENA Cs	31	-0.695**	-0.635**
		CEE Cs	17	-0.005	0.055
		SEM Cs	6	-0.895*	-0.867*
		All Cs	54	-0.579**	-0.513**
Total UAS	Male migration	MENA Cs	31	-0.710**	-0.636**
		CEE Cs	17	0.058	0.090
		SEM Cs	6	-0.859*	-0.918**
		All Cs	54	-0.587**	-0.513**
Male UAS	Male migration	MENA Cs	34	-0.900**	-0.839**
		CEE Cs	24	-0.028	0.020
		SEM Cs	11	-0.856**	-0.913**
		All Cs	69	-0.818**	-0.752**
Female UAS	Female migration	MENA Cs	31	0.275	0.302
		CEE Cs	11	-0.487	-0.633*
		SEM Cs	0	-	-
		All Cs	42	0.232	0.250

^(a) Because of the method, the age of migrants is their final age in each time period.
 ** = significance at 0.01 level; * = significance at 0.05 level
Source: our elaboration of ILO and UN estimates.

In CEE countries the relationships were looser or even inverted, probably because of both restrictions to out-migration and special rules in the functioning of their labour markets under the centrally programmed economy. We find the highest significant correlation for male UAS and male 15-34 migratory change in SEM countries, where valid cases are almost always concentrated in the first and second time period for all countries, when their out-migration was really abundant and the transformation of the economy from agriculture to the modern sector took place everywhere. But the model also works very well for males in MENA countries, both for 15-34 and, especially, the 15-64 group, as highlighted in Figure 1. Finally, the correlation between total UAS and male migratory change is significantly high in MENA and SEM countries.

Figure 1. Relationship between unsatisfied additional supply (UAS, per thousand of the expected labour supply) and migratory change (MC, per thousand of the expected relevant population) by sex and age group of migrants.



Source: our elaboration of ILO and UN estimates.

So the model seems to describe correctly what happened in fast transforming economies with a high and declining male labour force employed in agriculture and many opportunities for international out-migration. This is the case in SEM countries, in earlier decades, and in

MENA countries, especially in later decades.

Our second step aimed to verify a more complex model, where migratory change is correlated with a set of stock and flow variables in the same time period¹³. The model was separately tested by gender (male, female, and total) and two age groups (15-64 and 15-34). A backward method was privileged for reducing non-significant independent variables.

Results are in Table 3, where only significant independent variables up to level 0.1 appear.

	15-64			15-34		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
R^2	0.637	0.383	0.648	0.533	0.293	0.530
Independent variable TAR	-	-	-	-	1.424**	-
Independent variable %Agr	-2.441**	-0.958**	-2.217**	-2.199**	-	-1.730**
Independent variable Δ Agr	2.393**	1.775**	2.513**	2.463**	0.803*	2.541**
Independent variable Δ NAgr	2.306**	0.737**	1.943**	2.127**	0.457**	1.742**
Independent variable Δ Marg	-	-	-	-0.496*	-	-0.449*
Independent variable Δ D	-3.756**	-3.333**	-4.168**	-1.934**	-	-2.056**
Independent variable Δ LPR	-10.519**	-2.137**	-3.967**	-	-	-
Dummy variable MENA	-	-	-	-0.456*	-0.535**	-0.335
Dummy variable CEE	-	-	-	-	-0.352	-

** = significance at 0.01 level; * = significance at 0.05 level
Source: our elaboration of ILO and UN estimates.

In the 15-64 models there are no differences either by gender or by group of countries. Natural demographic change is the most

¹³ The set of independent variables is as follows: TAR = initial total activity rate, sum of five-year specific participation rates between the ages of 15 and 64 (15-34), as a percentage of total years; %Agr = initial percentage of labour force employed in agriculture; Δ Agr = percentage change of labour force employed in agriculture; Δ NAgr = percentage change of labour force employed in other industries; Δ Marg = percentage change of the marginal labour force; Δ D = percentage change of 15-64 (15-34) labour force due only to the natural demographic change; Δ LPR = percentage change of 15-64 (15-34) labour force due only to the changes in specific labour participation rates; MENA = dummy for MENA countries; CEE = dummy for CEE countries.

determinant variable in almost all cases, but modernisation of the economy, with changes in labour participation and a labour force shifting from agriculture to other industries, also plays an important role, highlighting mutual offset between out-migration and the developments of the internal labour markets. High initial levels of the agricultural labour force accompany high out-migration, while the level of labour participation and changes in the marginal labour force seem to be of no particular importance. A more limited correlation for females is confirmed again, but the set of significant variables is exactly the same.

On the contrary, in the 15-34 age group, country groups play a certain but limited role, underlining the difficult situation in the MENA countries. The set of significant variables is different here for males and females whose model is not very well determined and migratory change is positively correlated only with the level of labour participation (i.e. modern v. traditional countries) and the increase in the female labour force employed both in agriculture (probably due to a substitution effect because of male migration) and in other industries (i.e. modernisation). In the male and total models, main predictor variables are to be found in the level of the agricultural sector and the change in the labour force by industry. Moreover, possible increases of the marginal labour force seem to hamper out-migration of young men and vice-versa, while population change exerts less pressure here than in the 15-64 age group and the change in labour participation has no importance.

Though the preceding analyses have already specified the model by gender and group of countries allowing little optimism for other analogies, we tried to find clusters starting from the set of variables used in multiple correlation¹⁴, but reducing them in a factorial analysis from which we drew four factors (80 per cent of variance explained), either for the 15-64 or the 15-34 age groups. For both we chose a partition into six clusters, of which we show the country groupings in the Annex (Figure A1). Average values for the most important variables are to be found in Tables 4 and 5, for which follows a

¹⁴ The actual change in labour force as the percentage of its initial value (ΔLF) was added.

description of each cluster. The path mainly followed by males and females of each country through the clusters are shown in the Annex (Figure A2), and summarised in Table 6 by group of countries.

Selected variables	Cluster						Total groups
	A	B	C	D	E	H	
TAR	80.4	27.5	64.1	70.2	82.4	35.7	63.4
%Agr	67.9	75.6	40.6	59.3	37.1	37.7	53.2
Δ Agr	14.3	18.6	-22.1	-9.8	-23.7	-21.6	-6.7
Δ Nagr	61.6	70.9	37.8	93.7	22.4	59.2	52.7
Δ Marg (0-14; 65+)	12.7	13.8	-9.1	-24.7	-20.8	-16.0	-7.5
Δ LF (15-64)	27.4	33.6	14.9	31.9	4.7	28.8	20.9
Δ D (15-64)	31.1	26.8	36.3	31.4	9.3	8.1	20.9
Δ LPR (15-64)	-3.8	8.9	2.7	1.2	-2.9	18.7	2.4
MC (15-64; per 1,000)	8.3	-28.9	-168.8	-12.6	-12.8	0.9	-21.2

Source: our elaboration of ILO and UN estimates.

For the 15-64 age group (Table 4), cluster A includes the MENA countries, mainly for males and earlier periods. It seems to describe pre-migratory patterns where rural and marginal activities are widespread and even increasing.

In any case, the activity rates are higher than in other groups (except group E), and decreasing. The natural demographic change exerts strong pressure on the labour market swelling the labour force. Notwithstanding this backward pattern, migratory change is positive, probably because of the lack of out-migration opportunities and other factors (e.g., refugees and asylum seekers during the last period in Jordan and Sudan).

In cluster B we find only female models, especially for SEM and some CEE countries in earlier decades, and a large part of MENA countries during the whole time period. Here the percentage in agriculture is very high and even increasing, as are marginal forces. Participation rates are obviously low but they are increasing fast. Migratory change – which is negative – is large.

Males from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia in 1960-1970 are to be found in cluster C, where we also find the Lebanon in later decades,

both males and females. This corresponds to the period of paramount economic transformation and out-migration. In fact, migratory change is largely negative because of strong demographic pressure and also the decrease in the agricultural labour force, which cannot be offset by the limited increase in other industries. Hints of a degree of modernisation come from the decreasing marginal labour force and increasing participation rates.

Cluster D describes the next stage of modernisation in the MENA countries, although the large percentage of the labour force is still employed in agriculture, probably because of the significant presence of female models: marginal forces rapidly decline along with the agricultural labour force, while the non-agricultural labour force expands, almost doubling. The demographic increase is still large and affects the growth of the labour force since participation rates are high and stable. Migratory change is negative but small.

Cluster E represents the typical model for males in CEE and SEM countries; in later decades it works also for females from CEE countries. It characterises the most advanced situations, since the agricultural labour force is limited and decreasing as are the marginal labour forces, while modern industries go on growing. Labour participation rate is high but decreasing while the demographic pressure is low, thus producing very limited increases in labour force. Migratory change is negative, but small in percentage terms.

Cluster H comprises only SEM female models in later decades (Italy for the whole period) and a few other cases from CEE countries. Here the labour force expands because of the large increase in participation rates: increases only involve women in the core labour force, employed in non-agricultural industries. Migratory change is practically nil.

The importance of the original country groups (MENA v. CEE and SEM) and gender is confirmed since almost all the clusters are specific for these parameters. In any case, cluster B links female models from both SEM and some CEE countries (only earlier periods) and MENA countries, showing a common backwardness from which the European countries only recently emerged.

For the 15-34 age group (Table 5), cluster P groups the initial periods for almost all the MENA countries. For females from these countries, the model works for a longer period. It is characterised by

the predominance of agriculture which is even increasing as are the marginal forces.

Selected variables	Cluster					Total groups	
	P	Q	R	S	T		U
TAR	46.7	84.4	78.6	66.3	79.3	27.5	63.2
%Agr	78.6	43.9	43.6	53.1	33.2	45.0	53.2
ΔAgr	18.7	-30.0	0.6	-13.8	-26.2	-3.2	-6.7
ΔNagr	69.3	34.4	75.3	47.5	21.3	97.2	52.7
ΔMagr (0-14; 65+)	16.0	-1.6	-18.9	2.6	-35.9	-27.4	-7.5
ΔLF (15-34)	31.2	1.4	54.9	8.8	3.8	56.4	21.1
ΔD (15-34)	33.2	35.7	58.5	9.2	8.7	27.7	22.7
ΔLPR (15-34)	1.2	-4.2	-1.8	2.5	-3.6	28.3	1.9
MC (15-34; per 1,000)	-27.0	-194.5	-10.2	-25.2	-11.4	-39.6	-30.3

Source: our elaboration of ILO and UN estimates.

The activity rate is low and stable. Demographic change exerts strong pressure on labour markets, which is only partially absorbed by a negative migratory change.

Intermediate periods for males from some MENA countries and Greece are to be found in cluster Q, where participation rates reach a peak but suffer a sharp downturn. Although demographic pressure is fairly strong, the labour force remains stable owing to significant levels of out-migration. The important reduction in the agricultural labour force is barely offset by the increase in other sectors.

Cluster R groups the final male models for most of the MENA countries. The participation rate is high but decreasing. Natural demographic pressure is strong and causes the labour force to increase quickly. The labour force engaged in agricultural is stable while in other industries it is rapidly growing. Marginal forces are decreasing and migratory change, though negative, is small¹⁵.

In the broad cluster S, we find initial models for males and

¹⁵ This seems to contradict the recent migratory history of those countries characterised by important male out-flows. We can try to explain this contradiction either by comments made in the Annex or by the fact that many migrants are moving only temporarily.

females from SEM and CEE countries, while some female SEM models remain there during the whole period. We also find some specific cases for MENA countries. Agriculture is prevalent but decreasing fast, while other industries are developing. Because of the prevalence of female models, the total activity rate is limited and increasing, as are marginal forces. Demographic pressure is feeble and migratory change is negative but limited.

In cluster T we find mainly CEE and SEM countries in later periods (for SEM countries, male models), thus interpreting the most advanced situation analysed here, and in practice replicating the pattern described for cluster E of the 15-64 age group, but here marginal forces are declining at a faster pace.

Females from a few more developed MENA countries, together with Greece and Spain, are to be found in cluster U in later periods. Participation rates are low but increasing fast, as is the labour force, because of the big increase in modern industries. Nevertheless, migratory change remains negative and of considerable importance.

Any broad communality among country groups and/or genders is really limited to clusters S and T, the others being mostly homogeneous, at least for one of the two parameters: in cluster S, initial male and female patterns in CEE and SEM countries mix with the evolving patterns of males in some more advanced MENA countries, showing possible inter-temporal affinities; cluster T, on the contrary, represents the last phase in the more developed European countries, in either the central and eastern or southern Mediterranean, and as regards both men and women.

In Table 6 we describe the path mainly followed by the countries of each country group, by gender and age group, highlighting their development and any possible analogies. CEE and SEM countries mainly develop through a zero- or one-step path, while the MENA countries (except females aged 15-34) follow more complex routes (for country-specific paths refer to Figure A2 in the Annex).

Males aged 15-64 from CEE and SEM countries are mostly stable in cluster E, which describes the most advanced patterns with low demographic pressure, decreasing participation rates, with a modern industrial structure. As a result, out-migration, if any, is small.

Table 6. Paths mainly followed by each group of countries through the clusters ^(a) by sex and age group.			
Country Group	Sex	Age group	
		15-64	15-34
MENA	males	A (D) → (C) → A or D	P (#) → P or Q or R → R (#)
	females	B (A) → B (D)	P → P (U)
CEE	males	E → E	S or T → T
	females	B (#) → E	S → S or T
SEM	males	E → E	S (T) → T
	females	B → H	S → U (T)
^(a) in brackets when there are only a few cases in the cluster (#) different clusters, each with a few cases			

Also females aged 15-64 from CEE countries follow the same pattern, starting from different, more underdeveloped situations among which cluster B prevails. This pattern seems to group female starting points for the large majority of countries under consideration here. This is probably because of overlapping between the backwardness of women in Arab countries and the transient female condition both in southern and eastern Europe after the 2nd World War. Arab women mainly remain in the same group during the whole period, whilst women either from CEE or SEM countries move to other patterns, respectively to cluster E (a more masculine model) or to the female, quickly modernising cluster H. Lebanon excluded, male MENA models seem to move through clusters A, C, and D, with no particular pattern, probably because of the different times at which each experienced the demographic boom in the working-age population, economic transformation, etc.; some of them even remain in cluster A (the most underdeveloped) until the last period or even return there at the end under the influence of the ‘demographic wave’ caused by the entry into their labour markets of the surviving children born in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Also the European block on immigrants from outside the area since the 1970s surely contributed to stalling or reversing the situation in some MENA countries.

Paths for the 15-34 age group show an even clearer contrast between MENA v. CEE and SEM countries. The latter are mainly grouped in clusters from S to T, thereby describing the similar socio-

economic conditions in eastern and southern Europe immediately after the war and the path followed since then, which is different only for the young women who remain faithful to the starting pattern or move with the males to cluster T in CEE countries and Italy, while in Greece and Spain they move to a transient situation experienced also by young women from the most modern MENA countries. Here, female models are mainly stable in cluster P, which describes the starting patterns there for both females and males. A large part of the latter arrive at the end of the period in cluster R, passing through other clusters following no particular pattern, thus confirming the heterogeneity of this group of countries and the difference in the timing of their processes of socio-economic change.

Therefore, it is not possible to prove the hypothesis of similar paths followed at different times by different countries with reference to their economic development and international migration, at least with the set of countries and within the time period used here.

Methodological and Statistical Annex

Referring to the UN's mid-ten-years life expectancy by sex and infant mortality we chose appropriate standard life tables from either the Coale & Demeny's or the UN's set in order to project the initial population of each ten-year time period thus obtaining the 'expected' population at its end, by sex and five-year age groups. Two differences were calculated: between the initial and the expected population, thereby highlighting the natural demographic effect (cohort turnover and mortality); and between the final, actual population and the expected one, thus obtaining residual estimates of the ten-year migratory change by sex and five-year age groups. Because of the fast changes in young mortality in developing countries the hypothesised life tables might be obsolete and too severe for the youngest cohorts, underestimating their survival and reducing the residual negative migratory change.

By multiplying those quantities for the gender- and age-specific labour participation rates as estimated at the starting time, we obtained on the one hand the additional demographic supply (ADS), dependant only on the natural demographic change, and, on the other hand, the estimated effects of migratory changes on the active population (MC). The parallel effects of changes in gender- and age-specific labour participation rates were then calculated by multiplying those changes for the initial population in the corresponding age groups. Thus, the actual ten-years changes in the active population were split, in each five-year age group into the effects of: *i*) the natural demographic change, *ii*) migratory change, *iii*) the change in labour participation rates, plus *iv*) a residual addendum due to the simultaneous change in population and labour participation. Such calculations were extended either to people aged 15-64 years at the final point in time, where we find the 'core labour force', or to people aged 15-34 years, who are the main potential movers in international migration.

We aggregated total changes in labour force by three-sectors industries into a 'backward' sector (agriculture) and 'modern' activities (manufacturing and services) –, in the knowledge however that this rough partition does not work for many jobs, especially in less developed countries. The ten-years change in people working in

agriculture – which we expected to be negative because of modernisation – was ascribed first to the change in the marginal labour force (i.e. working people either younger than 15 years or older than 65), then giving a positive or negative change in the core labour force employed in agriculture. On the other hand, the change in other industries – which, on the contrary, we expected to be positive – was supposed to absorb the ADS first.

Whenever the ‘new’ jobs in ‘modern’ activities were insufficient to employ the ADS, an unsatisfied additional demographic supply (UADS) originated, to which the possible negative change in the core labour force employed in agriculture (EAW) should be added in order to get the unsatisfied additional supply UAS. As a matter of fact, different combinations occur both in sign and reciprocal numbers for those quantities, making a further hypothesis necessary regarding the path followed by the labour market: e.g. be the increment in non-agricultural jobs larger than the ADS, UADS is obviously zero and the unsatisfied EAW, if any, are calculated as the difference between the EAW and the residual of new modern jobs not absorbed by the ADS, because the expelled agricultural workers in the core labour force are supposed to be (partially) employed in ‘modern’ jobs. If, in spite of our hypothesis – as often it happens for females in less developed countries –, the core labour force employed in agriculture turns out to be enlarging, we considered that this fact was not really absorbing the ADS unless in the form of under-employment, leaving it unsatisfied.

Table A1. Percentage of the labour force employed in agriculture in 1950 and 1990 by country and sex; ten-years rate of increase of the labour force in agriculture by country, sex, and period.

Country	Sex	Percentage		Ten-years rate of increase (per cent)			
		1950	1990	1950-1960	1960-1970	1970-1980	1980-1990
Turkey	M	79.3	38.3	7.0	5.5	-6.2	11.6
	F	96.1	82.5	4.4	1.3	5.3	18.5
	T	87.0	53.6	5.7	3.4	-0.6	15.2
Syria	M	58.7	21.6	11.1	10.5	-26.3	12.3
	F	85.3	68.8	26.2	23.0	36.7	28.0
	T	64.3	33.2	15.3	14.3	-5.7	19.7
Lebanon	M	52.6	6.3	-23.7	-38.3	-28.2	-50.0
	F	76.7	9.9	-7.9	-14.3	13.3	-38.2
	T	55.2	7.3	-21.4	-34.2	-18.8	-46.3
Jordan	M	55.0	9.7	14.3	-18.8	-58.3	38.5
	F	77.7	41.1	46.9	14.9	9.3	39.0
	T	57.7	15.2	19.5	-12.1	-41.0	38.7
Egypt	M	61.4	32.8	14.4	10.3	9.7	-12.9
	F	87.6	60.5	25.6	28.3	26.0	-4.1
	T	67.4	40.3	17.7	16.0	15.4	-9.5
Sudan	M	90.6	64.1	9.4	7.5	18.3	26.1
	F	97.9	84.1	18.1	20.4	26.3	25.0
	T	92.5	69.5	11.8	11.3	20.8	25.7
Tunisia	M	71.0	22.5	-9.2	-19.1	-0.9	-12.6
	F	77.6	42.0	5.5	18.2	48.0	4.2
	T	72.3	28.2	-6.2	-10.7	13.8	-6.1
Algeria	M	81.0	17.8	-10.8	-26.0	-26.4	-3.4
	F	90.5	57.2	16.7	17.9	27.5	17.4
	T	82.5	26.1	-6.2	-17.1	-10.8	5.2
Morocco	M	75.0	34.9	14.6	-2.0	6.0	-7.3
	F	83.9	63.1	25.6	25.1	38.7	16.2
	T	77.4	44.7	17.8	6.5	18.0	2.9
Poland	M	49.0	27.4	-9.8	-4.2	-7.5	-1.3
	F	69.4	27.5	-3.8	-0.2	-26.5	-12.4
	T	57.8	27.5	-6.7	-2.1	-17.8	-6.7
former Cz	M	30.6	13.5	-28.2	-19.8	-10.2	-4.9
	F	53.2	9.2	-32.5	-34.9	-19.5	-17.4
	T	39.0	11.5	-30.4	-27.2	-14.3	-10.1
Hungary	M	51.3	18.9	-26.7	-22.2	-31.5	-17.3
	F	52.9	10.6	5.1	-29.0	-31.8	-34.7
	T	51.8	15.2	-17.2	-24.8	-31.6	-23.5
Romania	M	61.8	21.0	-6.1	-24.6	-33.1	-19.0
	F	84.3	27.8	-1.6	-17.0	-25.7	-42.2
	T	72.1	24.0	-3.7	-20.5	-28.9	-32.8
Bulgaria	M	63.2	13.8	-22.9	-38.0	-34.0	-32.3
	F	85.5	13.0	-17.3	-34.9	-44.1	-39.0
	T	72.8	13.5	-20.0	-36.4	-39.4	-35.6
former Y	M	68.3	19.5	-13.9	-15.1	-32.2	-27.7
	F	85.0	22.6	8.3	-17.2	-21.7	-31.7
	T	73.8	20.8	-5.5	-16.0	-27.7	-29.6
Spain	M	52.8	12.6	-16.4	-30.1	-33.3	-29.1
	F	46.0	10.4	1.2	6.4	-19.9	-20.1
	T	51.6	11.9	-13.8	-23.7	-30.1	-26.6
Italy	M	44.3	8.3	-32.4	-40.8	-35.7	-26.9
	F	42.8	9.1	-19.3	-30.7	-11.5	-24.1
	T	44.0	8.6	-29.2	-38.0	-28.3	-25.9
Greece	M	53.0	19.7	1.3	-26.3	-22.8	-26.4
	F	63.3	28.9	9.3	2.7	-10.1	-2.9
	T	55.3	23.0	3.3	-18.4	-18.5	-17.5

Table A2. Estimates of ten-year net migratory change by country, sex, age-group, and period (thousands).									
Country	Sex	15-64 age group				15-34 age group			
		1950-60	1960-70	1970-80	1980-90	1950-60	1960-70	1970-80	1980-90
Turkey	M	185.0	-274.6	-154.5	258.4	-47.1	-414.6	-81.6	-138.6
	F	164.3	-60.9	-239.4	427.9	125.5	-24.4	-247.0	143.7
	T	349.3	-335.5	-393.9	686.3	78.5	-439.0	-328.6	5.1
Syria	M	.0	-121.1	-91.9	-52.8	-2.7	-108.6	-128.5	-23.7
	F	.2	-97.1	-59.8	-22.6	-1.5	-63.5	-70.5	-13.4
	T	.2	-218.2	-151.8	-75.4	-4.2	-172.1	-199.0	-37.1
Lebanon	M	6.0	2.7	-170.4	-239.1	1.7	2.5	-133.0	-153.2
	F	4.0	1.9	-120.5	-208.0	.1	-1.0	-83.6	-130.2
	T	10.0	4.6	-290.9	-447.1	1.8	1.5	-216.6	-283.5
Jordan	M	39.6	.0	-123.7	72.1	21.0	-1.7	-78.9	48.5
	F	30.3	1.8	-121.1	66.2	17.9	-3.3	-75.8	43.7
	T	70.0	1.9	-244.8	138.3	38.9	-5.0	-154.6	92.2
Egypt	M	159.9	29.2	-99.6	-104.0	-17.7	-94.3	-87.9	-26.5
	F	21.0	-13.9	-117.7	-40.5	-68.1	-74.8	-147.5	-32.6
	T	180.9	15.3	-217.3	-144.5	-85.8	-169.2	-235.4	-59.1
Sudan	M	-156.8	24.4	238.8	41.2	-91.2	-59.1	67.1	-84.1
	F	-160.8	-102.1	244.0	41.1	-85.0	-74.4	93.4	-37.0
	T	-317.6	-77.6	482.8	82.3	-176.2	-133.5	160.5	-121.1
Tunisia	M	-68.6	-188.1	-19.8	4.4	-65.5	-163.1	-92.5	-7.6
	F	-58.4	-105.4	-72.7	13.2	-31.2	-99.1	-86.1	3.2
	T	-127.0	-293.5	-92.5	17.6	-96.7	-262.2	-178.5	-4.4
Algeria	M	-243.9	-653.7	-71.3	139.1	-103.3	-416.8	-132.4	-34.5
	F	-116.0	-294.6	-115.0	-83.2	-47.6	-223.4	-122.1	-19.0
	T	-359.9	-948.3	-186.3	55.8	-150.9	-640.2	-254.6	-53.5
Morocco	M	-73.2	-523.3	-273.6	-169.9	-33.9	-516.1	-251.3	-96.5
	F	-74.5	-340.6	-230.4	-175.3	-33.3	-267.7	-103.0	-101.4
	T	-147.7	-863.8	-504.0	-345.2	-67.2	-783.8	-354.3	-198.0
Poland	M	-71.4	-120.0	-141.1	-236.0	-61.5	-63.8	-78.8	-93.0
	F	-198.1	-66.4	-193.1	-172.0	-104.8	-31.1	-116.2	-57.8
	T	-269.6	-186.5	-334.2	-408.1	-166.2	-94.8	-195.0	-150.8
former Cz	M	-18.1	-91.1	-36.9	-63.0	22.7	-51.5	-18.9	-12.2
	F	9.0	-85.8	-16.8	-44.4	12.7	-31.7	-10.3	-15.6
	T	-9.1	-176.9	-53.8	-107.4	35.4	-83.2	-29.1	-27.8
Hungary	M	-98.9	51.3	-42.7	-127.0	-83.5	18.9	-14.3	-46.4
	F	-74.6	-7.3	-27.2	-64.2	-35.6	-2.3	-10.7	-19.0
	T	-173.5	44.0	-70.0	-191.2	-119.0	16.6	-25.0	-65.4
Romania	M	-41.2	-25.0	-27.8	-92.6	-29.6	-24.8	-11.4	-40.4
	F	-104.6	-70.2	-26.8	-59.5	-40.7	-49.7	2.8	-45.2
	T	-145.8	-95.2	-54.6	-152.1	-70.4	-74.5	-8.5	-85.6
Bulgaria	M	-49.1	-1.9	-50.3	-127.2	-29.5	-13.3	-38.7	-67.0
	F	-55.9	4.5	-36.0	-79.2	-24.1	-10.3	-28.5	-40.5
	T	-104.9	2.6	-86.3	-206.4	-53.6	-23.5	-67.3	-107.5
former Y	M	-189.3	-302.4	-190.3	-143.4	-65.1	-168.6	-64.3	-11.3
	F	-118.4	-252.3	-50.1	5.6	-44.9	-149.1	-34.1	3.2
	T	-307.7	-554.7	-240.4	-137.7	-110.1	-317.7	-98.5	-8.1
Spain	M	-395.7	-293.0	-28.4	-1.3	-230.9	-297.8	-155.0	36.3
	F	-256.4	-309.9	-52.3	-6.4	-160.1	-196.4	-120.1	57.4
	T	-652.1	-603.0	-80.7	-7.7	-391.1	-494.2	-275.1	93.7
Italy	M	-252.9	-458.3	-128.2	65.6	-228.4	-316.3	-123.3	127.9
	F	-459.3	-346.5	112.8	101.4	-185.8	-225.8	39.4	183.8
	T	-712.1	-804.8	-15.4	167.0	-414.2	-542.1	-83.9	311.7
Greece	M	-96.2	-196.7	99.4	121.8	-95.8	-209.9	-2.9	21.8
	F	-64.7	-174.5	116.2	115.2	-28.9	-179.4	36.7	80.0
	T	-161.0	-371.3	215.6	237.1	-124.8	-389.3	33.8	101.8

Figure A2. Paths followed by each country through the clusters by sex.														
15-64 age group				15-34 age group										
Country		Time period				Country		Time period						
group	initials	Sex	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	group	initials	Sex	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	
MENA	SUD	M	A	A	A	A	MENA	SUD	M	P	P	P	P	
	EGY	M	A	A	A	D		EGY	M	P	P	P	P	S
	SYR	M	A	A	D	A		MOR	M	P	Q	R	R	R
	TUR	M	A	A	D	A		TUR	M	P	S	R	P	P
	MOR	M	A	C	A	D		SYR	M	P	S	R	R	R
	JOR	M	A	D	C	A		JOR	M	R	R	Q	R	R
	ALG	M	D	C	D	D		ALG	M	S	Q	R	R	R
	TUN	M	D	C	D	D		TUN	M	S	Q	R	R	R
	LEB	M	E	E	C	C		LEB	M	T	T	Q	Q	Q
	TUR	F	A	A	A	A		ALG	F	P	P	P	P	P
	JOR	F	A	B	C	D		MOR	F	P	P	P	P	P
	SUD	F	B	B	A	B		SUD	F	P	P	P	P	P
	ALG	F	B	B	B	B		SYR	F	P	P	P	P	P
	MOR	F	B	B	B	B		TUR	F	P	P	P	P	P
	SYR	F	B	B	B	B		JOR	F	P	P	P	P	R
	EGY	F	B	B	B	D		EGY	F	P	P	P	P	U
	TUN	F	B	B	B	D		TUN	F	S	P	U	U	U
LEB	F	D	H	C	C	LEB	F	U	U	U	U	U		
CEE	YUG	M	D	E	E	E	CEE	POL	M	S	S	T	S	
	BUL	M	E	E	E	E		HUN	M	S	S	T	T	
	CZE	M	E	E	E	E		ROM	M	S	S	T	T	
	HUN	M	E	E	E	E		YUG	M	T	S	T	T	
	POL	M	E	E	E	E		BUL	M	T	T	S	T	
	ROM	M	E	E	E	E		CZE	M	T	T	T	T	
	POL	F	B	B	E	E		BUL	F	S	S	S	S	
	YUG	F	B	D	H	H		YUG	F	S	S	S	S	
	HUN	F	B	H	E	E		POL	F	S	S	T	S	
	BUL	F	D	D	E	E		CZE	F	S	S	T	T	
	ROM	F	E	E	E	E		HUN	F	S	S	T	T	
	CZE	F	H	H	E	E		ROM	F	S	T	T	T	
SEM	GRE	M	E	E	E	E	SEM	ITA	M	T	T	T	T	
	ITA	M	E	E	E	E		SPA	M	S	T	T	T	
	SPA	M	E	E	E	E		GRE	M	S	Q	T	T	
	GRE	F	B	B	H	H		ITA	F	S	S	S	T	
	SPA	F	B	B	H	H		GRE	F	S	P	S	U	
	ITA	F	H	H	H	H		SPA	F	S	U	U	U	

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ECONOMIC GOALS, MIGRATION PLANS, AND WORK STATUS OF RECENT IMMIGRANTS IN ITALY

*Giuseppe Gesano**

1. Economic reasons in current migration

When we see the expressions of dismay and suffering of the illegal immigrants who have escaped from the shipwreck of yet another boat, it is hard to imagine that an economic motivation almost always underlies this suffering, i.e. an evaluation involving a comparison of the various costs of migration with the expectations, often just the hope of improving their living arrangements. These presumable economic motivations are, of course, more obvious in cases like those for example, of young Italian graduates who find it difficult to get a suitable research position or an adequate salary on the labour market. In this case, however, rather than migrants we might define them as part of the 'brain drain'.

For those who examine migration by econometric standards there is, however, no difference. The decision to migrate from one country to another is assumed to derive substantially from a comparative evaluation of the person's income conditions in the country of origin with the expected ones in the country of destination, compared with the costs, monetary and otherwise, involved in the transfer [Massey *et al.*, 1993]. Since for most individuals, the main source of income is their own labour, the wage differentials on the two labour markets associated with the different job opportunities available represent the

* This paper was presented as an invited paper to the Thematic Session on "Migrations: Labour Market and Economic Development" (Milano, 23-24 November 2000) in the framework of the itinerant Conference "Migration Scenarios for the XXI Century" organised by the Roman Agency for the Preparation of the Jubilee.

I would like to thank Dr. Antonella Guarneri, a scholarship-holding researcher at the IRP, for processing some of the statistical data presented here.

assets side of that balance sheet, while the liabilities consist not only of the actual travel and new-settlement costs, but all the tangible and intangible costs, in monetary form, related with the migration and with all that implies in the life of an individual [Centro Europa Ricerche, 2000].

On the basis of data for existing residence permits (Table 1), over three quarters of the men and just under half the women immigrants in Italy holding a residence permit obtained it for work purposes. Over the past two years, the percentage of these has fallen with a rise in the permits issued for family reasons (which now are one on ten for the men and over four on ten for the women), above all due to an immigration policy favouring almost only family reunions [ISTAT, 2000].

Table 1. Residence permits for work purposes by gender and area of origin: Italy, 1994-1999. (Percentages of total permits).						
Year (31 st December)	Men		Women		Both sexes	
	Total	HMPCs	Total	HMPCs	Total	HMPCs
1994	77.2	84.3	42.3	52.5	61.6	72.0
1995	76.0	82.8	41.2	49.8	59.8	69.3
1996	76.1	82.7	41.0	48.6	59.5	68.3
1997	81.6	87.3	47.4	55.5	66.6	74.7
1998	80.3	86.0	45.1	51.8	64.6	72.0
1999	77.5	82.6	41.1	45.6	60.6	66.7

Legend: HMPCs = Countries with heavy migration pressure: countries in Central-Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia (excluding Israel and Japan), Central and South America.
Source: ISTAT, data from BBS.

It is however quite probable that also some holders of a residence permit issued for reasons other than work find some kind of employment, often irregular. It is likewise possible that those who have a labour permit may not actually be on the labour market, for personal or temporary reasons, because their job is not officially reported, or because they are on the market, but looking for a job.

However, neither work as stated in the granting of the residence permit, nor the actual employment status identified in the statistics of

various archives involved in the phenomenon¹ can describe the extent to which economic motivations have contributed to individual decisions to emigrate. On the one hand, the lack or inadequacy of work and the corresponding salary in the home country are only part of the overall economic conditions of the individuals, families and population aggregates of which they form part. On the other hand, completely different push factors may overlap with and sometimes contrast this condition, as in the case of racial, political or religious intolerance. General economic poverty generates migrations, and sometimes an exodus due to hunger or extreme want. The various types of intolerance recalled here cause different flows of persons who more or less explicitly request asylum. Despite a widespread and valid humanitarian aid provided in these cases by international organisations or the host nation, this type of immigration inevitably results sooner or later in a participation, legal or illegal, in the labour market in the host country.

Although the flows of migrant workers are still far from those involved in the productive systems of the Western European countries in the 1950s and 60s due to their manpower requirements, the lack or inadequacy of work in the countries of origin or an unsatisfied demand in the developed countries are still the basis or at least the consequence of almost all migration flows.

In the analysis we are trying to develop, work becomes an essential aspect in the life of the migrants and their families, as well as for the two economies that are linked by international migration. This analysis will utilise the fragmentary data, often uncertain and impossible to compare, deriving from international and national sources on migration, but above all using some results of a survey on the basic causes of international migration commissioned by the

¹ While its questionnaire of labour force survey identifies the employment status and nationality of the interviewee ISTAT has not made these data available since the methodology of the sample cannot guarantee a representative sample of the foreign population which is not yet sufficiently stabilised in Italy. The employment-service archives for 1998 showed about 207,000 foreigners seeking jobs, while 217,000 were hired. Finally, in the INPS (National Social Security Institute) archives for that year, there were about 342,000 foreign dependent workers registered.

European Community, precisely from Eurostat, to NIDI² and conducted by the IRP³ for the part regarding Italy.

2. Macro imbalances, individual conditions and micro choices

If we observe the enormous differences involved in the economic conditions of the various countries in the world, for example through World Bank data (Table 2), we cannot avoid to wonder why there are *only* about 125 million people living in a country different from the one where they were born, in the *entire* the world, at least according to UN estimates [UN, 2000].

Data on economic development for individual countries show enormous gaps, with a ratio of about 92 times between per capita incomes with an equivalent purchasing power in the richest country, i.e. Luxembourg, and the poorest one, i.e. Sierra Leone. The former has, in fact, one of the highest percentages of foreigners, 35 per cent of the overall population, but four fifths of them come from the main European Union countries due to its role as one of the EU capitals. There is no data on migration from Sierra Leone (a country with a civil war) as for many other countries with backward economies. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove the relationship asserted to exist between the general standard of living in a nation, however measured, and its emigration rate. *On the contrary*, it is sufficiently clear that the stocks of emigrants and larger migration flows do not originate from the poorest countries but rather from those

² The NIDI (Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Research Institute) organised the multinational study by using previous surveys and studies as well as by surveys on similar questionnaires in two receiving countries (Italy and Spain) and five sending countries (Egypt, Ghana, Morocco, Senegal and Turkey). The data shown here refers to the latter approach and is published in NIDI-Eurostat (2000) and in eight National Reports, including the Netherlands.

³ The Italian research group, of which the Author was in charge, was formed by researchers inside and outside the IRP. In order to achieve sufficiently representative standards on the national level, a research group for Northern Italy was later set up under the management of Professor Giancarlo Blangiardo. According to the plan agreed with the NIDI, interviews were conducted with 502 families with at least one 'main' migrant (an adult who had immigrated for over three months but less than ten years) coming from Egypt and 660 from Ghana.

in which the process of economic development has already made headway. It therefore seems that a certain overall threshold of economic development must be overcome for emigration processes to start in a country, especially migration for work purposes.

Groups of countries	PPP pro-capita income 1999	Consumption change 1990-98	Agriculture added value 1998	Agriculture labour force 1990
	(constant 1987 US\$)	(annual % in current US\$)	(% GDP)	(% of labour force)
World	6,490	+1.1	4	49
Low income countries	1,790	+4.7	23	68
Medium income countries:	4,880	+2.1	9	28
- Low-medium	3,960	+1.3	11	30
- Medium-high	8,320	+2.6	8	25
Low and medium income cs.:	3,410	+2.6	13	57
- Eastern Asia and Pacific	3,500	+5.7	15	68
- Europe and Central Asia	5,580	+2.6	12	23
- Latin America and Caribbean	6,280	+2.0	8	25
- Middle East and North Africa	4,600	..	14	35
- Southern Asia	2,030	+3.5	28	63
- Sub-Saharan Africa	1,450	-0.6	17	68
High income countries:	24,430	+1.5	2	5
- European monetary union	20,990	+0.9	2	7
- <i>Italy</i>	20,751	+0.4	3	9

Legend: PPP = Purchasing Parity Power.
Source: World Bank, 2000.

The problem of the minimum threshold is even more evident when we go on from average national wealth to household and individual wealth and its distribution. For example, out of the 77 countries for which the necessary statistics are available, there are 32 in which over half the population lives with a purchasing power of under two dollars a day and 6 with less than one dollar. Furthermore, there are many countries where the poorest 20 per cent of the population is compelled to live on less than 5 per cent of national income or consumption [World Bank, 2000]. It is thus highly improbable for these very poor fringes to implement any aspirations they may have to emigrate. At the most, they may be involved in mass

movements repeatedly shifting destitute populations from one poor country, generally to another poor one or from rural areas to towns.

‘Voluntary’ emigration is more likely to occur in medium-income brackets of population. The results of the just-mentioned survey indicate that in sending countries those who have emigrated recently generally give a worse *evaluation* of the economic condition of their family before emigration compared to those who have never emigrated but, except in Turkey, most of the migrants and those who have never emigrated judge their previous economic condition to be in the two middle categories, sufficient or just sufficient to satisfy all the basic needs of the family (Table 3)⁴.

Table 3. Assessment of the economic condition of own family before emigration (recent emigrants) or five years before the interview (non-migrants), by country. (Percentages on relative total of respondents).									
Country of		Economic condition							
		not sufficient		barely sufficient		sufficient		more than sufficient	
interview	origin	RM	NM	RM	NM	RM	NM	RM	NM
Italy	Egypt	7	-	29	-	54	-	10	-
	Ghana	24	-	42	-	28	-	6	-
Spain	Morocco	22	-	46	-	28	-	4	-
	Senegal	55	-	33	-	11	-	1	-
	Egypt	15	7	26	23	57	64	2	6
	Ghana	32	18	27	31	39	49	2	2
	Morocco	17	24	44	49	32	24	7	3
	Senegal	21	23	57	42	21	34	1	1
	Turkey	60	28	32	41	0	4	8	27

Legend: RM = Recent Migrant; NM = Non Migrant.
Source: NIDI-Eurostat survey.

Similar conclusions emerge from the immigrants interviewed in Italy and Spain in the same survey. When asked to evaluate the

⁴ Besides the real differentials which may have actually triggered emigration, the cause of the worse self-evaluation of the migrants is probably also due to the different frames of reference, local in the case of those who have never emigrated, and broader for those who have had this migration experience.

conditions regarding their social context before emigrating, only per less of a fifth of the Ghanaians and Senegalese, less than a quarter of the Egyptians and just over a third of Moroccans said their situation was worse compared to that of their neighbours. In some groups, up to almost a fifth said their situation was relatively better.


People certainly emigrate out of need, but it is generally not due to a condition of serious poverty, at least with regard to the standards of living of the community around the migrants and their family. In any case, the real costs for travelling, legal or illegal as the case may be, are high enough to exclude those who do not have savings or an adequate credit. Family and community networks (clans, villages, etc.) often intervene in this process, so that the decision to migrate and the hoped-for benefits are no longer individual but group-based [Massey *et al.*, 1993].

3. Reality and perception of imbalances in labour markets: information channels and migration networks between bureaucracy and illegal activity

We cannot assume that the decision to migrate is merely based on a comparison – all too easy in the era of global communication – between the standards of living in the countries of origin and the potential countries of destination. The decision must necessarily be made in terms of the real possibility of producing the income necessary to aspire to those levels. We then come up against the mechanisms and rules of the labour markets, and above all their imbalances in terms of quantity and quality that are highly variable over time and according to the location and industry. All this requires an advance knowledge enabling the potential migrant workers to properly assess their concrete job opportunities in the country where they would like to emigrate and to compare these and the resulting net income with their current working and income conditions in the country of origin [Borjas, 1999].

Once again, macroeconomic data only partly justify the direction of the current migration flows or the stock of migrants accumulated in the receiving countries. There is undoubtedly an inverse relationship, as we might expect, between the level of domestic unemployment in the various European receiving countries and the percentage of their foreign labour force (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Average level of domestic unemployment and presence of foreign workers in some European countries (latest available data).



Legend: A = Austria; B = Belgium; CH = Switzerland; D = Germany; E = Spain; EIR = Ireland; F = France; GB = Great Britain; I = Italy.

Source: elaboration of OCDE-Sopemi data, 1999.

Nevertheless, on the one hand actually we are comparing countries whose immigration history differs considerably in duration and composition⁵; on the other, in the countries with an older tradition of immigration, the percentage of the foreign labour force should be reduced by the higher unemployment rates affecting it⁶. Finally, at least part of the new immigrant flows seem to prefer countries like Italy and Spain, where domestic unemployment is higher.

⁵ For example, Great Britain considers most immigrants to be her citizens since they come from Commonwealth countries.

⁶ For example, in 1997, the unemployment rate among foreign workers in France and Germany was more or less double the corresponding general rate.

Theory [Piore, 1979] and experience clearly show the need for 'dual' or even 'ethnic' labour markets for a consistent job insertion of foreigners, also given the high domestic unemployment. This situation involves the need for extensive grassroots information among potential migrants for work purposes on job opportunities and wages. Few of them actually leave unprepared, without any information on the country where they are going.

Except for apparently unprepared groups (e.g., the Senegalese interviewed in Spain, but not those who come back home), most of the emigrants had advance information on job opportunities and often on wage levels in the country where they were going (Table 4).

Country of interview	Country of origin	No information	Information about					
			salary	work	welfare ^(b)	standard of living	taxes	foreign people ^(c)
Italy	Egypt	31	45	56	41	26	8	66
	Ghana	31	32	57	19	17	4	42
Spain	Morocco	15	57	68	93	49	9	27
	Senegal	64	15	27	29	14	7	27
	Egypt	24	54	62	37	50	5	41
	Ghana	20	64	68	96	55	17	68
	Morocco	28	53	64	49	28	8	36
	Senegal	22	42	64	29	35	4	62
	Turkey	40	36	46	80	28	7	48

^(a) The sum of percentages may exceed 100 because multiple responses were allowed for the information contents.
^(b) Sum of items regarding unemployment benefits, family benefits and the education and health systems.
^(c) Sum of items regarding admission rules for foreigners and attitudes towards them.
Source: NIDI-Eurostat survey.

The family and friendship networks formed by persons already in the country of destination and those in the home country, probably back from a previous migration experience, have a crucial role in collecting this advance information (Table 5). The emigrants interviewed reported scarce intervention by information/employment agencies operating at home or in the future destination country. There is thus a 'do it yourself' attitude in information, which perhaps

involves greater risks for the certainty of the outcome of job insertion compared to the use of agencies working legally on behalf of potential employers in the country of destination. However, the information gained through informal networks undoubtedly responds better to flexible labour markets where foreign workers are generally employed [Guilmoto and Sandron, 2000].

Table 5. Recent migrants by source of information before departure on the country of final destination, by country. (Percentages^(a) on total respondents).								
Country of interview	Country of origin	Personal experience	Household in the country of		Basic information ^(b)	Agencies in the country of		Other sources ^(c)
			origin	destination		origin	destination	
Italy	Egypt	6	44	55	43	5	0	1
	Ghana	8	42	50	46	7	0	3
Spain	Morocco	10	43	69	55	4	1	18
	Senegal	11	24	59	13	2	1	25
	Egypt	13	47	56	11	1	0	3
	Ghana	9	34	69	71	10	8	11
	Morocco	5	67	83	58	7	5	7
	Senegal	14	45	70	10	5	1	6
	Turkey	7	34	74	55	7	1	1

(a) The sum of the percentages may exceed 100 because multiple responses were allowed.
(b) Sum of items regarding education and media.
(c) Sum of items also including foreign tourists.
Source: NIDI-Eurostat survey.

The potentially dangerous aspect of this migration through networks and on the basis of information they produce lies in the possibility of the spread of groundless reports about new job opportunities, thus leading to an excess flow with respect to the real needs of the host country's labour market. On the other hand, this type of surplus can also be due to slowdowns when employment demand is reduced, and the new immigrants could find fewer job opportunities than they expected. Another negative aspect is that in this 'do it yourself' migration there is a considerable scope for illegal trafficking in migrants and foreign workers, interested in spreading optimistic reports about job opportunities in the country of destination, or – as we often see in the news headlines – exploiting those illusions in order

to channel the immigrants, especially women, into illegal activities controlled by crime syndicates.

4. Motivations, expectations and economic plans in the decision to emigrate

International migration thus often involves an invisible threat linking the sending countries with the receiving countries. The destinations chosen by the main migrants – generally working-age men, although in some ethnic groups women may be prevalent – mainly depend on economic motivations (Table 6).

Country of		Men			Women		
interview	origin	economic	family	other	economic	family	other
Italy	Egypt	48	30	22	17	71	12
	Ghana	62	18	20	39	55	6
Spain	Morocco	54	19	27	58	27	15
	Senegal	82	13	5	16	84	0
	Egypt	61	14	25	42	58	0
	Ghana	56	21	23	43	46	11
	Morocco	69	13	18	11	86	3
	Senegal	73	14	13	6	90	4
	Turkey	39	55	6	0	95	5

Source: NIDI-Eurostat survey.

In general, the groups most often characterised by short-term migration plans (e.g. in the NIDI-Eurostat surveys, the Senegalese and Moroccans) are more motivated in the choice of destination by economic and work-related factors, while the groups that traditionally have settlement-oriented or long-term migration plans (e.g. the Egyptians and Turks) seem to be more inspired by other types of motivation. Family reasons prevail in the migration of women from societies where they are traditionally less emancipated. However, this aspect does not prevent them, out of necessity or due to integration, from at least partly entering the labour market of the host country [Schoorl, 1994].

Among the male immigrants interviewed in Italy, emigration

explicitly and mainly justified by being unable to find a job in the home country accounted for only 15 per cent among the Egyptians and 25 per cent among the Ghanaians. Nevertheless, inadequate working conditions at home, for the level of income or other aspects, were stated to be the main reason for the last emigration by another 20 per cent of the Egyptians and 30 per cent of the Ghanaians. The other economic motivations or aspirations (i.e., excessively low income, the search for a source of income, improvement of living arrangements, etc.) are less explicitly related to work, although due to the real conditions in the country of origin or the expectations regarding the country of destination, work is obviously a primary factor.

Economic motivations were stated to be even more prevalent (73 ÷ 93 per cent) by those who in their countries of origin intended to emigrate without having ever emigrated before or being returning migrants. The percentage of these potential migrants varies according to the countries and the migration experience, and is important above all in the two West African countries and among those who already had a previous migration experience. Above all it is interesting to observe that the proportion of those who state their intention to emigrate is reduced considerably when exact time-spans are set for this choice (within two years), or if this intention is checked by asking the actions already undertaken for migrating (Table 7).

Table 7. Migration intentions of persons who never emigrated and of return migrants, by stage of intention and country of origin. (Percentages on total groups).						
Country of origin	Non migrants			Return migrants		
	Migration intention	Within two years	Already prepared	Migration intention	Within two years	Already prepared
Egypt	12	1	0	30	6	4
Ghana	41	13	8	51	23	18
Morocco	20	4	3	27	8	7
Senegal	38	5	2	47	7	5
Turkey	26	2	1	38	4	2

Source: NIDI-Eurostat survey.

We must conclude that also in these countries where emigration

abroad is a consolidated and widespread method of solving economic problems and lack of work, there is still a wide gap between a general intention to emigrate and actual emigration. As well as the obstacles to the arrival of new immigrants in the current migration policy of many advanced countries, there are also considerable difficulties involved in covering travelling costs and in dealing with material and family bonds that limit the possibilities of migration.

We should finally verify whether those who emigrate form a more valuable human capital than those who do not. Much has been written in literature about the quality selection of migrations and, more recently, about the shrewd choices made by families and villages in investing in the migration of their most valid and promising members resulting in funds being sent back home [Stark and Bloom, 1985]. As a matter of fact, the 'forerunners' of the new migration flows were found to have good and sometimes even high levels of education, as found in many surveys on immigrants in Italy. Except for sporadic cases, however, it has also been observed that those qualifications, quite uncommon in the home country, are not generally utilised in work in the host country, since the labour markets to which most immigrants have real access either do not require those qualifications or do not recognise them⁷, with an apparently great waste and poor use of human resources [Stark, 1991].

In the NIDI-Eurostat survey, the comparison between levels of education of recent emigrants and those who have never emigrated provides a clear confirmation of the hypothesis. In general, the majority of emigrants say that they have a secondary or higher education (Table 8). We should likewise observe the relationship between the levels of education stated by the emigrants of the various groups interviewed in the two host countries (Italy and Spain) and those of the corresponding returning emigrants interviewed in their countries of origin.

These levels are higher in the case of the Egyptians, in general better integrated (as we shall see) in work in Italy, and the same or lower for the two ethnic groups from Western Africa, where the

⁷ In this respect, there is also a problem of the equivalency of educational or vocational qualifications gained abroad.

‘forerunners’ probably have already returned and which now provide migrants who are generally less qualified. With the increasing tendency to emigrate from a country, the level of the human capital emigrating is likely to decline gradually [Eurostat-European Commission, 2000].

Table 8. Level of education before emigration (recent emigrants) or five years before the interview (non-migrants), by country. (Percentages on the relevant total of respondents).									
Country of		Educational level							
		none		primary		secondary		highest	
interview	origin	RM	NM	RM	NM	RM	NM	RM	NM
Italy	Egypt	8	-	8	-	55	-	28	-
	Ghana	4	-	30	-	58	-	8	-
Spain	Morocco	42	-	31	-	23	-	4	-
	Senegal	73	-	20	-	6	-	1	-
	Egypt	36	58	11	13	31	14	22	15
	Ghana	3	17	37	51	40	25	20	7
	Morocco	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Senegal	62	69	24	20	11	8	3	3
	Turkey	15	48	66	47	19	3	0	2

Legend: RM = Recent Migrant; NM = Non Migrant; n.a. = not available.
Source: NIDI-Eurostat survey.

5. The winding path of immigrant work

Migrating for the reasons mentioned above, and with information which is perhaps extensive but not sufficiently accurate in the final stages and conditions, often means undertaking a long and winding path towards employment, starting from the work situation left behind at home and taking place in a wholly different economic, social and labour-market context in the receiving country or countries.

5.1. Work experience before departure

Just as it is difficult to manage to emigrate from a condition of extreme poverty, it is improbable that the “main” migrant is not working at the time of emigration (Table 9). Even the status of unemployment, hard to define in economic systems often on the verge

of subsistence, seems uncommon, and probably, in the minds of the Ghanaian or North African immigrants to Italy or Spain, actually corresponds to a real condition of under-employment or highly precarious work.

Table 9 - Employment status of interviewees before emigration (recent emigrants) or five years before the interview (non-migrants), by country. (Percentages on relative total of respondents to question).							
Country of		Working status					
		Employed		Unemployed		Non active	
interview	origin	RM	NM	RM	NM	RM	NM
Italy	Egypt	69	-	17	-	14	-
	Ghana	71	-	20	-	9	-
Spain	Morocco	47	-	17	-	36	-
	Senegal	83	-	7	-	10	-
	Egypt	80	52	9	2	12	46
	Ghana	71	81	7	3	22	16
	Morocco	45	87	13	1	42	12
	Senegal	80	79	5	3	15	18
	Turkey	73	62	19	4	8	34

Legend: RM = Recent Migrant; NM = Non Migrant; n.a. = not available.
Source: NIDI-Eurostat survey.

If we examine the occupations and job positions of the migrants before departure⁸, there are few traces of origin in a backward farming economy; they are rather an enterprising vanguard of people who are often self-employed, even if only as street vendors or transport personnel. On the other hand, there is also a middle class formed by government employees or, more rarely, by professionals who are obviously unsatisfied with the income conditions or living arrangements in their country of origin.

5.2. The impact with work upon arrival and the 'work career' in Italy

Only less than 5 per cent of the 'main' Egyptian or Ghanaian

⁸ For this aspect, and for subsequent analyses, only the Egyptians and Ghanaians interviewed in Italy are discussed.

immigrants interviewed in Italy have never (or not yet) had any work experience in our country⁹, thus showing the work motivations of those flows, as for most migration in Italy.

Nevertheless, not many have found a job immediately: just over a quarter of the Egyptian men and less than a seventh of the women, thus showing that their immigration was often based on vague hopes and rumours more than on specific employment contracts or promises. For the others, there is a longer time waiting for a job. While for women there is an average of over two years, also because insertion in the labour market occurs only after partial processes of emancipation, for men the wait is on average seven months for the Ghanaians and ten for the Egyptians. However, half the workers of all groups, excluding the Egyptian women, found a job within three months after their entry in Italy, i.e. 90 per cent of the Egyptian males within nine months, while the Ghanaian men achieved this within a year. For the women, over two years were required.

For most of the workers, men and women, Egyptians or Ghanaians, the first work was precarious or irregular, with the men working mainly in tourist services (Egyptians), the construction industry (both groups) and in agriculture (Ghanaians); the women – as well known – almost all work in domestic service.

The picture deriving from the analysis of the initial impact with the labour market of the country of destination thus seems to confirm the existence of a recent immigration based on attempts, but, as we have seen, it is based on a series of previous information and contacts which seem to be able to prevent this attempt and the entire migration plan from failing. However, we should verify how many returns due to ‘failure’ have occurred compared to the ‘successes’ that surveys can detect because the migrants have been able to stay in the host country. There should be an additional analysis on the degree of satisfaction on expectations among the immigrants, both in terms of

⁹ The case of the few Egyptian women interviewed, half of whom said they had no work experience in Italy, is almost certainly due to cultural factors and the role of women in the family and in Arab societies. It should be observed that three quarters of the Egyptians who work do so as permanent employees or even owners of enterprises.

income and of actual working conditions, and more in general with regard to their insertion in the host society.

Nevertheless, when migration is not seasonal or in any case very short, this employment uncertainty also provides the immigrant with considerable occupational mobility, which often is also spatial mobility. Periods of unemployment¹⁰ alternate with periods of activity, sometimes in different industries and locations according to the seasons and types of opportunities emerging.

We should therefore wonder whether this occupational path of the immigrants involves some form of their progress, at least in terms of job security. In a comparison by length of stay (Figure 2), there is clearly a net reduction of unemployment and an advance towards a more regular employment or, especially for the Egyptians, self-employment.

A more correct comparison between the initial employment status and those at the time of the interview (Table 10) shows that they mainly stay at the same occupational level, in particular for the women and the Ghanaian men.

Over 40 per cent of the Egyptians have, however, achieved an improvement of their employment status, while among the Ghanaians, less than a third of the men, and less than a quarter of the women have managed to do so.

We therefore see two or three different models of migration for work purposes on the basis of the work experience of these ethnic groups. The first one, the Egyptian males, seems to describe the phases of a long-term migration plan or in any case aimed at successful insertion in the host country's labour market.

On the other hand, the experience of the Ghanaians, men and women, seems to involve (perhaps necessarily due to the characteristics of the migrants) temporary solutions with a generally constant professional profile.

¹⁰ The men we interviewed, both Egyptians and Ghanaians, reported an average of about ten cumulative months of unemployment in Italy.

Figure 2. Duration of stay in Italy and job position of the two groups of male immigrants interviewed in the NIDI-Eurostat Survey.




Table 10. Comparison between the employment status and position of the interviewees between the first experience in Italy and the situation at the time of the interview by country and sex. (Percentages on total respondents).						
Working status	Men from Egypt		Men from Ghana		Women from Ghana	
	first	current	first	current	first	current
Employer, owner	3	9	2	3	2	2
Permanent dependent w.	34	57	39	57	48	63
Temporary dependent w.	12	7	11	5	9	3
Occasional/irregular w.	46	13	45	17	39	18
Out of work	5	14	3	18	2	14
Total (absolute value)	475	476	526	523	124	119
Persistence index ^(a)		54		61		73
Improvement index ^(b)		43		34		24

^(a) Percentage of those who currently have the same employment status and initial job position.
^(b) Percentage of those who have risen in the career progress.
Source: NIDI-Eurostat survey.


Finally, the Egyptian women, and some of the Ghanaian women, have clearly immigrated with their men. This does not prevent some of them from entering the labour market subsequently, probably for reasons of survival and increasing the family income, but in any case in net contrast with those traditions that prevented women from working outside the home.

5.3. An overall view of the migration and employment path

This contrast between migration models seems clearer and more justified when considering the overall relationships between some of the characteristics of the migrants (age and educational qualifications) and their comparisons of income conditions at home with the employment path before leaving up to the time of the interview (Figure 3)¹¹.

¹¹ The method adopted here is called 'path analysis' and consists of a logically arranged series of linear multiple correlations in which the subsequent dependent variables also depend on the previous ones, according to a sequential theoretical model. The variables used here are the ones remaining by significance from a larger set of survey variables, quantitative or subject to ordering, that we tested before modelling.

Figure 3. Determinants in the job-path of the immigrants in Italy coming from Egypt (men) or Ghana (men/women).



N.B.: The arrows' thickness is roughly proportional to the force of the relation.

There is clearly a continuous sequence connecting all phases of the migration and work process of the Egyptian men, for whom first of all age, and then educational qualifications have a positive impact on a continuous process starting from the employment status before departure up to the last one. This is not the case for the Ghanaians, men and women, who experience a break with their working past upon entry in our labour market. However, in their case, too, the closest relationships apply in their occupational sequence in Italy, showing that there is a major conditioning by ethnic groups on the job-insertion processes and often on the type of job.

6. A few concluding questions

The situation of recent migration for work purposes thus appears to be different from the past, above all because of the different economic pattern, actors and the conditions involved. Instead of the apparent certainty of jobs in mines, factories or construction sites, there is now the more widespread uncertainty of the jobs in the vast and varied sector of services. Personal initiative and the capacity to take advantage of the various opportunities that may arise prove to be more successful and often more remunerative compared to a migration plan aimed at a specific job. In any case, work experience abroad is in itself a learning process, at the very least due to the impact it implies with a modern labour market.

The first question arises from the considerable occupational mobility of recent immigrants, especially in our new migration-receiving countries.

Will it ever be possible to plan the number and type of immigrant flows on the basis of the needs of our labour markets¹²?

Which authorities or organisations will be able to quantify the demand for foreign workers, a factor which is so large in the number involved and so variable according to time and location? Up to what point can that demand be satisfied by those who are already

¹² Recently, the Union of the Chambers of Commerce has conducted a fact-finding survey on Italian enterprises, recording a current annual requirement of about 200,000 immigrant workers [Zanfrini, 2001].

immigrants seeking a job or who work in precarious conditions or on an occasional basis?

A second problem arises from the frequent link between illegal status and precarious employment. In these situations, it is quite probable that there may be a relationship of mutual advantage between employers offering illegal work and immigrants, who thus find the conditions for survival and for staying in the country even without a valid labour permit. This relationship is of course to the greater advantage of the employers, whose power of blackmail over the workers is strong enough to impose the working and wage conditions. We should also wonder whether this mechanism produces only 'private interests' on both sides and whether it actually tend to unload all the negative consequences on society.

First among these 'public waste' factors is the frequent incongruity between the human capital (i.e. qualifications) of the migrants and roles they play in the host country's labour market. Even taking into account the differences of the educational systems and the lack of experience with work in advanced, complex production systems, we have to admit that this type of situation is a waste of resources for all the parties involved: for the immigrants, who are unable to exploit the skills they have; for their society of origin, which suffers a net loss in the investments made in education; for the host society, which could better use this human capital, whose real potential is often unknown [Pugliese, 2000].

We might then wonder whether there are excessive resources compared to a limited demand. This may apply from the quantity point of view, if we consider the manpower demand of our markets, thus far limited compared to the enormous mass of potential migrants from third world countries, and from the quality point of view, because of the possible gap between the human capital made available by migration and its actual use in the production systems of the receiving countries.

Finally, there may be some doubt as to the real training impact and the possibility of transferring home the migration and work experience acquired abroad, especially when the two situations (the home and host countries) still have excessive differences in their economic and production systems.

Despite all these problems and some evident inefficiency

connected with the transfer of people rather than capital, we should expect to see in the near future an increasing migration for work purposes. This is due to surplus working-age population in the third world countries, but also to the quality as well as quantity imbalances of our labour markets.

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